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knowledge of the elements that they work with. The Program has also 
adopted a radionuclide recovery and reuse program that has provided 
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1. CHAPTER 1 
RECOVERY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS FOR REUSE 
RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
1.0 Radionuclides Used in the UNLV Radiochemistry Program 
 The radiochemistry program at the University of Nevada Las Vegas 
(UNLV) is a comprehensive, research intensive program that is 
collaboration between the Departments of Health Physics and Chemistry. 
The research within the program focuses on the radioelements, primarily 
the actinides and technetium (Table 1-1). The isotope 99Tc, with a half-
life of 2.13x105 years and beta emission energy (Emax) of 293.7 keV is 
used in a range of studies. Isotopes of thorium, uranium, neptunium, 
plutonium, americium, and curium have been examined in solutions and 
solid phases. These research efforts span from basic studies to applied 
experiments. All this research effort necessitates the usage of 
radionuclides. Obtaining these radionuclides, and using them in a safe 
manner, is central to the success and capabilities of the program. 
 This combination of work with actinides and 99Tc and the provision 
of safety make for a unique learning atmosphere within the PhD 
radiochemistry program. This combination also provides an opportunity 
to develop, evaluate, and document issues associated with radionuclide 
usage in an educational setting. The recycling of radionuclides from in 
house experiments or outside sources provides a means to preserve a 
relatively rare resource. Additionally, the ability of students to work with 
these radioelements necessitates the development of a unique radiation 
 2 
 
safety program. These novel attributes of the UNLV Radiochemistry 
program are explored and used as a basis for developing a means of 
radionuclide reuse and documenting the necessary radiation safety for 
their use in experiments. This combination of radionuclide usage and 
applied health physics is exceptional and provides the basis for the 
unique contribution contained within this document.  
 Obtaining and using radioactive materials are cost-driven 
activities. Often it is difficult to obtain suitable concentrations of 
radioelements. Initially their purchase may be high, if obtainable, and 
the analysis of their properties may become expensive. Reuse of 
experimental residue by recovering the radionuclide to an identifiable 
chemical form provides a route to reduce costs and supply a scarce 
resource. A component of this project focuses on the recycling and reuse 
of radioactive materials. This reduces procurement and disposal costs, 
and minimizes the generation of hazardous waste products that contain 
radioactive materials. 
 Another unique aspect of this work was development of the 
radiation safety program for measurable masses of radionuclides in an 
academic setting. The vision was a defined program that allowed 
research use of technetium and actinide isotopes in experiments. These 
experiments require quantities that have contamination control and 
serious exposure implications. The program development was facilitated 
by unprecedented changes to the radioactive materials license, 
procurement of control equipment, and training. Use of long lived 
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radionuclides by many faculty members, post-doctoral candidates, 
visiting scientists and students in many laboratories on campus has 
changed UNLV’s image in the research community. The radiation safety 
described in this work is a central component to the noted and 
acknowledged radiochemistry capabilities at UNLV. 
Table 1-1. Common Radionuclides used in Radiochemistry at UNLV 




99Tc 2.13x105 a 6.27x108 Bq/g 2.59x107 Bq 
232Th 1.41x1010 a 4.04x103 Bq/g 3.7x101 Bq 
233U 1.62x105 a 3.5x108 Bq/g 1.48x103 Bq  
235U 7.1x108 a 7.9x104 Bq/g 1.48x103 Bq  
238U 4.46x109 a 1.25x104 Bq/g 1.48x103 Bq  
237Np 2.14x106 a 2.61x107 Bq/g 1.48x102 Bq  
239Pu 2.44x104 a 2.27x109 Bq/g 2.22x102 Bq  
241Am 4.29x102 a 1.28x1011 Bq/g 2.22x102 Bq  
243Am 7.94x103 a 6.86x109 Bq/g 2.22x102 Bq  





1.1 Sources for Procurement of Radionuclides for Experiments 
 In the laboratory the option of using milligram to kilogram 
quantities of these radionuclides enhances the ability to observe the 
result of chemical reactions in both the solution and solid phase. 
Radionuclides that are used in experiments are usually obtained 
commercially from companies that purchase larger quantities and 
dispense them in solutions, solids, or plated on materials [1]. The source 
of those radionuclides is typically government laboratories, research or 
production reactors, or laboratories with the ability to produce 
radionuclides using an accelerator [2]. The availability of radionuclides is 
typically associated with the demand. If the demand is low, it may only 
be available at times when the need is demonstrated and the conditions 
are right for production. For the UNLV radiochemistry program, 
radionuclide needs are often independent of this demand. 
 For some radionuclides, costs and availability can hinder or 
prevent experiments. There is no standard for determination of the cost 
as prices vary widely between vendors. Exploring the availability and 
pricing options will provide an extensive array of both (Table 1-2). For 
less commonly used radionuclides, such as transuranic elements, 237Np, 
239Pu, 243Am, this expense can increase substantially. Two prime 
considerations in the cost of the material are the quality of both the 
compound and the quality of the radionuclide analysis. Activity that is 
traceable to a standardizing entity [3] such as the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) in the United States or Physikalisch-
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Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) in Europe has a large fee associated 
with support of the facility. The cost is typically associated with the need 
for calibration of specialty measurement equipment and specially trained 
personnel. The compound available for high activity, long lived 
radionuclides is typically a chemically stable molecule that may be 
suitable for the intended work. In many cases, chemical methods are 
applied to change the compound with the intention of making novel 
applications of radionuclides, or providing a platform from which to 
synthesize other compounds.  
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 In 2007, an in-house price comparison was done to determine the 
cost and availability of 244Cm for experimentation. Estimates were 
received from Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Ekert & Ziegler 
Laboratories. The cost of 0.5 mg, 1500 MBq, from the national laboratory 
was $5682.00. The cost of 1.2 g, 3.7 MBq, of this radionuclide from a 
commercial laboratory was $2300.00 for a nominal solution (±15%) and 
$2860.00 for a calibrated (±2.5%) solution [4]. While the purchase from 
the national laboratory is attractive from a quantity standpoint (400 
times as much for 2 times the price), consideration must be given to the 
quantity needed for the research and the quality of the product. As a 
result of this comparison, the decision was to purchase the calibrated 
solution from the commercial laboratory for the experiments. This 
solution was provided at a lower cost with a certified analysis. Another 
benefit of this purchase was a minimization of total activity, enhancing 
contamination control capabilities. 
1.2 Disposal of Radioactive Material 
In the United States disposal of radioactive material is a controlled 
process that provides a high degree of assurance that radioactive wastes 
will be transferred from a radioactive material licensee to a licensed 
radioactive waste disposal site. The foundation for the process of 
controlling waste is in Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations, Title 
10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Energy [5]. 
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 Each of the low level radioactive waste disposal sites in the United 
States have restrictions on the type of materials that are allowed [6]. For 
example, the US Ecology Richland Washington facility may not receive 
mixed waste. Mixed wastes are materials that generate toxic gases, 
vapors, or fumes, or pyrophoric, hazardous, dangerous, or explosive 
items. This exclusion of mixed waste is a necessary measure to protect 
the integrity of the site [7] [8]. The impact on the radiochemistry program 
is associated with the need to comply with regulation and prevent mixed 
waste production, as limited disposal is available.  
The costs of disposal at commercial sites may be associated with 
the volume, mass, activity, activity concentration, radionuclides present, 
and any hazardous chemicals that may require processing before the 
waste is accepted for burial [9]. The most recent price for disposal of dry 
low level radioactive waste generated at UNLV in 2009, has been 
approximately $1000.00 per 55 gallon (208 L) drum [10]. UNLV uses a 
‘waste broker’ [11] [12] to facilitate the removal of these wastes from the 
campus and their delivery to a licensed low level radioactive waste site. A 
waste broker is a commercial service that will collect and combine wastes 
from other facilities, minimize waste volume through compaction, and 
deliver the waste to a licensed disposal facility. Use of a broker is 
important to reduce waste costs, eliminate transportation costs and 
provide expert consultation regarding the site to be used for disposal.  
The waste collected for disposal in the radiochemistry laboratories 
is non-radioactive waste, non-radioactive hazardous waste, or low level 
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radioactive waste. These wastes may be either solid or liquid. There are 
currently four listed wastes, F-list (from non-specific sources), K-list 
(from specific sources), P-list (acutely hazardous discarded commercial 
chemical products), and U-list (discarded commercial chemical products) 
[13]. Listed and characteristic hazardous waste require controlled 
disposal. Treatments such as neutralization or solidification [14] may be 
necessary to allow their proper burial. This is of course also true of the 
disposal practices for radioactive wastes that have a hazardous 
component in order to prevent damage to the waste site from the 
hazardous waste.  
Disposal costs for mixed waste are associated with the removal or 
neutralization of the hazardous component. If processes are not available 
to separate these materials, the waste may be solidified or encapsulated 
to allow disposal. Since each of these processes requires special facilities, 
resources, and trained personnel, the costs of disposal are high for mixed 
waste compared to solely radioactive waste. An exact price for disposal of 
mixed wastes requires a detailed analysis of the radioactive and 
hazardous components of the waste by a certified laboratory and an 
evaluation of the processing and disposal costs of the resulting 
components by the commercial disposal facility. It is therefore prudent to 
prevent the generation of mixed waste and if it cannot be prevented, its 
volume and hazardous nature must be minimized to allow removal of the 
hazard or removal of the radionuclide. 
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1.3 Use of Radioactive Materials in Experiments 
Radioactive materials are used in research to identify the behavior 
of radionuclides in chemistry [15], identify properties for commercial 
exploitation [16], evaluate their transport in the human body and the 
environment [17] [18], and determine safe means for their disposal [19]. 
Together with the Authorized Radioactive Material User, the researcher 
decides to use radioactive materials available in storage or from a 
commercial vendor. The decision will provide two benefits if recycled 
material is available, the material can be dispensed to the researcher 
within a short time and the material has no financial drain on the 
research funds. If the decision is made to purchase radioactive materials, 
there may be a waiting period while the radio-chemicals are prepared, 
usually up to 6 weeks. Additionally there is a cost and time component 
associated with commercial radionuclide procurement. The sequence of 
obtaining and using radioactive materials in the radiochemistry 
laboratories at UNLV is explained in Figure 1-1. 
The User has the overall responsibility for the radioactive material 
in their laboratories. The User assigns a laboratory and equipment for 
the trained researcher to work. A protocol is devised that provides 
technique, equipment, safety, storage and waste considerations 
associated with the radionuclide(s) and experiment [20]. Use of the 
material is documented in a tracking log [21], and the experiment 
proceeds. While the experiment is in progress, the researcher is 
responsible to document disposal and the content of residues that may 
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be useful for recovery. Upon completion of the experiment a recovery 
analysis may be useful to identify whether recovery of the radionuclides 
from any residue is beneficial. The availability of these records provides a 








1.4 Residue Recycling 
Recycling of materials from experiment residue eliminates the 
concerns for mixed waste generation and provides radionuclides for use 
in future experiments [22]. Radionuclides used in experiments can be 
expensive; reuse reduces costs associated with replacement and waste 
disposal. In Chapter 3, an evaluation method to determine the feasibility 
of reuse of materials residues generated from laboratory experiments will 
be discussed. If the residues can be broken down and converted to an 
identified chemical form with a reasonable procedure, then recovery 
should be the desired option. Furthermore, the concept of recycling 
residues to obtain valuable radionuclides can be expanded to industrial 
application (see Chapter 4). As the Radiochemistry Program grows and 
expands its use of radionuclides, it is even more desirable to recover 
material upon completion of their experiments due to increased scarcity 
of even common uranium compounds. Since the researchers are the 
most familiar with their experiments, they would be the best suited to 
propose the appropriate techniques for recovery and provide a 
description of the final residue. 
 The products of experiments in radiochemistry laboratories are 
typically a prepared, well-defined compound plus liquid and solid wastes. 
The intended product has a known structure and has been characterized 
by analysis from a host of techniques. The low level solid radioactive 
waste products, primarily laboratory gloves and other consumables are 
disposed in the laboratories. The liquid residues contain products of the 
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experiments that have hazardous and radioactive components (See 
Chapter 3). These residues often contain reaction byproducts of 
radionuclides in both liquid and solid forms. Recovery of the 
radionuclides to an identified chemical form represents a means to reuse 
these isotopes in experiments. 
 The decision to recover radioactive materials from experimental 
products should be based on the value of the radionuclides and ease of 
separation. Labeling residues based on their expected chemistry provides 
a starting point for recovery. In planning any recovery, the researcher 
who produced the material should be consulted. Since recovery often 
deals with the seldom investigated part of an experiment, the desirability 
of recovery is not always an easy decision to make. In order to recover 
radioactive materials from liquid or solid residues of radiochemistry 
experiments, there must be a series of evaluations to answer the 
questions that follow: 
 Is the radionuclide worthwhile to recover? 
 Is the recovery cost efficient? 
 Does the material present a hazard? 
In many cases, the decision to recover the material can be made with a 
simple evaluation regarding radionuclide quantity. For example, if the 
total radionuclide stock is large (kg) compared to the amount in the 
experimental product (mg or g), then recovery may not be desirable. A 
more difficult decision will be required when there is valuable material to 
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recover but separation will be difficult. In this case leveraging established 
laboratory procedures can facilitate recovery. 
 Figure 1-2 provides some important considerations in determining 
recycling feasibility. Costs of recovery are radionuclide and residue 
specific. Consider the following example for recovery of 239Pu from a 
residue. An experiment has created a product that can be broken down 
with minimal effort and the cost for materials and labor is less than 
$500.00. The radioactive compound used in creation of the product cost 
$8,000.00. The cost for disposal of the product, a mixed waste, is 
$2000.00. Considering a 90% recovery, the value of the material 
recovered is $7,200.00. In this example, the financial decision may be 
either the primary or sole consideration. Therefore, the gains (avoided 
cost of disposal and value of material recovered = $2000.00 + $7200.00) 
compared to losses (cost of recovery = $500.00) would indicate that 
recovery is a reasonable decision. If the solution that was created is not 
well documented then the decision to recover may not be justifiable. 
Once the administrative evaluation is complete and the residue is 
determined to be valuable, the ability to define a recovery method is then 
made. The recovery effort should put the radionuclides in a condition 






Figure 1-2. Recovery Flowchart for Radioactive Material Used in Research 
 Products that have been recovered must have an identified 
chemical form of known purity to be usable in further experiments. 
Ideally the level of purity should be similar to commercially available 
material. The material can be characterized with a range of techniques 
designed to identify chemical concentrations. Within the UNLV program 
these include atomic emission spectroscopy, mass spectroscopy, UV-
Visible spectroscopy, and radiochemical methods [23] [24]. If the 
experiments will simply involve use of the activity of the radionuclide and 
the chemical compound is not important, then characterization may only 
involve simple activity determination. When the product of recovery is 
available for reuse, the properties of the material must be made 
available. These properties include chemical form, isotopes, and any 
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impurities. If the final form is a solution then the matrix composition and 
radionuclide concentration needs to be reported. 
1.5 Recovery Methods 
 There are a number of simple techniques that can be used to 
separate radionuclides from a mixture of chemicals. These include 
filtration [25], precipitation [26], evaporation [27], ion exchange [28], and 
extraction [29]. This section will describe some methods that might be 
used for recovery of a material of interest. In order to use one of these 
processes, it is important that the mixture conform to the needs of the 
method. This may require a pretreatment such as precipitation or 
solution neutralization. For example, solutions that are known to be 
destructive to filters may require pH neutralization as a pre-treatment. 
The recovery method is intended to remove what has been determined to 
be a valuable quantity of radioactive material based on analysis of a 
sample aliquot or prior knowledge of the solution. 
 An example of evaporation as a removal method is described. The 
rotary evaporator provides a means to enclose the evaporation process to 
reduce emissions and losses. With evaporation, it is usually the intent to 
remove a volatile liquid that is the solvent matrix for the radionuclide. 
Where many solvents or liquids with a low flash point are combined, it 
may be reasonable to use multiple collection temperatures on a rotovap, 
Figure 1-3, to allow extraction of reasonably clean solvents. In order to 
use this method, the residue must have one or more volatile liquids and 
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the material of interest must be in a chemical form that is less volatile. If 
the above condition is met, the volatile liquid(s) will be evaporated from 
the remainder of the solution using a rotary evaporator or similar device. 
 
Figure 1-3 Typical Rotovap Evaporation Apparatus 
 In cases where the residue matrix is well known, the final 
evaporative state may be a suitable final product. As an example, for a 
radionuclide in an acid, the resulting radioelement salt can be a suitable 
final product. For an organic residue, the final product may require 
further treatment. As an example, technetium in a hydrocarbon organic 
residue can be treated by steam reforming to produce the metal [30]. An 
important consideration for some materials is their volatility in different 
compounds; enclosed apparatus such as the rotovap will help to prevent 
loss. Many other techniques for removal of radionuclides from solutions, 
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this is the subject of many chemistry courses too extensive to add to this 
document. The separation techniques to be used should be researched 
so that the most appropriate technique for recovery of the materials of 
concern is used. 
1.6 Donated Material 
 Many organizations have donated radionuclides to the UNLV 
Radiochemistry Program in the past several years (Table 1-3). Materials 
obtained were planned for disposal by other radioactive material 
licensees but were instead transferred to UNLV. These donations have 
resulted in procurement of many materials useful to the university for 
very low cost. The methods to receive, license and control these materials 
are inherent in the UNLV Radiation Safety Program. The savings by the 
donating licensee was sufficient incentive for a donation. Confirmation of 
the chemical and radiological purity of the donated samples is necessary 
prior to finalization of the transaction. The material received in donations 
has been adequate for reuse. A list of some of the materials in a typical 
donation received is shown in Table 1-4. The items received were labeled 
and assigned a number from the radiochemistry stock tracking system. 
As the materials were received, the quantity and inventory was controlled 
by continuous communication with the UNLV Radiation Safety Office. 
Over the years 2006 to 2010 the UNLV Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) 
understood that the UNLV Radiochemistry Program was not taking the 
‘waste’ products from other facilities; it was taking the facility’s excess 
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materials for reuse rather than having them dispose of useful 
radionuclides. 
 The suitability of a donation to provide benefit to the 
Radiochemistry program must be thoroughly evaluated to prevent receipt 
of materials that will require costly disposal or cause an unsafe situation. 
Considerations appropriate for a useful donation are; radionuclide(s), 
quantity, age and stability of the compound(s), and purity. The 
documented radionuclides and their activity must provide assurance that 
the material will be usable. The age should be considered so that there is 
confidence that there has not been ingrowth of radionuclides that provide 
an undesirable radiological hazard; the stability of the compound should 
be such that it remains usable, and the purity should be adequate to 
provide for reuse. Some complications that interfere with the ability to 
know the purity are related to the radio-sensitivity of the compound. If 
there is sufficient activity in the compound, there should be 
consideration given to radiolytic degradation. 
 Plutonium was received in the form of two NIST standards that had 
documentation indicating isotope composition. Each standard contained 
250 mg of solid plutonium sulfate. The value of this material to the 
program is very high as the costs of plutonium for experiments in 2007 
had been as much as $10,000 for 5 ml of liquid containing 1 mg of 239Pu. 
Many different uranium compounds were received such as oxide, acetate, 
formate, nitrate, oxalate, sulfate, and chloride, commonly as the 
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Table 1-4. A Transfer of Radioactive Compounds from the University of 



























































 Specific donations sought from other radioactive material licensees 
across the United States have helped to build a stockpile of uranium, 
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thorium, and plutonium sufficient to provide for research with these 
actinides for years into the future (Table 1-5). This clearly indicates that 
there were many facilities that took advantage of the offer for UNLV to 
utilize their excess. For small facilities, radiological control agencies, 
universities, and even high schools, it was advantageous for the UNLV 
Radiochemistry Program to provide this service. There were other 
facilities that had materials they wanted to donate; however, the inability 
to ship the material or the lack of a method to ship the material provided 
a barrier that could not be overcome. In other cases, some recognized a 
liability that their management considered unacceptable. While the 
majority of the donors were eager to provide the materials that were 
needed without stipulation, some of the more stringently regulated 
agencies were concerned with our ability to provide them with closure to 
their obligation for the subject materials.  
 Materials recovered that were typically planned for disposal by 
other radioactive material licensees may not have a purity that would be 
expected when purchased from a chemical manufacturer. It is prudent to 
inspect any donated radioactive compounds to verify that the purity is 
adequate for the intended experiment. Initially, this may be completed by 
obtaining and evaluating documentation of any work performed on the 
subject material by the original licensee. Table 1-5 lists the donations 
that have been received since donations were first received in 2006. 
Another risk taken when accepting a donation is the possibility that the 
material has already been used in experiments and what is received is 
 23 
 
actually a residue that may or may not be acceptable for further 
research. In this situation, the extra evaluative step to provide prevention 
from receiving a waste product can be important. 
Table 1-5. Summary of Radioactive Material Donations Received 
Donor Radionuclide Compound 
Mass 
(g) 
U Mass at Amherst 238U Uranyl Acetate 1138 
U Mass at Amherst 238U Uranyl Nitrate 503 
U Mass at Amherst 238U Mg-Na-Uranyl Acetate 229 
Brown University 238U Uranyl Acetate 305 
Brown University 238U Uranyl Oxalate 10 
Brown University 238U Mg-Uranyl Acetate 25 
Brown University 238U Uranyl Oxide 50 
Brown University 238U Uranyl Formate 5 
VA E. Colorado 238U Uranyl Acetate 265 
U Texas at Austin 238U Uranyl Nitrate 600 
U Texas at Austin 
238Pu, 239Pu, 240Pu, 
241Pu 
Plutonium Sulfate 0.5 
Cal State Fresno 238U Uranyl Acetate 900 
Cal State Fresno 238U Uranyl Nitrate 860 
Cal State Fresno 238U Uranyl Sulfate 160 
Cal State Fresno 238U Zn-Uranyl Acetate 50 
U Nevada Reno 238U Uranyl Acetate 1260 
U Nevada Reno 238U Uranium Oxide 2800 
U Nevada Reno 238U Uranyl Nitrate 50 
U Nevada Reno 232Th Thorium Nitrate 1350 
U Nevada Reno 232Th Thorium Chloride 100 
New York Med Col 238U Uranyl Nitrate 172.5 
Penn State U 238U Uranyl Nitrate 168 
Florida Dept. of 
Radiation Control 
238U Uranyl Nitrate 454 
Rensselaer 
Polytech Institute 
238U Uranyl Acetate 500 
Battle Mountain 
High School 
238U Uranyl Nitrate 50 
 After the receipt of donations of uranium compounds at UNLV, a 
company in Florida, International Bio-Analytical Industries, Inc. was 
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found to be accepting uranium compounds for reuse. This practice 
continues today [31]. While the reason for the recycling effort on the part 
of this company may or may not have been as a result of the success of 
the UNLV recovery, it was not in place before recycling uranyl 
compounds was found to be useful at UNLV. The donations that have 
been received were as a result of general inquiries regarding the 
materials that are considered surplus by radioactive material licensees. 
The current stockpile of radioactive materials is reasonable to keep 
uranium research projects well provided for until 2015. In seeking future 
donations, requests made should be more specific regarding nuclide and 
available quantities to avoid having material become waste because of 
non-use and to avoid having surplus material at the time of 
decommissioning of the program. 
1.7 Thesis Preview 
 In the following chapters novel aspects of material reuse and 
control inherent to a unique academic program utilizing high levels of 
radioelement will be described. Chapter 2 is concerned with development 
of radiation safety for a radiochemistry program. As the levels of activity 
used in the university program are unique, the radiation safety in the 
laboratory, training of personnel, surveys, monitoring, and management 
represent a novel contribution to academic research. Recycling Tc 
recovered from decontamination of a chemical fume hood is presented in 
Chapter 3. This effort used a commercial gel based radionuclide removal 
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agent. The investigation into the utilization of this material has 
implications for its application to nuclear forensics [32]. A unique 
application of the gel in the sampling and recovery of materials is shown 
to be feasible. The use of the gel in collection of samples from 
contaminated sites for health physics or nuclear forensics applications 
[33] can be an outcome of this initial research. Methods to break down 
the gel are discussed; other reactions are identified but not pursued. In 
Chapter 4 recovery of Tc from experiment waste products is discussed. 
This required working closely with researchers to identify methods that 
would not result in unexpected reactions and unsafe conditions. The 
resulting solutions are useful for moderate activity experiments and free 
of gross organic impurities. The techniques used, monitoring methods, 
development of rapid analysis of the waste for activity, and recovery 
yields are discussed. In chapter 5, analysis of coal ash is completed to 
determine the feasibility of recovering natural uranium from the ash. 
This represents an application of the reuse and recovery concepts 
developed in the laboratory to an industrial setting. The results indicate 
the same concepts can be applied to residue reuse evaluation. 
 Chapter 6 provides recommendations for the future of the recovery 
and reuse of radioactive materials and radiation safety in the UNLV 
Radiochemistry Program. 
 Unique contributions are as follows:  
 The recovery of radioactive materials from hazardous waste in 
anticipation of reuse is a novel approach to resolution of two 
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problems associated with the UNLV Radiochemistry Program; 
disposal of mixed waste and availability of radionuclides for an 
academic radiochemistry program. 
 The use of a decontamination gel created by a commercial firm as 
a means for recovering spilled radionuclides or sampling high 
activity dispersions of radioactive materials is a new use of this 
material. 
 Implementation of a plan for upcoming radiochemistry experiments 
by each researcher was a precursor to the vision of a complete 
laboratory experiment tracking system. 
 Development of a radiation safety program for use of measurable 
masses of radionuclides provided an opportunity for development 
of a program for novel radiochemistry research in an academic 
setting. 
 The last section of each chapter is provided with an 
implementation document. This could be converted to a publishable 
paper or note in a professional journal. This is provided to accentuate 





2. CHAPTER 2 
RADIATION SAFETY FOR A RADIOCHEMISTRY PROGRAM 
2.0 Introduction – Design Considerations for Radiochemistry 
 Radiation safety for the UNLV Radiochemistry Program [34] was 
developed with the key features used by any academic facility using 
licensed radioactive materials in the United States and innovative 
methods to maintain control. Academic programs in the United States 
are designed with the basic requirements prescribed by regulatory 
authorities [35] [36] [37]. Prior to the existence of radiochemistry as a 
degree at UNLV, the license and radiation safety program supported low 
activity use of short lived radionuclides for biology experiments and long 
lived radionuclides in low activity solutions, powders, and sealed or 
encapsulated sources for instrument calibration or environmental 
analysis. The requirements of the new license would require a 
combination of the regulatory guidance for academic programs, use of 
special nuclear materials, a license of broad scope, and a service provider 
license. Table 2-1 provides a review of controls before and after 
establishment of the Radiochemistry Program. 
 The radionuclides and associated activity limits applied for were 
devised by the Authorized User, the Director of the UNLV Radiochemistry 
Program. The controls established for these radionuclides were described 





 The development of the radiation safety aspects of the program 
were completed as needed to support research goals for radiochemistry 
and meet all appropriate regulatory guidance. There are many unique 
aspects of this type of program compared to other radiation safety 
programs [38] for research in the United States [39]. This chapter will 
discuss some of those differences, the details of work control and the 
successes and failures observed since the program started using 
radioactive material. 
 The fundamental needs of a radiation safety program must 
consider the goals of licensed entity. The goal of the UNLV 
Radiochemistry Program is to prepare students for a career at facilities 
where large quantities of radioactive material may undergo processes 
that could create a hazardous work environment. The preparation for 
such a career requires that the student understand the controls required 
for protecting themselves and others around them while they do their 
work. Students work with low and moderate activity radioactive material 
to develop contamination control skills while researching the properties 
of the materials that they create. Consider the regulatory agencies as 




Figure 2-1 Major Regulatory Agencies Involved with UNLV Licensing 
 Enhancement of the UNLV Radiation Safety Program to allow work 
with quantities of radioactive material with the potential to cause harm 
was done at a time when the public image of radiological and nuclear 
facilities was poor. By public opinion polling in 18 countries in 2005, the 
IAEA identified that 54% of those asked, were concerned that the risk of 
nuclear terrorist acts was high because of inadequate protection [40]. 
The case presented to the State of Nevada regulators to allow use of gram 
quantities of alpha emitting radionuclides in any form was strong; 
contamination control, dose control, and public protection were 
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addressed to resolve concerns. Before radioactive material use at UNLV 
changed to accommodate the Radiochemistry program, contamination 
control was a minimal aspect. It has now become the most important 
aspect. The following factors were considered for development of 
radiation safety for the UNLV Radiochemistry Program: 
• control of individual internal and external dose;  
• researcher awareness of radiological conditions and controls;  
• training to provide researchers with protection techniques; 
• management oversight of routine and non-routine experiments; 
• protection of members of the campus and the public; 
• control and security of radioactive materials;  
• appropriate support of area and personnel monitoring programs;  
• completeness and retrievability of records;  
• radiological control performance indicators;  
• special controls for unusual situations or work; 
• compliance with regulatory standards. 
 
 The preparation for high activity work required license and office 
operation changes in the UNLV Radiation Safety Office to recognize that this 
work would be done on campus and controls must be in place when it is. 
This would be a significant change from the control of short lived 
radionuclides used in nuclear medicine, or biology research and the use of 
x-ray machines for imaging with which the UNLV Radiation Safety Office 
was already familiar. 
 An amendment to the UNLV radioactive material license was 
submitted in 2004 that provided significant capability for a new program 
at a facility that had no demonstrated User experience with high activity 
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dispersible sources of actinides [41]. The license change allowed up to 
200 grams of the following radionuclides in any form: 237Np, 241Am, 
243Am, 244Cm, and 248Cm in addition to the previous limits in the license. 
The approval of this license amendment provided evidence that the State 
of Nevada had confidence that the UNLV program was capable of 
controlling the radionuclides listed in addition to the radionuclide 
inventory that was currently maintained on campus. Nevada is an NRC 
Agreement State with radiation protection regulations and license 
specifications in the Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) [42]. 
 The radiochemistry laboratories were initially only housed at 
UNLV’s Harry Reid Center for Environmental Studies (HRC). As the 
program grew, the laboratories expanded to UNLV’s Bigelow Health 
Science (BHS) building and the Science and Engineering Building (SEB). 
Original facilities for chemistry laboratories were adequate for 
radiochemistry program operations. 
2.1 Radiation Laboratory Design Hypothesis 
 Through proper laboratory design, several aspects of the 
radiochemistry program are enhanced. 
 personnel access control; 
 isolation of work with different radionuclides; 
 isolation of low activity and high activity work; 
 multiple levels of contamination control; 
 location of instrumentation outside of contaminated areas; 
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 low background areas for radionuclide analysis. 
 Laboratories where radioactive materials are used have desired 
features to allow personnel to control radioactive materials and protect 
themselves from hazardous materials. In order to ensure personnel who 
enter the laboratories are prepared for work with hazardous materials, 
they must be trained to understand methods of control and be provided 
with security access. Changes were required in laboratories to prevent 
access to radioactive materials by untrained personnel and to provide 
radiation detection equipment for contamination control. The most 
substantial change was to the laboratory layout and the security controls 
for each laboratory. 
 
2.1.1 Challenges in Laboratory Use and Design 
 Two groups inhabited the laboratory areas, one worked with low 
activity (Bq) of 99Tc, 237Np and 129I; the other worked with gram 
quantities (MBq to GBq) of 99Tc and MBq of actinides. Both groups 
ingressed and egressed their laboratories in the same hallway. 
 Contamination controls were not of interest to the low activity 
group because their activity was always in solution and their 
solutions did not cause contamination control concerns. 
 Equipment for contamination control did not provide adequate 




 The laboratories had many exit points and access and egress from 
the laboratories did not require security in some cases. 
 Equipment was moved from areas of high activity use to areas of 
low or no activity use without concern for contamination control. 
 Fume hoods designed for work with radioactive materials were 
insufficient in number to allow for the number of projects with 
radioactive materials. 
 Many fume hoods in the program laboratories did not have High 
Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtration of exhaust air, 
minimizing the number of simultaneous experiments. 
 Security of radioactive materials in the laboratories was 
continuously in question because doors to laboratories were left 
propped open or unlocked to facilitate ease of access. 
 Security of radioactive materials was minimal and was controlled 
by a single user. 
 Chemicals were commonly stored in many locations without regard 
to potential incompatibility hazards. 
 There was no organized accountability of personnel access to the 
laboratories. 
 There was no organization of personal protective supplies. 
2.1.2 Actions Taken to Improve Facility Use and Design 
 The issue of one group using activity of a radionuclide used in 
quantities 1x106 to 1x109 times higher than the group across the hall 
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was resolved by ensuring that these groups did not have access to each 
other’s laboratories. A proximity card access system was implemented 
and personnel were informed of their access limitations and the reasons 
for them. This type of restriction will only have the desired effect for a 
limited time. The low activity group left UNLV and the issue was resolved. 
 Contamination controls were required to be implemented at the 
work site in accordance with the UNLV Radiation Safety Program. To 
implement this, all laboratories were required to purchase contamination 
control instrumentation and conduct surveys of work areas. In addition, 
all personnel have been instructed in how to take smear surveys and 
how to analyze smears. It is emphasized in training that the primary 
contamination control measures must be taken at the work area. 
 Contamination control equipment was provided at the exit from the 
laboratories to ensure that the hands and feet of workers were 
sufficiently free of activity to allow release from the area. A revision to 
this that further enhanced control was a donation from the USEPA of a 
personnel contamination monitor (PCM-1B). The PCM is not designed to 
be a primary instrument for release of personnel from the laboratories. It 
is the final action that is taken to ensure that the primary contamination 
control actions were effective. When a researcher leaves one of the 
laboratories, it is necessary that they are radiologically clean and the 
work area that they just left is not contaminated. In this way, the PCM 
will not get contaminated and will provide the level of comfort for the 
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Authorized Users and the radiation safety officer that it was designed to 
provide. 
 As more research with higher activity was conducted, the layout of 
the laboratory bay was changed to provide for one entry point, one 
controlled exit point, and several emergency exit points from the area 
that previously had been individual laboratories. Some individual 
laboratories had their own security and some did not. Figure 2-2 shows 
the combined layout which became the original laboratories of the UNLV 
Radiochemistry Program. Proximity card access was decided as the most 
desirable method of security. With keys, a door could be left unlocked, 
they also provide a physical vector for contamination transfer to a hand, 
pocket, or to another person. Marlock cards provide the security but 
have the same difficulty for contamination transfer in that they require 
handling.  Proximity cards can operate a lock without a person touching 
them and without touching a surface. 
 The new layout provided better security, a location for common 
entry and exit from the area, a contamination control point, a protective 
clothing storage location, a monitoring station, and an exit to another 
enclosed location in the building that could serve as a secondary control 
point should there be an event which caused either loss of control or a 
requirement for evacuation. Sufficient room and monitoring capability at 
the exit location provided for the ability to ensure adequate monitoring of 
equipment before it was moved out of the laboratory bay to other areas 
where contamination control was not necessary. 
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 The use of filtered ventilation on fume hood exhaust was rare in 
the laboratories, as that was only a feature on two the laboratories.  
Filtration of exhaust on laboratory fume hoods is provided to minimize 
release of activity from the hood that might result from vaporization of 
radioactive solutions or unexpected changes in the physical state of 
radioactive liquids or solids. The filtration is a safety measure not 
provided to routinely collect activity that is discharged but to minimize 
the probability of accidental release of radioactive material from the 
facility. As the number of experiments requiring controlled ventilation 
has increased, more chemical fume hoods were provided with high 
efficiency (HEPA) filters.  
 In 2010, the new UNLV RSO supervised testing of the HEPA filter 
systems in use to verify that they indeed met the specifications for HEPA 
filter systems. A form of testing using dispersed oil particulate (DOP) was 
used to evaluate the filtration capability of the system. In this testing a 
known concentration of the DOP is introduced to the exhaust flow 
upstream of the filter and the measured concentration downstream is 
compared with the introduced concentration to determine the filtration 
efficiency. All systems passed the testing. 
 The number of fume hoods with HEPA filtration systems on their 
exhaust was significantly increased with the installation of filters on five 
remaining unfiltered hoods in the older laboratories in June of 2012. Of 
the significant events that relate to the potential for discharge of 
radioactive materials to the campus, one event in MSM-165 had potential 
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for release of an actinide mixture to the campus through an unfiltered 
fume hood. In this incident, a researcher was heating and stirring a 
solution in a fume hood that did not have filtered exhaust. The liquid 
boiled away and activity entrained in the vapor was carried to the back of 
the hood where it attached to the cooler hood surfaces. Surveys of the 
spread of contamination in the hood did not reveal evidence that activity 
was released. This event once again caused a discussion of the use of 
radioactive materials in fume hoods that did not have filtered ventilation. 
It was decided at this time that all hoods would be labeled to prevent use 
for experiments where there was the possibility of release of radioactive 
material from the experiment. All researchers were made aware of the 
new labeling and the new policy regarding hood use at the weekly group 
meeting and through the distribution of Newsletter 29 in Appendix B. 
 The entry to the radiochemistry facility was provided with 
proximity card security [43] that enabled direct control of access to the 
laboratories and would allow exclusion of people who were not qualified 
or disqualification of person’s whose training had gone beyond a year 
without receiving requalification training. The experience of the initial 
development of the program indicates that a Radiochemistry Program in 
an academic setting needs to be independent from non-complementary 
research and security protocols need to be in place and understood by all 
researchers who enter the radiochemistry laboratories. 
 Because of the large quantities of radionuclides held for research 
by the radiochemistry program, and the way that radionuclides are used, 
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security of the areas where there is a contamination control concern is 
very important. UNLV is in the center of a city whose most important 
industry is tourism [44]. There must never be a fear developed in the 
local population that would cause people to have second thoughts of 
coming to Las Vegas because of poor security of radioactive materials. 
The only way to prevent this is to have tight security of all radiochemistry 
laboratories and important quantities of radioactive materials. It is not 
acceptable to lose sight of the fact that the Radiochemistry Program is 
not important to the local population and there must always be focus on 
the need for detailed documentation that proves the ability of personnel 
in the program to control radioactive materials. Security for control of 
radioactive materials has been good and has not changed since the use 
of a gun safe, for radioactive material storage, procured in 2006. 
 While security in the program is good, there must continue to be 
improvement in this area because it is imperative. In the past, events 
have occurred where someone was allowed to enter controlled 
laboratories without proper training and without an escort. Until 
everyone associated with security of any part of the program recognizes 
the need for control, the program will be at risk. The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission issued an order for increased controls for certain radioactive 
materials licensees in 2005 [45]. This order established controls for 
radioactive materials based on quantities that are much higher than the 
levels held by the Radiochemistry Program. At the current time the 
security of the laboratories is established as the responsibility of 
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everyone in the program. There are no requirements for increased 
security based on government regulations or UNLV procedures.  
 
 
Figure 2-2. Layout of the HRC Laboratories for Radiochemistry 
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 Chemical storage in the laboratories was a concern because the 
quantity of chemicals tracked by the Risk Management Group was close 
to limits for some chemicals and many containers of the same chemical 
were spread throughout the laboratories. A common storage location was 
decided on, storage cabinets procured and a labeling mechanism devised 
to allow easy access to the chemical desired. This system minimized time 
looking for the chemical in all areas of laboratories where dose rates were 
higher than the chemical storage area. This change was a boost to 
chemical control and to ensuring personnel dose was ALARA. 
 When first established, the access to the laboratories was based on 
the access granted by administration of the Harry Reid Center. Access 
was granted by need to enter and not on evaluation of the individual’s 
qualification to work in the laboratories with hazardous and radioactive 
materials. A change specified that all personnel would apply for access 
and criteria established for required training and permission from the 
Authorized User for the laboratories. Access requires a magnetic 
proximity card be programmed to allow access to the bay and to any 
rooms where the trained researcher required access. Control of access 
remains related to training and permission. 
 Redesign of the laboratory layout and control of the hallways 
allowed a reorganization of the protective clothing, dosimetry, eye-ware, 
and an employee ‘In/Out’ status board that are located at the entrance to 
the laboratories. This establishes a means whereby a researcher can 
store their personal belongings, collect all of their safety equipment and 
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ensure that they are ready to do their work before they enter a 
radioactive materials work area. The entry hallway must be maintained 
radiologically clean to allow for survey of equipment and personnel before 
leaving the area. This location also serves as a decontamination area 
should activity be identified in the release survey. 
2.2 Development of the Radiation Safety Culture Hypothesis 
 The most important aspect of any radiation safety program is a 
well-founded respect for radioactive materials and radiation producing 
devices. Training in the fundamental aspects of radionuclide properties 
and radiation protection principles is the beginning of establishing a 
safety culture. The Radiation Safety Officer provides for the control of 
radioactive materials and the radiation safety of the campus by 
authorizing personnel as Users with the responsibility to supervise the 
use of radioactive materials. Users must have respect for the 
requirements of the radioactive material license and work together to 
keep students, staff, and the public safe. 
 The safety culture at the Radiochemistry Laboratories is good 
within the program. As long as the Authorized Users communicate well 
with each other and with the UNLV Radiation Safety Officer, the 
programs that are set up will succeed and the research will be 
unaffected. Two important aspects of the program are attention to detail 
in contamination control and minimization of waste products that are 
both hazardous and radioactive. The first, contamination control, will 
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keep the program in operation by preventing the release of radioactive 
materials from the confines of the radiochemistry laboratories. The other 
feature, hazardous waste minimization, is the basis for the work 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation. Creation of mixed 
waste is costly and is unnecessary in a radiochemistry program. 
 It is essential that researchers in a Radiochemistry Program 
respect the authority of a Radiation Laboratory Administrator 
(Authorized User or Laboratory Staff) and the University Radiation Safety 
Officer and staff. In addition, other members of the organization need to 
recognize that it would be highly unproductive in the laboratories unless 
there was respect for radiological controls. Personal dose must be As Low 
As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) and the understanding of this concept 
can be achieved with continuous training through weekly group meetings 
that emphasize a need for dose and contamination control. 
2.2.1 Challenges in Safety Culture Development - Incidents 
 The safety culture in a program develops based on influences from 
management, senior researchers, professors, and associate researchers. 
Whether the program has positive influences depends on the 
observations that a researcher experiences when working with well-
respected researchers in a group. Constant positive influences of good 
work practices, contamination control, and license requirements are 
needed to keep everyone on the right track. The following items 
challenged the program’s method of compliance with license conditions. 
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 On 17 January, 2008, there was a minor spill of 99Tc in laboratory 
MSM-173. This spill caused low level contamination of a small area of 
the laboratory and the clothing of two researchers. The clothing was 
collected and disposed, the floor was cleaned and work resumed. The 
activity spilled caused no additional dose to the researchers but provided 
indication that contamination in the area was becoming a concern to the 
UNLV RSO. 
 On 18 January, 2008, another loss of control, this time associated 
with handling particles of plutonium from soil in laboratory MSM-165. 
The particles were found to travel from the work bench to the floor 
without recognition by the researchers until their post work survey. After 
the particles were found; the area was isolated, cleaned, and work was 
allowed to resume in a more controlled manner. It was again recognized 
that the event was not important from a dose standpoint but indicated 
an increasing trend of conditions adverse to good contamination control. 
 On 30 April 2008 a third event occurred in a different laboratory, 
this time involving a spread of 233U from an experiment in a fume hood in 
MSM-164. This event was also not important from a dose standpoint but 
was an important event regarding an undetected loss of contamination 
control. Although surveys were done by the researcher, they were not 
sufficiently extensive to recognize the contamination outside of the hood. 
The timeliness and detail of RSO surveys and laboratory staff surveys 
identified the contamination, the radionuclide, and the source of the 
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contamination within 48 hours, the area was isolated and the 
contamination cleaned up in the next 12 hours. 
2.2.2 Actions Taken In Response to Incidents 
 When there is an event that has caused a deviation from the 
normal conditions of radiological control, it is necessary that the event is 
evaluated with input from all of the people that were involved and the 
people with the authority to make changes based on the results of the 
evaluation. In many industries this evaluation is termed a root cause 
analysis, the idea to find the underlying event(s) that contributed to the 
occurrence. In each of the occurrences that contributed to changes in the 
control of radioactive material, a meeting was held with each of the 
participants, written statements were obtained by those involved and 
action taken was reported to the UNLV when it was decided on by the 
Authorized Users for the area. 
 A review of all of the events together provides the following set of 
similarities and differences: 
 each event was related to contamination control,  
 each event caused contamination spread on the floor, 
 there were different personnel involved in each event, 
 each event involved different radionuclides, 99Tc, 239Pu, 233U, 
 each event occurred in different laboratories, 
 everyone had different research goals, 
 one event was discovered immediately, 
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 one event was identified when the end of the day survey was done, 
 one event was not identified for two days after its occurrence, 
 in the 99Tc event the material was being moved in an open 
container, 
 in the 239Pu event, the material was being physically sorted on a 
bench-top, 
 in the 233U event, a solution was being bubbled with gas in a fume 
hood. 
 In any evaluation to determine the cause, once the facts about the 
event are collected, a set of questions is generated to identify the most 
reasonable actions to take for recovery from the event this is the 
analysis phase which allows the event to be seen from a larger 
viewpoint than the individual experiences of the participants. With 
sufficient information about what happened conclusions might be 
reached that establish the cause and contributing factors. From the 
analysis of possible causes a determination of actions to prevent 
recurrence of the event can be made. 
 The three events discussed in section 2.2.1, changed the course of 
the program. The changes included: 
 training regarding the details of these three occurrences, 
 requirements for more detailed contamination control surveys, 




 work with potential for contamination spread should be done in 
enclosures such as glove boxes or fume hoods, 
 procedures for research involving radioactive materials and 
requirements for contamination control need to be specified, and 
 closer evaluation of work areas where work with solutions, 
powders or particles was to be done. 
 As a result of the attention provided to these events in 
requirements for training, detailed contamination surveys, better 
material control, and plans for work involving high amounts of activity, 
the number of events that could be termed incidents was reduced. There 
were no events with similar magnitude as those identified here. 
 All researchers need a structured program for controls no matter 
how much experience they have or how comfortable they are working 
with radioactive materials. For example, contamination controls are 
established to prevent the spread of activity from work surfaces. Yet, in 
the first two years of the program, most researchers did not analyze 
smears of their work area as they were trained to do. Periodically a point 
was made at group meetings or training bulletins were issued, yet the 
spread of contamination continued until there were individual 
repercussions when it was found that surveys were not done. 
 It is best to determine a method for dose and contamination 
control that has minimal effect on a researcher’s work and maximum 
control for the effort that he or she would apply. If a researcher has to 
spend time associated with contamination control for survey or cleanup, 
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it is more likely if the time required for this action is minimized and 
demonstrated to be important. 
 Since the occurrence of these events, there have been other minor 
losses of contamination control, but they have been recognized by the 
more frequent and detailed surveys. Laboratory management also has 
increased the detail of their surveys and ensures immediate cleanup 
when contamination is found. Even with simple solutions, proper 
equipment, and continuous reminders, work could be done with 
radioactive materials in powder and liquid form without doing 
contamination control surveys. 
 In March 2010, the number of smears taken in the weekly surveys 
that were identified in excess of the contamination control limit 
continued to increase. This was again indicative that researchers were 
not complying with the requirement to survey their work area each time 
they used radioactive material. Although surveys were required, 
documentation of those surveys was not. At this time a change was made 
in the contamination control program to require documentation of all 
surveys done by researchers.  The surveys were easy to do and 
document, this provided more assurance that contamination was 
controlled at the worksite. The efforts since that time have focused on 
each individual working in the facility, what they are working with, and 
when they are present in the laboratory. This has increased the number 




2.3 Training the Participants Hypothesis 
 A safety culture is evolved in time through recognition that non-
compliance with radiation safety rules is detrimental to one’s research. 
The following statements are the hypothesis for this section:  
 There must be continuous identification of what the rules are so 
that everyone has a similar belief in what is needed. 
 Understanding the goals of the researchers will provide them with 
the information they need to be successful.  
2.3.1 Initial Development and Evolution of the Training Program 
 The initial training for radiation safety in the UNLV Radiochemistry 
Program was established as two hours of radiation fundamentals and 
regulation. In time, this training developed into a laboratory 
familiarization and general laboratory safety training. Continuing 
training was first established with the general distribution of a radiation 
safety newsletter that provided a simple coverage of several topics to 
enable a basis for compliance with laboratory rules. 
 Early in the development of a program for radiation safety in 
radiochemistry, the characteristics of the radionuclides used will lead to 
conclusions about the balance for internal and external radiation 
protection. In this program, the radionuclides used require more focus 
on protection from intake of radionuclides as external dose rates are 
typically low throughout the laboratories. Contamination control was the 
primary concern at the start of the program and continues to be the most 
significant concern for radiation protection. 
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 With initial training for radiation safety and annual refresher 
training providing the fundamentals of radiation protection in two hours, 
there was no time provided for other aspects of radiation safety such as 
the fine points of contamination control, instrument use, radioactive 
waste collection, responsibilities, security, fume hoods, etc. It was 
decided to establish a method of expanding the periodic training to 
include those details. This also provided a way of establishing 
documented training in many aspects of radiation safety that cannot be 
covered due to time constraints. 
 In January of 2007 the first HRC Radiation Laboratory Newsletter 
was published and distributed to the program participants [46]. The first 
newsletter was entitled ‘Contamination Surveys’ and was written in a 
question and answer format. The introduction provided a reason for the 
newsletter. “Whenever you work with radioactive materials, there is the 
possibility that some of the radioactive material evaded your control 
mechanism and may be spread to other parts of your laboratory or even 
outside of the facility. While the contamination spread is not likely to be 
hazardous to anyone, it may be in excess of our license conditions. In 
order to prevent this type of situation from developing, we take 
measurements of our work areas with portable instruments or in some 
cases we take smears for laboratory analysis to identify the level of 
surface contamination (or absence of it) in our work areas.” 
 This newsletter then asked the question “When are surveys 
required?” The answer was provided as follows: “Contamination surveys 
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are desired in each laboratory where radioactive material is used, weekly, 
or immediately after unsealed radioactive materials are used in an area, 
whichever is more frequent. If you are using high-energy beta emitters, 
you should also evaluate your body and clothes for the presence of 
contamination after each procedure.”  
 That newsletter went on to identify what instruments to use for 
evaluation of surfaces when using different radionuclides, what a smear 
is and how to evaluate a surface for loose surface activity, how to know 
when a surface is contaminated, how to convert from instrument 
response to activity, how to survey your body, what to do if you identify 
contamination on the body, and how to prevent spills of radioactive 
material. The newsletter concept was demonstrated to be a good way to 
get a lot of information out to the continuously growing group in a 
reasonable amount of time while allowing the information to be digested 
on their time. Table 2-2 provides a list of the newsletter topics that were 
published from January of 2007 to December of 2010. The newsletters 
were brief and covered a single topic. The intent was to provide a 
constant reminder of the need for vigilance in the control of the 
radioactive materials that were the mainstay of the Radiochemistry 
Program. In June of 2007, a newsletter on contamination control was 
again published, aimed at assigning responsibility so that all researchers 
would know who they are responsible to when it came to: who must 
answer for a loss of contamination control. This newsletter also took a 
different approach with things to do to maintain control of 
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1. Delineate a work area in your laboratory. Ensure that the area is not subject to 
high personnel traffic that may cause items to be touched or knocked off of the 
laboratory bench. 
2. Wear protective clothing (gloves and laboratory coat) to prevent the spread of 
contamination. 
3. Complete surveys each time that you use radioactive materials to ensure that no 
material is spread to other parts of your laboratory. Surveys may be done by direct 
monitoring for some radionuclides but must be done using smears and liquid 
scintillation counting for others. 
4. Ensure that you monitor any items that are taken out of the contaminated area. 
Remember, anything in that area is suspected of being contaminated until proven 
not to be. 
5. There must be no food, drink or cosmetics stored or used in any laboratory 
where there exists a potential for intake of radioactive or hazardous materials. 
contamination. in your work area. Some of these items are provided in 
Figure 2-3. In some cases, the topic of the monthly newsletter was 
dictated based on the events that had occurred to put the control of the 
laboratories in jeopardy. For example, before the publication of HRC-9 
“Laboratory Access” in September of 2007, there were a number of times 
that people without training were found to be in the laboratories without 
an escort. Publication of the rules on that topic was a way to make it 
clear what was expected so that future events such as that did not recur.  
 
  
Figure 2-3. June 2007 Radiation Safety Newsletter Excerpt 
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Table 2-1. A Listing of Radiation Laboratory Newsletter Topics 
Number Date Published Newsletter Topic pp 
HRC-1 January, 2007 Contamination Control 4 
HRC-2 February, 2007 Dosimetry 3 
HRC-3 March, 2007 Training 2 
HRC-4 April, 2007 Radioactive Waste 4 
HRC-5 May, 2007 Security of Radioactive Materials 2 
HRC-6 June, 2007 Contamination Responsibility 2 
HRC-7 July, 2007 Transporting Radioactive Materials 2 
HRC-8 August, 2007 Using Radiation Detectors 4 
HRC-9 September, 2007 Laboratory Access 4 
HRC-10 October, 2007 Personnel Contamination 4 
HRC-11 November, 2007 Protective Clothing 2 
HRC-12 December, 2007 Fume Hoods 2 
HRC-13 January, 2008 Postings for Radiation Safety 3 
HRC-14 February, 2008 Radioactive Materials Regulations 4 
HRC-15 March, 2008 X-Ray Producing Devices 3 
HRC-16 April, 2008 Instrument Checks and Calibration 2 
HRC-17 May, 2008 Background Radiation 4 
HRC-18 June, 2008 Liquid Scintillation Counters 4 
HRC-19 July, 2008 Transportation of Rad. Material 5 
HRC-20 August, 2008 Emergency Equipment in Laboratory  4 
HRC-21 September, 2008 Access to the Radiochemistry Facility 3 
HRC-22 October, 2008 New Laboratories in HRC Completed 4 
HRC-23 November, 2008 Emergency Preparedness 3 
HRC-24 December, 2008 Instruments – Ludlum 3/44-9 5 
HRC-25 January, 2009 Instruments – Ludlum 2360/43-93 5 
HRC-26 March, 2009 Laboratory Inspections 3 
HRC-27 April, 2009 Radioactive Material Inventory 3 
HRC-28 May, 2009 Survey Documentation 4 
HRC-29 June, 2009 Radiochemistry Fume Hoods 7 
HRC-30 July, 2009 Risk and Radiation Exposure  3 
HRC-31 August, 2009 Labeling Radioactive Material 3 
HRC-32 September, 2009 Safety and in the HRC Laboratories 3 
HRC-33 October, 2009 X-Ray Machines 4 
HRC-34 November, 2009 Good Work Practices 5 
HRC-35 December, 2009 Wearing Dosimetry 2 
HRC-37 May, 2010 Authorized User Responsibility 8 
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 Over the years there were events that the whole group learned from 
even though only a few participated in the laboratory situation. Each 
occurrence was discussed at the weekly radiochemistry group meeting 
and in some cases presented to the group by the researcher in charge of 
the experiment. The events were primarily minor losses of contamination 
control and chemistry research with undesirable consequences. However, 
in each of the events, there was no measurable intake of radioactive 
material, there was no measurable dose to personnel, and there was no 
release of radioactive material from the radiochemistry laboratories. 
 Then there were the events that were the result of inattention to 
detail and lack of basic common sense. These events continue to occur, 
one such item is the disposal of food containers or food wrappers in the 
waste containers within the radiological control area. This one item has 
been continuously brought to the attention of everyone in the 
Radiochemistry Program for all of the years that there has been 
organized radiochemistry at UNLV and the only way to minimize its 
recurrence is continuous reminder. 
 Those who have poor safety practices and put the health and 
safety of other people in the laboratories with them at risk must have a 
life changing experience to enable them to recognize the need for 
changing their ways [47]. As humans, we change our behavior based on 
perception and availability of a desire to change to satisfy ourselves or 
others. For example, if someone recognizes that they did something that 
upset another deeply and caused them to express emotion, this may 
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cause a change in behavior. Over the years there were many times that 
evidence of deviation from good safety practice which occurred in the 
laboratories was brought to the attention of faculty, staff, and students 
in a radiochemistry group meeting, there was usually recognition that 
behavior must be changed. Restriction of access to the laboratories may 
be useful as a means to help a researcher recognize that change is 
needed for them to be able to complete their work. Another way of 
ensuring compliance may simply be related to the amount of activity that 
a researcher is allowed to work with. 
 In another example, consider a researcher who is using high 
activity of a radionuclide with a low Annual Limit on Intake in a 
laboratory where other people are using much less hazardous materials 
in quantities that are lower in health significance. If the researcher using 
the more hazardous material fails to conduct detailed surveys of their 
work area, he or she will put others working in that laboratory at risk for 
a potentially serious intake. That researcher might also cause a concern 
in the cohabitants of the laboratory that their research could be affected 
by a loss of control on the part of the high activity worker. 
 The discovery of poor controls is not easy, but once identified and 
reported to a researcher, the realization that their controls may have cost 
shut down of the laboratory and affected the ability for anyone working 
there to accomplish their experiments is a significant emotional 
experience that may enable them to recognize the need for more diligence 
in control of radioactive materials in their possession. There are also 
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times when an arrogance associated with someone’s feeling that their 
research is much more important than anyone else’s and that they will 
control their activity any way that they want. This type of attitude can be 
devastating to a radiochemistry program where all researchers must 
work together to accomplish their projects. The way to accomplish large 
projects is to get all personnel involved; the way to minimize non-
beneficial interaction is to ensure that all personnel know what it is. 
 Over the years there have been many changes in the management 
of the radiation safety program, the research facility, the Department of 
Chemistry, and the College of Sciences, but there have been no true 
changes to the Authorized Users in the radiochemistry program. This 
consistency in the program and the working relationship between the 
radiochemistry professors has been the force that has kept the program 
intact. Control of undesirable behavior in the laboratories is the 
responsibility of the faculty and staff. It must be recognized and dealt 
with quickly and forcefully. A solution should be presented to 
management that will resolve any situation that is detrimental to the 
work of researchers in the program and allow completion of the work of 
all researchers, even if they need to be separated. Researchers need a 
management member capable of resolving conflict, to prevent issues that 




2.4 Communication of Program Ideals Hypothesis 
 In training personnel to work with radiation and other hazards in 
the radiochemistry laboratories safely, there must be expression that 
security of the materials is essential, dose must be As Low as Reasonably 
Achievable (ALARA), and contamination control must prevent radioactive 
materials from becoming airborne and from leaving the confines of the 
laboratory. These are not goals of a radiochemistry program; they are 
essential aspects of the radiation safety program. These simple controls 
prevent violation of the conditions of the UNLV State of Nevada 
radioactive materials license so that radiochemistry research may 
continue at UNLV. 
 The goals of the program must be less lofty and present a 
quantifiable level below which is ALARA, above which is unacceptable 
and requires adverse interaction with a laboratory authority if exceeded. 
Original contamination control goals were to maintain contamination 
levels less than 10,000 dpm/100 cm2 for beta emitters and 100 
dpm/100 cm2 for alpha emitters in the continually contaminated areas of 
laboratories, and maintain contamination levels less than 1000 dpm/100 
cm2 for beta emitters and 20 dpm/100 cm2 for alpha emitters in all other 
areas of the laboratory. These later goals have since become the 
contamination control limits for the radiochemistry laboratories. There 
does not appear to be an allowance of contaminated areas at the current 
time, even when experiments are in progress. The rationale for these 
limits is associated with the desire to minimize the occurrence of 
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contamination in unrestricted areas. If higher levels of contamination 
were allowed to exist in work areas, then the frequency of observing 
activity outside of the work area would increase. This would also be the 
result of lowering the contamination control limit to allow for some 
increased margin of safety. The basis for these limits is the UNLV 
Radiation Safety Manual, the foundation for these particular values is an 
obsolete Nuclear Regulatory Commission document on decommissioning 
from June 1974, Regulatory Guide 1.86.  
 For airborne activity, a safety factor of 20 is applied to the Derived 
Air Concentration (DAC) value for the radionuclide being used. This 
ensures that airborne activity is below the requirements for use of 
respiratory protection and any potential exposure will be below the 1.25 
mSv per quarter year limit for areas where respiratory protection is not 
required. Ideally, airborne radioactive materials should never be present 
in the air space of researchers, but realistically this cannot be prevented. 
 For personnel, goals should minimize the probability that the 
annual dose will exceed 10% of the federal and state limits for total 
effective dose equivalent [48], less than 0.005 Sv per year. The fractions 
are the same fractions used by regulators to provide a limit for 
unmonitored workers or workers under the age of 18. The standard of 
care for control of dose in the Radiochemistry Program is the regulatory 
limit of 0.05 Sv/year. The goal is to establish a level of dose which fits 
with the excellence of the radiochemistry program. This level 
demonstrates that the control of higher amounts of activity is 
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accomplished in the program without harm to program participants. The 
essential elements of the program are easily communicated to members 
of the radiochemistry program and they are recognized as non-deviation 
requirements by the UNLV Radiation Safety Staff. 
 
2.4.1 Key Indicators and Tracking Performance 
 As the Radiochemistry Program has grown, incidents have been 
experienced that put the program in need of actions to minimize the 
occurrence of events adverse to radiation safety and ensure that control 
of the laboratories was not at risk. Three incidents in 2008, discussed in 
section 2.2, demonstrated that the program needed changes and 
researchers were not as good at control of radioactive material as was 
considered before the events occurred. 
 Each of these incidents was the result of inattention to detail 
associated with the work that was being done. None of these events was 
found to have caused a release of radioactive materials from the 
laboratories and there was no intake of radioactive materials by any of 
students, faculty or staff that occupied the laboratories where these 
events occurred. Since then, there have been several changes that have 
resulted in a much more closely guarded program and much better 
controls. Each event was an experience that changed the behavior of 
personnel in the program, the potential consequence was the loss of the 
Radiochemistry Program, the response to each experience was, 
laboratory closure, area cleanup, verification that there was recovery 
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from the event, documentation of the event, discussion of ways to 
prevent such an occurrence in the future and a change to the training 
program to include discussion of each loss of control. 
 Several measures of the status of a radiation protection program 
should be used to ensure that the program is performing in a manner to 
ensure conditions of the radioactive material license are satisfied. A 
reasonable example for a radiochemistry program is listed in Table 2-3. 
The focus for this program is contamination control, prevention of 
internal exposure, and waste minimization. 
Table 2-2. Proposed Performance Indicators for Radiation Safety Programs 
Key Indicator 
The number of skin contamination events. 
The number of personal clothing contamination events. 
The number of air samples that indicate an airborne concentration 
greater than the DAC value for the radionuclides used. 
The personnel dose equivalent in excess of 1 mSv in a badging period. 
More than 10 cubic feet of waste generated in a month. 
The number of spills that required greater than 1 hour to clean. 





 An increase in the number of events for each category must cause 
a re-evaluation of the control measures and not the key indicator. For 
example, if the number of skin contamination events in a month is five, 
and no events have ever been recorded, then there is an indication of 
poor contamination control. The action taken is resolution of the bad 
practice. Performance should show continuous improvement. If an 
indicator shows a trend toward less control, action should be taken to 
put the indicator back on the right path. 
 Each event caused a re-evaluation of control methods and the 
needed changes for the program to continue into the future. One change 
that has helped substantially by the contamination events was increased 
awareness of the need for assistance by the UNLV Radiation Safety 
Office. Immediately after the first important loss of contamination 
control, the RSO was asked to change the frequency of the surveys that 
they completed from quarterly to monthly. Surveys completed by the 
Laboratory Support Group were done weekly and the number of smears 
taken in high risk laboratories was increased. This increased surveillance 
would provide a more timely evaluation by the Radiation Safety Office 
and a more timely alert should something be missed by the research staff 
surveys. 
 In large radiological facilities with an abundance of manpower 
there is a tracking of key indicators to ensure that everyone is aware of 
situations that are adverse to a quality radiation safety program. The 
quality of any program should be a concern to the management of that 
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program and items that are preventable and may cause unnecessary 
harm (or dose) to participants are tracked so that preventative methods 
may be tested. Such indicators as identified in Table 2-3 should be 
tracked at these facilities. The UNLV radiochemistry program has done 
well without these types of encouragers because there has always been 
an influence from the faculty that unacceptable behavior will be strongly 
discouraged and the students in the program have always had a high 
level of maturity. As the program changes and other influences manifest 
themselves, the desire to implement such a program of tracking 
performance of the program may become important to improve the 
program and demonstrate regulatory compliance. 
2.5 Radioactive and Hazardous Waste in Radiochemistry 
 In the United States radioactive waste is considered an undesirable 
aspect of nuclear power and any industry where radioactive materials are 
used. Disposal of unneeded residue or contaminated equipment is 
required. Early in the history of radioactive waste generation there was 
not a concern for the volume of waste generated and waste sites were 
filled to capacity.  Poor management practices also caused inappropriate 
disposal of caustic materials and deterioration of waste containers at 
licensed disposal sites. Recovery from these practices led to increases in 
the cost of waste disposal and a need to reduce waste volume generated 
to reduce cost. 
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 Radiochemists make hazardous wastes that are radioactive. This is 
normally accepted as the nature of the program. These materials together 
are known as mixed waste when they are no longer a part of research. 
The new mantra for radiochemistry students and researchers should be: 
“If you create a hazardous radioactive product, you will return that 
product to a non-hazardous, reusable, radioactive product or radioactive 
waste.” There will be times when such an accomplishment is not 
attainable, but with encouragement of faculty and staff, this can be an 
advantageous philosophy. 
2.5.1 Challenges in the Creation of Mixed Waste 
 The last three chapters of this dissertation identify the most 
important control problem that lingers in the program today. Waste is 
the Achilles heel of nuclear power in the United States and it could be 
the demise of a radiochemistry program if allowed. If new compounds 
and new techniques for chemical synthesis and separations that enhance 
our world can be developed, participants in the program can remove the 
hazardous components of residues created in the laboratories. 
 Early in the program (2004-2006) there were issues of personnel 
throwing potentially radioactive and sometimes radioactive waste in the 
non-radioactive trash. This problem was mostly eliminated within the 
main radiochemistry population. However, this issue reappears with new 
people to the laboratories. A constant reinforcement of this rule prevents 
lapses of compliance. 
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 Since the start of the radiochemistry program, liquid waste has 
been created at a slow rate. The volume created is relatively small but the 
degree of associated hazard is high. Waste is put into plastic containers 
and stored in satellite accumulation areas. The labeling of the waste is 
not consistent and the originator of the waste and its chemical 
constituents are not identified. 
 One major issue in reuse of waste materials that have been 
recovered is the purity of the final product. Actions should be taken to 
purify the material of concern to a specific documented endpoint. The 
recovery should be complete when the radionuclide is in a final 
identifiable form. Chemical separation of the radioelements may be 
beneficial to enhance the desirability of reuse.  
 
2.5.2 Actions Needed to Control Mixed Waste 
 In order to facilitate reuse of recovered materials, it is 
recommended that a Recovered Material Registry documenting the 
process to be developed (Figure 2-4). The registry should contain; 
 Chemical components and concentrations 
 Mass 
 Radionuclide and mass or activity 
 Researcher who produced residue material 
 Experimental methods used to produce material (can 
reference publication(s), report(s), or theses). 
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 The usefulness of any recovered material will be based on the need 
and desire of researchers to modify the chemical compound containing 
the radionuclide. Other information should be provided for the 
radionuclide to allow an informed decision to be made. Indication of 


















UNLV Radiochemistry Program Recovered Material 
Stock Material Identification Number ____________  
Inventory Number _________ 
Date of recovery __________  
Material recovered by ________________________________ 
Volume of solution _________ ml Solution pH ______ 
Radionuclide(1):______ ; Mass (1)_______ g; Moles (1)_______;  
Activity(1)_____Bq 
Radionuclide(1):______ ; Mass (1)_______ g; Moles (1)_______;  
Activity(1)_____Bq 
Radionuclide(1):______ ; Mass (1)_______ g; Moles (1)_______;  
Activity(1)_____Bq 
Chemical compound(s):_________________________________________ 
Known Impurities: __________________________________________ 
Notes:_________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Figure 2-4. Recovered Material Documentation 
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2.6 Administrative Controls Hypothesis 
 User interactions, work planning, policies, transportation, surveys 
and monitoring, evaluation of the program and laboratory management 
are the main personnel functions that make the radiation safety program 
in the UNLV Radiochemistry Program functional. Administrative controls 
are the exercise of authority over radiation safety in the Program by 
control of resources or equipment, logistics, and personnel management. 
The design of the laboratories and equipment requires an administrative 
means of operation or it will not be safe. 
2.6.1 Program Control - Administration 
 The UNLV Radiochemistry Program is controlled by a broad scope 
type B radioactive materials license under the authority of a Radiation 
Safety Officer with support of a committee of volunteers known as the 
Radiation Safety Advisory Committee. The Committee meets quarterly to 
discuss items of concern to the Radiation Safety Officer and provide 
him/her with their guidance. This system has been in place for more 
than ten years and has worked well for the radiation safety program. 
However, even with support of the committee, the radiation safety staff 
has not kept up with the demands of the UNLV Radiochemistry Program. 
 In the past five years there has been a progression of Radiation 
Safety Officers responsible for the radiochemistry laboratories. Each has 
had a different idea about how radiochemistry work should be controlled. 
The most important aspects of control in the operation of these 
laboratories are to keep the radioactive material secure, minimize dose to 
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personnel, and recover and reuse radioactive materials. Each of the 
radiation safety personnel that came through the radiochemistry 
laboratories looked at the controls in a different way and provided some 
degree of enhancement of the radiological control program. Everybody 
looks at things different; the support provided by these individuals has 
improved the radiochemistry laboratories. 
 The Radiation Safety Office provides the license authority and an 
independent evaluation capability that cannot be a part of the 
radiochemistry program so that decisions can be made in favor of safety. 
The line of authority for the Radiation Safety Office is to the president of 
the University through a pathway that avoids any research conflict of 
interest. 
2.6.2 User Designation and Support 
 Authorized Radioactive Material Users are trained faculty members 
and staff members who are trusted by the Radiation Safety Officer and 
the Radiation Safety Advisory Committee to control the laboratories 
where radioactive materials are used and stored. They also control all 
work within those laboratories in accordance with the conditions of 
UNLV’s radioactive material license, State of Nevada regulations, and 
Federal Regulations regarding the use of radioactive material. A simple 
loss of communication between the Authorized Users in the 
radiochemistry program could cause work to be done without the 
knowledge of the User on duty and result in someone doing work in a 
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method that results in serious injury or death to a student or other 
faculty member. This would be devastating to the researcher’s family and 
friends, the User on duty, and every member of the radiochemistry 
program. 
 Authorized Users recognize that the authorization is a privilege 
granted to a trusted person who will protect the radioactive material 
license while doing their research. This same degree of trust is provided 
to the students and staff of an Authorized User who use radioactive 
materials in research under the authority of that person. The interaction 
of Users in a single laboratory is where this need is most easily 
recognized. Consider the following situation; a researcher working for one 
User takes an action that puts another researcher who works for another 
User at risk. A correction should be made to prevent the first researcher 
from causing risk to anyone else in the laboratory. A conflict may arise 
when the second User instructed his researcher to do it that way. 
 There must be an ultimate authority within the radiochemistry 
laboratory management that has the ability to correct this type of 
situation as it is discovered. The correction is always unpleasant for 
somebody, but the needs of the program must be fulfilled. Depending on 
the RSO to take corrective actions in this situation places control of the 
disagreement in a different management chain. This is undesirable. The 
RSO provides a needed service to the Radiochemistry Program and 
communication between the RSO and any person using radioactive 
materials must never be stifled. Situations that involve deviation from 
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regulations or even from good work practice by Authorized Users should 
be resolved by Authorized Users, the ability to resolve all situations like 
this should reside in a Radiation Safety Committee that has supervisory 
authority over all work with radioactive materials and radiation 
producing devices. Only with that authority can these differences of 
opinion be resolved without a loss of communication. 
2.6.3 Transportation Challenges 
 The shipping and receiving of radioactive material is governed by 
regulations of the Department of Transportation in the United States 
[49]. All radioactive materials must be controlled to prevent unauthorized 
transport from the UNLV campus. In order to support radiochemistry 
experiments, materials and equipment may require movement to 
laboratories in other buildings or transport to laboratories in other 
states. All transporters, either on campus, or off-campus must be 
properly trained and follow the shipping regulations and guidance 
provided by the DOT and the International Air Transport Association. 
Even the most detailed preparation of packages will occasionally fail 
inspections required by carriers. It is essential that personnel who ship 
radioactive materials for the Radiochemistry Program receive detailed 
training to ship radioactive packages and collaborate to ensure that each 
package is properly classified, packaged, labeled, and marked. 
 The authority to ship radioactive materials for the Radiochemistry 
Program must be granted from the highest levels of program 
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administration. The Radiation Safety Office must work together with the 
radiochemistry program to ensure that the details of all shipments are 
properly evaluated and addressed. There are times when a rush to meet 
deadlines for experiments may cause a desire to ship inappropriately, 
this must never happen as it will put all operations of the program at 
risk. 
2.6.3.1 Actions to Support Relocation of Materials 
 Transportation on campus is as important to the program as when 
a package is moved off-campus through the public. A policy imposed 
early in the program was for transportation of any materials that could 
cause an area to be contaminated. The policy was specified in 
radiochemistry newsletter number 7, and is presented in Appendix B. 
The basic concepts are: 
 A user must be aware of the transfer of radioactive material 
between buildings and there should be a more senior student or 
User accompanying the transporter.  
 The package must be capable of containing the material and must 
be labeled to indicate the radionuclides and activity.   
2.6.4 Planning Experiments with Radioactive Materials 
 When work with radioactive materials is considered for any 
purpose, an evaluation must be done to establish control measures for 
protection of personnel and the environment. This evaluation may be 
simple and associated with no personnel risk and no environmental 
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effect, or it may require controls to reduce external dose rates, intake of 
radionuclides, contamination control measures, and environmental 
protective measures. The evaluation of radiation work and an organized 
documentation of that work can be done with the aid of software. 
2.6.4.1 Work Planning Challenges 
 Early in the evolution of the program considerations given to the 
work did not consider all aspects appropriate to safety although when 
activity (>1 MBq) was used, a discussion of the work to be done and the 
need to minimize the probability of airborne activity and surface 
contamination was held. One of the first set of experiments to use a high 
activity concentration in solution involved > 10 MBq of 237Np. A detailed 
training of the researchers was held to ensure that everyone was aware 
of the serious nature of using this radionuclide with a total activity 
greater than 2000 times the ALI by ingestion and 250,000 times the ALI 
by inhalation. 
 The dominating challenge associated with work planning is 
assuring that all Users are satisfied with the planned controls and 
sufficient communication has occurred so that supervision of the work 
will be available when the work occurs. A general policy early in the 
program was the presence of a senior member of the staff or faculty was 
required before work with radioactive materials could proceed. This 
challenge has become difficult with the increased number of researchers 
and more need for User coverage. 
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2.6.4.2 Actions Taken to Support Work Planning 
In 2010, a method was implemented to keep track of the 
experiments that were planned for each upcoming week. Each researcher 
is required to submit a “Plan of the Week” form that describes to the 
group of Users that may be responsible that week, what will be done. The 
plan requires the identification of radionuclides and activity, the 
researchers and the laboratory, and the methods that will be used. 
Before implementation of the plan, the approval of the Authorized User is 
required. 
This method provides a communication between the researcher, 
the Authorized User, and other Users who may be responsible for the 
laboratories when the work is done. The form provides a basic 
description of the work to be done including: 
 Starting date and expected end date, 
 Name of the researcher, 
 Radionuclides and mass or activity, 
 Laboratory designation, 
 Environmental influences that will be experienced by the material, 
 Analyses to be done, 
 Allowance for User evaluation notes, and 
 User Authorization. 
 Depending on the application, control measures, interaction of 
multiple work groups, and degree of liability accepted to do this work; 
multiple levels of authorization may be required. The level of 
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authorization provided should be commensurate with the degree of risk 
associated with the work. The degree of risk should consider not only 
radiation hazards, but also other liabilities in doing the proposed work. 
For large experiments with high risk, the radiation safety office should be 
a required authorization. 
 Issues not presented by the Plan of the Week but require 
consideration are purchasing of materials, the limits of activity 
appropriate for the experiments, protective clothing requirements, 
external and internal monitoring requirements, and surveys to be done 
before during and after the work. 
 Upon authorization to begin work, authorization may be made to 
purchase radionuclides, protective equipment, and other needed 
supplies. As the work continues, monitoring of the work area provides 
information related to job progress, interferences to radiation safety 
measures, the need for more or less protection, or the need to stop work 
and reconsider the work plan. In the event of high exposure to personnel, 
loss of contamination control or unanticipated airborne activity, work 
would be stopped and the cause evaluated. To continue, corrective 
actions would be taken, plans reviewed, control measures evaluated and 
assigned, and re-authorization considered. 
 Upon completion of the work, it is customary to evaluate the work 
area with a post job survey to identify the degree of hazard that remains 
or was created as a result of the work. This survey considers surface 
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contamination, external dose rates, and airborne activity. The post job 
survey requires review by the radiation safety organization. 
2.6.5 Surveys and Monitoring Hypothesis 
 The purpose of monitoring is multifold. Surveys identify the 
condition of a work area before, contamination and dose rates they are 
exposed to during, and the situation that remains after work. Whether it 
is contamination or dose rate, the condition of the area after work should 
not be worse than before work was done. With appropriate training and 
experience in how to do surveys researchers will be able to maintain their 
areas to ensure minimal personnel contamination, and dose. 
2.6.5.1 Challenges to Surveys and Monitoring 
 Early in the radiochemistry program it was decided to allow 
contaminated areas to remain in fume hoods or glove boxes in an effort 
to reduce the amount of time spent cleaning those areas and thus reduce 
the dose received during the cleaning. The concept seems sound, but the 
level of contamination will build to the point where it cannot be 
contained in that area and will spread to areas where it becomes a 
concern. It may be reasonable to allow a buildup to some factor of 2 to 5 
times the contamination control limits but this must be periodically 
evaluated and cleanup must prevent excess buildup. Areas immediately 




 The most important areas for contamination control in a 
radiochemistry laboratory are associated with process locations where 
samples are cut, ground, pulverized, polished, heated, pressed, bubbled 
or weighed. Each of these operations creates small particles that may be 
spread around due to the motion of the particles when they are created, 
heated, or bubbled. Smear surveys alone are not sufficient to ensure a 
clean area after using one of these processes. In some cases, the process 
needs a contained area with little air movement to ensure control of the 
particles created. 
2.6.5.2 Considerations for Surveying Radiochemistry Areas  
 In radiochemistry materials are manipulated in powders and 
solutions that may have high concentrations of radionuclides. When the 
process is complete a detailed evaluation of the work area for a spread of 
contamination is expected. This must be a slow continuous direct survey 
with an appropriate survey meter and a detailed smear survey to 
demonstrate the area is clean for the next person who will use it. When 
activity is found in an area, the researcher is responsible to 
decontaminate the area. 
 A program was implemented which made surveying work areas 
simple and keep the spread of contamination under control. From March 
of 2010 until the end of the year, hundreds of surveys were performed 
and documented to control radioactive materials at each of the 
radioactive material work areas. If you were a researcher in the 
 75 
 
laboratories and did surveys, there was probably a time when you 
thought that all of your actions were deliberate and appropriate and you 
could not have spread contamination from your work area. However, 
when you counted your smears, there were surprises that indicated the 
presence of removable contamination in areas that you considered clean. 
 The discovery of radioactive materials in a work area immediately 
after work with radioactive materials is done should never be construed 
as a loss of control. A loss of control is when activity is found in a work 
area that a researcher has left contaminated. If radioactive materials 
could be seen as huge colorful spots as we work, then recognition and 
cleanup would be easy. However, a contaminated area cannot be found 
until an appropriate survey is completed. Table 2-4 displays the mass 
equivalence of activity of radioactive materials that used in the 
Radiochemistry Program at the contamination limit of 1000 dpm/100 
cm2 (16.7 Bq/100 cm2). With the typical density of that material, a 
particle size is also provided. 
 The approximate limit of our ability to see particles if we have good 
vision is a particle of contrasting color with a diameter of 0.1 mm (100 
micron) [50] at 0.3 meter from the particle. Some people may see better, 
some not as well. This particle size is based on observation at a specific 
distance to identify an object of contrasting color. Table 2-4 is a 
reasonably close approximation of the size of radioactive particles.
 Another important aspect to consider when looking at the 
radiological control aspects of this contamination is that a person will 
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not spend a great deal of time scanning the work area for barely visible 
particles, they may look like dust particles or just some dirt. As shown in 
the table, this size particle is much more easily detected with a radiation 
detector for most radionuclides. 
 
































































































 In Table 2-4 a determination is made of the particle diameter for 
different radionuclides with the consideration that it is a pure metal with 
the specific activity and density provided. Considering that the limit of 
our vision is indeed a particle that has a diameter of 100 micron, an 
approximation of the activity can be made as shown in Table 2-5. In this 
table it is considered that the volume of that particle is 1.33x10-6 cm3 
and the activity in Bq, is the activity that is in that volume. 
 The shaded information in Table 2-5 shows those radionuclides 
with a specific activity that enables them to be easily detected with a 
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radiation detector even though the particles are not likely to be visible to 
most people. Consider also that a particle 10% of that size will not be 
visible, yet it will still have an activity greater than the contamination 
control limit. This table shows that a smear survey provides what can be 
found with a slow scan survey using an alpha/beta scintillation detector 
such as the Ludlum model 43/93. This instrument is typically available 
in all of the radiochemistry laboratories at the HRC. 


















































































 The current series of surveys that are completed in the laboratories 
to maintain control have evolved over the years so that mistakes can be 
recognized and action taken to correct unfortunate errors before they 
affect others in the laboratories. The three levels of contamination control 
survey protection are good and exist as shown in Table 2-6. Use of a 
system of contamination control that provides checks by multiple groups 
provides protection for the program and UNLV. 
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Table 2-5. Contamination Control Survey Frequency 
Survey Type Frequency Surveyor(s) 
Work space control 
Each time work is done in a 
work area. 
Individual Researchers 
Laboratory control Weekly 
Laboratory Support 
Professionals 
Program control Monthly 
Radiation Safety Office 
Personnel 
 
2.6.6 Identifying Non-Compliance 
 In any large program where radioactive materials are used, there is 
a license requirement to evaluate the radiation safety program annually. 
This overall evaluation of the program is a function of the radiation safety 
office. However, in order to minimize non-compliance situations in the 
large scale review daily evaluations of compliance are recommended for a 
radiochemistry program. 
2.6.6.1 Challenges to Compliance with License Conditions 
 Non-compliance with laboratory rules is discovered when adverse 
situations result. In order to identify non-compliance which might result 
in harm to personnel, the current Radiation Staff frequently visit the 
radiochemistry laboratories for the purpose of assessing compliance. 
Usually it is another researcher that identifies if someone has 
contaminated an area and did not clean up. This is because the 
researchers are required to do surveys every time they work. 
 Early in the program a student used a large UV light and observed 
the distribution of uranyl compounds on surfaces in laboratory MSM-164 
[51]. Even though a person could visually identify the presence of these 
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compounds, the absence of surveys caused contamination of keyboards, 
phone keypads, door knobs, and bench tops. As the routine laboratory 
duties are accomplished, a laboratory inspection is done. This includes 
looking to see what is in the trash, review of the setup of each 
experiment, observation of how and where samples are stored, 
determination of what is reasonable for waste that is collected from that 
area and what notation is expected on the waste inventory form for each 
laboratory. When items that deviate from good work practices are found, 
action must be taken to correct the situation, or if it is a task that would 
require hours, document it, photograph it and let people know about it. 
 The following items of concern have been found periodically in the 
radiochemistry laboratories: 
 radioactive material found in clean waste, 
 untrained personnel in a radiochemistry laboratory, 
 sloppy control of radioactive material work areas, 
 contaminated equipment (furnaces, pellet press, gloveless box), 
 contamination in normally clean areas, 
 contaminated PPE in a clean area (laboratory coats), 
 unsecured radioactive materials, 
 safety glasses in a contaminated work area, 
 blocked safety equipment, 
 blocked emergency exits, 
 fume hoods for radioactive work inoperable, 
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 argon glove boxes without adequate argon supply, and 
 contaminated radioactive material storage areas. 
Each of these items could have become an item of non-compliance or 
caused injury to personnel if it was not discovered and corrective action 
taken. 
2.6.6.2 Actions Taken to Avoid Non-Compliance 
 A daily review of all laboratories before work with radioactive 
materials and a walkthrough before leaving for the day are actions that 
will identify conditions adverse to good radiological controls before they 
cause harm or become items of non-compliance. This walkthrough 
should be done by a senior researcher or Authorized User with the 
specific intent of identifying problems that need correction.  
 Because of the ‘area possessive’ nature of researchers, the 
Authorized User of that area will easily be identified and they will 
recognize the need to fix items that deviate from proper control. If the 
need for cleanup or a change to control habits is not identified, it must 
be easy to cut off access to the laboratories until the offender recognizes 
the need to clean up the area or provide more control. The real 
unresolvable difficulty is associated with the people whose time is wasted 
by the inconsiderate actions of some others. 
 Every person who has access to the radiochemistry laboratories 
has the power to violate a regulation that would cause the immediate 
failure of the Radiochemistry Program. The honesty of every person in 
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the program and the trust in every person who is allowed access to the 
laboratories by faculty and staff are two of the main components that 
fight non-compliance. If at any time, a trusted member of the 
organization observes a situation adverse to the goals of the program, the 
Authorized Users must be notified and action must be taken. 
2.6.6 Emergency Preparedness 
 “The ultimate objective of disaster management is to bring the 
probability that damage will occur from an event as close to zero as is 
possible” [52].  In radiochemistry or any area where there are a number 
of hazards, the awareness of risks created by the researcher or others in 
the laboratories is essential. Hazards and risks that will be dictated by 
nature or equipment failure are not possible to prevent, but easy to 
prepare for. 
 As the Radiochemistry Program grew and the need to prepare for 
an emergency situation was recognized, the laboratories were stocked 
with fire extinguishers, first aid kits, absorbent materials, protective 
clothing, and a laboratory presence so that people recognized there was 
help if it was needed. The support staff has 40 hour HAZWOPER 
(Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response) training [53], a 
confidence in the laboratories that comes from years of experience, and 
familiarity with the equipment and facilities. 
 Training of personnel in how to respond to an emergency is 
extremely important. Drills of postulated situations make people aware of 
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what actions are best to help people that may have been hurt and take 
action to return the laboratory spaces to normal after the event. In 2005 
the Environmental Health and Safety department conducted a chemical 
spill drill that had participation from the Clark County Hazmat team. It 
is always possible that the unexpected occurrence will cause a fire, a 
spill of hazardous or toxic or radioactive material that will result in some 
degree of harm to one or more people. Obviously, the frequency and 
severity of such events must be minimized, but any time that humans 
are involved in an area such as the radiochemistry laboratories, it is 
possible that an accident will happen. If personnel are trained and ready 
for an adverse situation, it might be avoided or the probability of harm as 
a result of it might be reduced. 
 The first drill training occurred in November of 2010. The first drill 
was conducted in December of 2010 and the actions taken by the 
student responder were excellent. The drill team needed to improve their 
operations, to more appropriately conduct and evaluate the drill, but 
drills are held so that everyone learns from the experience. Drills 
associated with possible undesirable events in the radiochemistry 
laboratories should be held more frequently to ensure that proper actions 
will be taken should a real event occur. 
2.6.7 Radioactive Material Security 
 Security of materials that might cause harm to members of the 
public has become more of a concern since 2001 and the concept of 
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public terror became an important aspect of life in the United States. 
Radioactive materials in large quantities may cause a dose to personnel 
that could result in undesirable effects; small quantities of radioactive 
materials are ingested, inhaled, and absorbed into our bodies every day. 
The distinction in the radiochemistry laboratory has to be associated 
with the fact that the materials used are licensed. 
 Security of the radioactive material in a radiochemistry program is 
directly controlled by the radioactive material user. Since the start of the 
program, the Authorized Users are the only people to have access to the 
laboratories supply of radioactive material. In radiochemistry at UNLV, 
access to the material requires access to the building, the laboratory bay, 
the laboratory containing the storage room, the room where the material 
is located, and the combination to the safe in which it is stored.  Each of 
these access points requires a method of access controlled by the 
Authorized User, building management, and the Radiation Safety Officer. 
 Licensed radioactive materials must be controlled in a manner that 
prevents the likelihood that they will be uncontrolled when outside if the 
radiochemistry laboratories. When out of any laboratory posted for 
control of radioactive materials, they must be properly packaged and 
labeled so that in case of an emergency, the correct people can be 
immediately notified to establish control while the emergency is handled. 
Licensed material is under inventory control at all times. A semi-annual 
inventory of the materials verifies their location, who has possession of 
the material, and the condition of their container. 
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 For special nuclear material controlled under the Nuclear Material 
Safety and Safeguards policies and distribution of the material must be 
controlled for each researcher. Disposal by the researcher is recorded 
and the disposition of material in milligram amounts is ensured in this 
manner. Periodic reporting to the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and 
Safeguards is required to verify that the material is properly controlled to 
disposal or transfer. 
2.7 Management 
 The most important aspect of any radiation safety program is 
support from management of the licensed entity whether it is a 
university, government facility, or industrial facility. Good management 
of a Radiochemistry Program comes from recognition of the hazards that 
will be created and providing for proper protection of the people that will 
do the work. The important aspects of radiation protection are discussed 
by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) in 
[54]. These are refined by the National Council on Radiation Protection 
and Measurements (NCRP) in their reports over the years and discussed 
in detail in [55]. In the United States, the fundamental principles of 
radiological protection are incorporated into regulation based on the 
recommendations of the NCRP. 
2.7.1 Management Challenges in Radiochemistry 
 When using radioactive materials in powder and liquid forms, the 
primary hazard for actinides is from inhalation and ingestion. The degree 
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of hazard associated with each experiment can be based on some simple 
management tools that are derived from the work developed at the 
University of Massachusetts at Lowell [56]. This work was developed over 
the years based on the recommendations of the ICRP in several 
publications, the initial work in ICRP 2 [57] and later, ICRP 30 [58]. 
 As a radiochemistry program grows, the costs associated with 
operating such a program also must grow. The radiation safety support 
in time, surveys, evaluation of the laboratories, bioassay sample 
analysis, and job coverage will grow in proportion to the increase in the 
number of laboratory spaces and the number of personnel in the 
program. The following considerations for cost should be revisited at 
least annually. 
 radiation safety and laboratory support manpower 
 radiation safety technical support capability 
 survey instruments at the laboratories 
 supplies and equipment to conduct and analyze smears 
 support for bioassay requirements 
2.7.2 Actions to Facilitate Management Support 
 The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) is the coordinator for all 
radiation work. Authorized Users are the trusted extension of the RSO to 
implement requirements of the radioactive material license and protect 
workers. The person in the position of Radiation Safety Officer has now 
changed six times in six years (2006 to 2012). A stable program can only 
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be achieved with a stable radiation safety office and the support of upper 
management. The American Academy of Health Physics published [59] 
standard qualifications for a university RSO in 2003. 
 Radiochemistry faculty must be more than capable to control the 
work and teach the students, and the laboratory manager must 
understand the issues required to control the laboratories. These 
features must provide for the control of work with radioactive materials. 
In doing so, the information needed must be provided in detail for high 
risk work so that there is clear understanding between the researchers, 
the Authorized Users, the laboratory managers, and the radiation safety 
staff. The details of controlling will depend on many factors, the 
radionuclides, the activity, the methods, and the interaction between the 
people involved [60]. Before each experiment there must be a detailed 
analysis of the possible outcome, potential undesirable results, and 
possible actions that may be needed to recover from those results. 
 Good radiation safety management is the only acceptable, safe 
pathway to work with radioactive materials and radiation producing 
devices. It is also important that corporate management maintain control 
of a radiation safety program to ensure that the impact of events does 
not destroy a program or the company. In 2006, just after transitioning 
to the radiochemistry program two papers were presented at the Health 
Physics Society annual meeting in Portland Oregon [61] [62]. The first 
paper provided a discussion of the need for any radiation protection 
program to have a reporting chain to the highest levels of management of 
 87 
 
any corporation or entity which allows the use of radioactive materials. 
This paper was a discussion of first-hand experience in association with 
the management of radiation protection organization which had become 
dysfunctional and a comparison of this with the program described in a 
paper delivered just six months previous to that time [63]. The second 
paper outlined the risks associated with managing a radiation safety 
program in a poster style that questioned people about their actions as 
RSO should a person be hurt due to accident or program failure. This 
paper displayed the many risks that must be considered and the 
responsibility that a large program Radiation Safety Officer accepts. 
There were no answers provided in this presentation, only questions 
asked in hope that the reader would acknowledge the many aspects of 
program control that are necessary. 
 For example, regarding regulatory compliance - A good radiation 
safety program provides compliance with all regulations. 
• What if you don’t have sufficient resources to provide compliance? 
• What if you get lucky and appear to comply but have some serious 
problems that go unnoticed? 
• What if an audit finds that you are not in compliance?  
• Will management help you achieve compliance or pay the fine? 
 Every safety program manager must accept that unpleasant things 
can happen. Unpleasant things happen every day, they just don’t 
necessarily happen to you. When commitment is made to management of 
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a program for minimizing the probability of harm to workers, the public, 
or the environment, the greatest achievement is prevention of injury. 
2.7.3 Perceptions of Work with Radioactive Materials 
 The radiochemistry program is in a fish bowl where everyone 
outside is watching to ensure that no one in the program takes an action 
that could be perceived as hazardous to personnel outside of the 
program, even if there is a very low probability of harm. Every participant 
in the program must recognize the fragility of the program. Participants 
may be strong in the science, they may be strong in protection, but they 
are humans in a sea of other humans who do not have the same goals 
and ambitions. The fear of radioactive materials continues to propagate 
throughout our population due to ignorance. 
 The Yucca Mountain Project is a classic example of ignorance 
preventing a project that is needed for protection of the American people 
[64]. As the politics has changed over the recent past regarding the 
desirability for nuclear energy, the need for long term isolation or for 
used nuclear fuel reprocessing has not been recognized as a 
responsibility of our government. The failure of the politicians in the 
state of Nevada to recognize the need to provide education for the people 
in their state is a serious deviation from science based decision making. 
Using fear as a way to prevent something that people need to know the 
truth about is inappropriate. 
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 The actions taken by students in the radiochemistry group, 
teaching people about science and radiation has been outstanding. The 
participation in the Health Physics Society, American Nuclear Society, 
and providing support for the Boy Scouts of America Nuclear Merit Badge 
program is great. The professionals working with radioactive materials 
and radiation producing machines, providing teaching, or radioactive 
products must also participate if we are to grow as a State and country. 
2.7.4 Visitors to the Radiochemistry Laboratories 
 Visitors to the radiochemistry laboratories are very important. They 
provide the opportunity to highlight laboratory capability and knowledge 
of personnel in the program. They also present a challenge for program 
participants to get the visitors out of the laboratory in the same condition 
that they entered. 
 During 2009 representatives from a Department of Energy facility 
that is very important as a funding source, a collaboration source, and 
as a future employer for our students toured the radiochemistry 
laboratories. During one of the tours a visitor observed what appeared to 
them to be less than satisfactory controls. Rather than ask about the 
situation as it occurred, that person reported to his management that 
controls at the UNLV radiochemistry laboratories were not very good. All 
students and faculty are encouraged to question anything that they 
perceive as inappropriate but training was not provided to visitors to 
encourage them to express their views so that all learn together. 
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 As a result of that incident, a letter was written to the facility 
management to indicate that they must bring items of concern to the 
attention of the staff so that everyone would learn from them. A 
document was prepared that all future visitors must sign [65]. The 
document provides five simple statements of training and requires that 
all visitors read and sign the document. The document is then held for 
future reference should there be a case similar to what happened as a 
result of that tour. 
 The document describes that radioactive materials are used in the 
area in quantities that require radiological controls to; 
 minimize external dose to personnel in the laboratories,  
 minimize intake of radioactive materials, 
 prevent exposure of visitors to our laboratories,  
 prevent exposure of workers who maintain utilities in 
laboratories, and 
 prevent exposure to other members of the public who may come 
in close proximity to laboratories. 
 It then provides a number of guidance statements for all personnel 
who intend to enter the laboratories for the purpose of touring or 
repairing utilities. The laboratory visitor must read and sign that they 
understand all of the statements made in the document. This simple 
action provides the visitor with a comfort that no matter what they see, if 
in their opinion, it does not look right, they can report it and they will get 
an answer to their concern. No one does everything right all of the time, 
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but researchers and managers can only try harder if the issues are 
known. Communication of thoughts to the leaders of the radiochemistry 
program will ensure that the program continues to grow with minimum 
adverse influences due to lack of knowledge. 
2.8 Implementation 
The radiation safety program for radiochemistry at UNLV was structured 
as previously described. This section describes the actions necessary and 
the program administrative structure that was beneficial to implementing 
the program. An important consideration in the establishment of new 
controls is the need to ensure that researchers have had sufficient 
training and have confidence in their actions to prevent extreme 
reactions with chemicals in an area where the event could not be 
controlled. 
2.8.1 Abstract 
Incorporation of a Radiochemistry PhD Program into an academic 
radioactive materials license is challenging and requires strong 
management support to sustain operation. A radiochemistry program 
uses long lived, low Annual Limit on Intake (ALI) radionuclides in order 
to observe chemical reactions and take measurements, over period of 
time, that would not be possible with short lived radionuclides. A 
program designed for control of short lived beta emissions may have a 
decay in storage program and thus have no radioactive waste disposal 
program; this also is not possible for a radiochemistry program. 
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Collaboration with scientists from other facilities requires shipping 
specialists to ensure safe transfer of samples. As events occur, actions 
must be taken to evaluate the cause and reduce the probability of 
recurrence and thus protect the program. 
2.8.2 Discussion 
The University Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) is responsible to the 
regulator or to a Radiation Safety Committee to establish controls 
appropriate to maintain exposure to university employees, visitors, and 
students ALARA. Some factors that are important in that action are as 
follows: 
 Management support to a program using alpha emitting 
radionuclides requires attention to facility capability, observation 
of work, review of experiments, accountability of materials, license 
changes, and detailed surveys to verify appropriate control 
measures are taken by the researchers. 
 Management of the Radiation Safety Office requires technical 
support to be able to properly evaluate issues that might arise 
regarding exposure of researchers. 
 Low ALI (high toxicity) radionuclides in powder form, not in 
solution, are required to be controlled in hoods or glove boxes. 
 High toxicity radionuclides must be maintained in a controlled 
state or in solution at all times. 
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 Locations where radionuclides are used in quantities that 
represent a potential to cause high dose to researchers require 
more attention. At least daily visits to these locations are 
necessary. 
 Abnormal events are evaluated via critique. A critique is a method 
to document the occurrence from the eyes of each participant so 
that a root cause may be identified and action taken to prevent 
recurrence of the event by identification of possible solutions in the 
data gathering process. 
 Documentation of contamination control surveys by researchers is 
essential. A delay in this requirement as a means of minimizing 
survey burden on the researcher was detrimental to the program 
and recovery was difficult for a group that was not previously 
required to document their surveys. 
In the beginning years of the UNLV Radiochemistry Program 
radiation safety support was provided by a Certified Health Physicist 
(CHP) as RSO with the knowledge that three other CHP’s were on campus 
and could assist if needed. This support ensured appropriate attention to 
issues required to keep the program in operation. The knowledge and 
experience of radiation safety personnel must be strong to support this 
type of program. After leaving the UNLV EHS organization, the former 
RSO joined the Radiochemistry Program as the Radiation Laboratory 
Director, the Health Physicist responsible for radiation safety for 
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radiochemistry. This was a good fit for the individual and the laboratory 
based radiochemistry program. 
When mixing chemicals, radioactive or stable, inhalation or 
ingestion are the most important pathways for exposure. Most long lived 
alpha emitting radionuclides do not emit gamma radiation, but some do. 
Therefore, internal exposure is the pathway of interest. Since exposure of 
the lungs is of primary concern for alpha emitting radionuclides, the 
inhalation exposure pathway is most important to control. With internal 
exposure as the most important pathway, prevention of exposure is 
typically simple: keep the radionuclides in solution or in a situation 
where intake via inhalation or ingestion is not possible. Two simple 
techniques to prevent airborne activity are; 1. Keep the activity in 
solution, 2. Keep the activity controlled in a hood or glove box. 
Training is the most important way for a researcher to know the 
rules and minimize their exposure to radiation; safety training must also 
provide protection techniques. Supervision is the only way for Authorized 
Users, Health Physicists, or Radiation Safety Office personnel to identify 
work practices that may lead to intake of radioactive materials and 
provide guidance to change them. The authorized user, responsible for 
radiation protection must be present in the laboratories at all times when 
research is in progress. Radiation Safety Office personnel should visit the 
laboratories frequently, at least daily when work is in progress. 
When things go wrong there must be learning of how it happened 
and what can be done to minimize the probability for it to happen again. 
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In research, actions are taken that will occasionally provide unknown 
results. These results or other actions may cause an undesirable 
situation to exist or unplanned exposure of personnel to radiation or 
other hazards. A critique of the situation should document who was 
involved, what happened from the perspective of each person, and a 
discussion of the best ideas to prevent recurrence. Management should 
then implement the best solution identified. 
In the first four years of the radiochemistry program there was 
reluctance by the Authorized Users and the radiochemistry health 
physicist to require documentation of contamination control surveys. It 
was considered more appropriate to enable the researchers to focus on 
their science and for others to focus on radiation protection. In 
hindsight, this was inappropriate and did not encourage researchers to 
do the required surveys. Documentation provides that encouragement 
and should be required. Surveys done by researchers should be for 
simple dose control or contamination control. Requiring surveys that are 
lengthy and take much of their time will cause issues of non-compliance; 
they will not be done as needed. 
2.8.3 Summary 
A radiochemistry program has special needs for radiological control 
that are not provided by radiation protection programs designed for short 
lived beta emitting radionuclides or those that only require protection 
from sealed sources. Control of long lived alpha emitting radionuclides 
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must consider contamination control measures as most important, 
provide for supervision of all aspects of research, and ensure that there 






3. CHAPTER 3 
RECOVERY FROM DECONTAMINATION 
3.0 Hypotheses 
 Radioactive waste production can be reduced and sustainability of 
the resources of the Radiochemistry Program can be accomplished 
through recovery of materials from contaminated surfaces. Specifically, 
resource recovery can be enhanced with use of new decontamination 
agents.  In addition, a new decontamination gel is a useful, protective 
sampling tool. 
3.0.1 Literature Review 
 
 This section describes a project which originated with the removal 
of technetium from surfaces of a research hood [66]. The evaluation of 
surfaces of the fume hood was made using techniques commonly 
described for radiological characterization surveys [67] [68] these are 
direct measurement using gas proportional detectors and indirect 
measurement using smears. The results of the characterization survey 
were reported in Operational Radiation Safety [69]. Since the Baker 
Atomic Weapons test near Bikini Atoll [70] that led to gross 
contamination of ships and land surfaces, methods have been 
researched to remove radioactive contamination from surfaces. There are 
many mechanisms to remove contaminants from surfaces. Reference [71] 
documents some general considerations from the 1950 era. 
Decontamination techniques include; washing using surfactants [72], 
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oils [73], or caustic solutions [74]; abrasion by blasting with CO2 pellets 
[75], abrasive foam pellets [76] [77], sand, zeolite; peelable polymer 
surfaces [78], foams, sugar solutions [79], and many more [80]. Each of 
these methods fit a specific need; however, every one either causes more 
radioactive waste than desirable, is time consuming, or is inefficient in 
decontamination. 
 The following is a discussion of several available decontamination 
methods and the rationale for selecting the one used in this research. 
Most commonly, contaminated surfaces are washed with surfactant 
compounds (detergents, soluble foaming agents, emulsifiers, etc.) that 
provide a removal action by lowering the surface tension between the 
decontaminating liquid and the surface to be cleaned [81]. These 
compounds are inexpensive, readily available, and easy to use. However, 
there is typically physical scrubbing required to break the contaminant 
free from the surface and wiping or rinsing action to remove the solution 
creates volumes of liquid waste. This is not a desirable option for large 
scale decontamination of a fume hood because it is time consuming, 
requires scrubbing in hard to reach areas, and creates liquid waste. The 
surfactant is good for removal of contaminants from small areas. 
 An original technique for removal of contamination from ship 
surfaces after the Bikini Atoll tests was scrubbing with fuel oil. The 
method was abandoned after several attempts because the removal of 
contamination was difficult and efficiency was low. A more common use 
of oils for cleaning is associated with removing surface dirt and dust from 
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wood surfaces. The wood is not damaged and in fact is protected in the 
process and the cleaning compound typically provides a pleasant aroma. 
In the case of large areas of stainless steel and plastic surfaces with 
baked on contaminants, oil does not assist in removing the contaminant, 
it typically provides a slick layer that may also require treatment for 
removal. Oil was not a consideration in this case because it would 
require physical scrubbing and may leave a contaminant on the hood 
surface (the oil) that could damage experiment purity. 
 Blasting surfaces with sand and zeolite have been common for 
paint removal for many decades. A more modern approach in blasting 
was introduced in the 1980’s using dry ice or abrasive foam pellets. 
Similar to the hard materials, these abrasives are blasted at the surface 
to be decontaminated and the contaminant is removed. The major 
difficulty associated with this process is the displacement of the 
radioactive contaminant from the controlled state on the surface to the 
free, loose state in the air. In addition, the abrasive blasting process may 
cause damage to the surface and other items that it hits. The most 
promising of these at nuclear plants was the dry ice blasting where it 
could be used on highly contaminated surfaces in a controlled 
environment with collection of the airborne activity via filtration. For the 
situation in a small radiochemistry laboratory, use of abrasive blasting 
would make the contaminant airborne and simply allow for its collection 
on other surfaces or in HEPA filtration systems. This technique is not 
desirable for fume hood decontamination. 
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 A common method in dealing with highly contaminated surfaces is 
binding the contamination to prevent re-suspension and a high 
concentration of airborne activity. The contamination is attached to the 
surface using a sprayable fixative that is not soluble in water and is able 
to be stripped to remove a large fraction of the contaminant thus 
reducing the dose rate in the work area. This is frequently used during 
refueling processes at nuclear power plants where contaminated surfaces 
from refueling water may reach levels of MBq/cm2. When the refueling 
water is removed from the refuel pool, contamination collects on the 
sides of the pool. The fixative is then sprayed onto the surface to reduce 
the amount of activity that would become airborne. After removal of the 
fixative from the pool walls, it is collected in shielded drums for disposal. 
The cost of this method is high but it has good decontamination 
efficiency, controls the spread of contamination and does not require 
physical scrubbing of the surface.  
 Another novel technique that was used in a highly contaminated 
area of an abrasive blasting room at Allied Technology Group facilities in 
Richland Washington was fixing the contamination with a fine spray of 
sugar water. The sticky surface provided good attachment of the activity 
to the surfaces so that they could be easily decontaminated using water 
and a vacuum cleaner with HEPA filtration that was set up for liquid 
collection. While the concept appeared sound, the use of sugar caused an 
unexpected problem, insects. A rapid infestation caused the cleanup to 
be much more difficult than anticipated and the method was not used 
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again. One aspect of this technique that was desirable was the solubility 
of the fixative. 
3.1 Selection of Technique and Evaluation 
 From the commonly used decontamination methods, the most 
desirable properties could be selected as follows: 
1. Provides encapsulation of the contaminant. 
2. Allows for removal of the contaminant from the surface. 
3. Is collected from the surface by peeling. 
4. Is in the form of a solid upon removal from the surface. 
5. Attenuates emissions from radioactive material collected. 
6. Does not create large quantities of waste. 
7. Does not cause other problems (insects, mixed waste, etc.) 
  The search for the most desirable decontamination product 
identified a new fixative with all of the properties identified above. A 
small volume of this agent [82] was purchased and tested on some spills 
at UNLV and tests at other facilities [83] [84] were published. This 
product had one property not present with other usable decontamination 
techniques. The decontamination material could be put back into 
solution and the recovered material extracted and reused. This property 
was discussed [85] with the developer of the material who indicated that 
research had not been conducted. After this initial evaluation, the known 
information about the gel indicated it that it meets all of the most 
desirable properties of a decontamination method as previously 
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described and more, it provides the opportunity to research recovery of a 
contaminant for reuse. 
3.2 Experience Using the Gel at UNLV 
 Several events occurred in 2008 that prompted review of currently 
available decontamination methods, these events are described in a 
series of communications beginning with the description of a personnel 
contamination with 99Tc [86]. The second event involved a spread of 
contamination from researchers working with 239Pu contaminated soil 
[87]. This was a minor loss of contamination control during the 
separation of hot particles from soil samples that had been collected from 
a nuclear weapon accident site [88]. The loss of control was recognized 
immediately by the researcher and action was taken to control the 
situation and remove all personnel from the area of the spill. Before any 
attempt at decontamination, the researcher recovered as many of the 
particles as possible for continued research. The floors in the laboratories 
where these two events occurred are designed to be slip resistant. This 
property is achieved by small hard shards that stick up from the rubber 
floor. When particles fall onto the floor they are difficult to collect and 
washing the floor surface will not remove radioactive contamination 
caught in the floor penetrations. 
 After initial cleaning which consisted of removal of sand and dust, 
decontamination gel [89] was applied to the floor in the affected area to 
immobilize identified contamination and collect as much of the 
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contamination as possible. It is noted at this time that no special 
preparation of the surfaces was done other than simple cleaning. The 
area adjacent to the gel was surveyed by direct measurement with an 
alpha/beta scintillation probe, no activity was found. The gel was allowed 
to dry overnight, it was peeled from the floor surface and all activity in 
the area was removed. Smear and direct measurement surveys were 
used to verify that the contamination was removed to below acceptable 
guidelines established by the UNLV Radiation Safety Office. The primary 
guideline in this case was a surface contamination limit of 20 dpm/100 
cm2 (0.33 Bq/100 cm2). The mass of 239Pu associated with the 
contamination was less than 10 micrograms, a mass that is below 
recovery considerations. 
 In an event involving 233U contamination of a concrete floor in one 
of the radiochemistry laboratories [90], the hydrophilic gel was spread on 
the floor covering the extent of the spill area. Approximately 2 liters of gel 
was poured from the container and spread over the contaminated floor 
area, approximately 5 square meters, with a thickness that ranged from 
2 to 5 mm. The gel was spread by hand; the surface was not prepared in 
any way. The contamination on the floor was slightly above the 
contamination control limits with a maximum alpha emitter surface 
activity concentration of 20 dpm/100 cm2. Considering that an area of 1 
meter by 5 meters was contaminated to that level, then a maximum 
activity, AMAX, for 233U, could be determined as follows: AMAX = 100 cm X 
500 cm X 20 dpm/100 cm2 X 1 Bq/60 dpm and AMAX = 1.7x104 Bq, with 
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an approximate specific activity of 3.5x108 Bq/g, the mass associated 
with this activity is estimated to be 4.8x10-5 grams. Recovery was not 
considered for this material; it was not thought of as an option at the 
time of these events. 
 The gel was allowed to dry for 24 hours and then it was peeled off 
of the floor as a solid. A survey of the floor after decontamination 
revealed that the floor showed no detectable removable or fixed 233U 
contamination. Removable activity was evaluated by smear surveys. The 
smears were counted on a Tennelec LB 5100 gas proportional counter. 
Fixed contamination was evaluated using a Ludlum 2360 rate meter with 
a 43-93 alpha/beta probe. 
 If recovery were considered; using the method previously 
described, the value of that recovery is determined as follows: The value 
of an uncertified nitrate solution of 48 micrograms of 233U is less than 
$30.00 [91]. The cost of disposal of waste (2 liters of solid gel) is 
determined from the fraction of a 55 gallon (207.9L) drum times 
$1000.00 per drum. This is about $10.00. The cost of labor to recover 
the material would certainly be more than an hour, with a labor rate of 
$50.00 per hour.  Therefore the cost of recovery is more than the worth 
of the material plus the cost of waste and recovery is unreasonable. 
3.3 Recycling of Tc from a Research Hood Decontamination 
In four years of working with 99Tc in milligram to gram quantities 
to make many different compounds and provide the resource for the 
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generation of several publications, a contamination problem was 
identified. Work in one of the fume hoods used by the UNLV 
radiochemistry program was contaminated to a degree that resulted in a 
significant increase in contamination events outside of the controlled 
hood as discovered in weekly surveys. Section 3.4 describes some of the 
chemistry that was done in this hood. It was decided that the hood 
should be decontaminated when the researchers were away, during the 
winter break in December 2009. The hood, until just before the winter 
break, held equipment from years of operation, as shown in Figure 3-1. 
The 99Tc research fume hood is a Kewaunee Supreme Air Fume 
Hood with open bypass operation with high efficiency particulate air 
filters in the exhaust train. The hood wall and back surfaces are 
stainless steel coated with anticorrosion material which is hard and 
Figure 3-1. The Technetium Research Hood Before Cleanup 
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smooth allowing for reasonably good removal of surface contaminants. 
The 1¼ inch epoxy resin base is the surface where all of the equipment 
and supplies were placed. The cup drain from this hood has been sealed 
flush with the level of the base. The sash is coated safety glass and is 
very easy to clean.  Decon gel was not used on the sash, it was easily 
cleaned with a common cleaning liquid in the laboratory, Radiacwash® is 
one used in the Radiochemistry Laboratories, but many similar cleaning 
solutions are adequate for this type of surface. 
3.4 Assessment of Previous Use of the Hood 
This hood has been the location where many researchers have 
collected to work with 99Tc in mg to gram quantities to investigate the 
chemistry of technetium. The primary focus of the research done here is 
on fundamental and applied technetium chemistry [92] [93].  
In general, 99Tc compounds and associated materials are subjected 
to a number of environmental influences in attempts to create new 
compounds or recreate those known to exist in order to characterize their 
behavior. Over the years, the research in this hood included: heating 
compounds in tube furnaces, mixing compounds in acids and bases, 
working with volatile and stable compounds, and working with various 
gases. Compounds have been spilled, splashed, sprayed, bubbled with 
gases, and vaporized in this fume hood. 
Twelve grams of 99Tc in the form of ammonium pertechnetate 
(NH4)TcO4-, or similar forms were used in research projects in this fume 
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hood. This relates to an activity of 99Tc of 5.3 GBq. The experiments 
included investigation of the applied aspects of technetium chemistry 
with special emphasis on synthesis, separations, and materials 
chemistry [94]. Synthetic chemistry focused on metal-metal multiple 
bonding, oxides and halides. Synthesis and characterizations of (n-
Bu4N)2Tc2X8, Tc2(O2CCH3)4X2 (X=Cl or Br), TcO2, Bi2Tc2O7, Bi3TcO8, TcBr3 
and TcBr4 have been performed. Some recent work included preparation 
of TcCl4 from the reaction of 99Tc metal with excess chlorine in sealed 
Pyrex ampules at elevated temperatures [95]. 
Heating in tube furnaces has introduced thermally hot discharges 
of air entrained with 99Tc in different chemical forms into the exhaust air 
flow of the hood.  The cooler surfaces of the hood and exhaust ducts have 
caused the Tc to attach to the baffles and plenum surfaces, as the 
particles contacted those surfaces. It is possible, but difficult to prove, 
that more than 10% of the activity used in these experiments has been 
attached to the hood and plenum surfaces or impacted the HEPA filters. 
Equipment present in the hood over the years has been a rotovap 
apparatus, mixers, hot plates, tube furnaces, cooling baths, Schlenk 
lines and associated clamps and racks, vacuum pumps, glassware, 
contaminated tools and many different gases. 
3.5 Initial Assessment of Activity in the Hood 
The first step in the decontamination was to conduct a reasonable 
assessment of the surface activity concentration within accessible areas 
 108 
 
of the hood and assess the total activity present in the hood. The results 
showed an approximate ‘loose surface activity concentration’ of 20-100 
Bq/100 cm2 with the highest activity concentration on the sides of the 
hood, possibly the result of sprays of activity from apparatus. As a result 
of the magnitude of this activity concentration, it was decided that the 
decontamination of this hood could provide some valuable information 
about the distribution of 99Tc (the major radioactive contaminant in the 
hood) and the effectiveness of the selected decontamination compound, 
Decon Gel™ 1101 [89]. 
The hood surfaces were marked into a grid pattern based on the 
size of a large area Berthold Xe counter [96] [97]. Smears were taken on 
several surfaces within the hood and counted on a Tennelec LB-5100 
Alpha-Beta Counter [98]. The hand held Berthold LB-122 and the 
Tennelec LB-5100 were calibrated to the same 99Tc source [99]. Decon 
gel was applied to 15 of the grid squares; five before the initial smear 
sample results were determined and 10 after the initial smear sample 
results were reported. The gel was applied before the smears on some of 
the grids to determine if the gel would remove some or all of the loose 
activity. This initial test provided reasonable assurance that the gel 
would be effective at removal of the 99Tc from the hood without 
scrubbing. The activity distribution in the initial survey of the hood is 




Figure 3-2. Display of the grid system used to evaluate smears, direct 
readings, and gel samples – Activity units = dpm/smear. 
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The contamination levels shown in Figure 3-2 are in units of 
dpm/smear with each smear representing the area of a Berthold LB-122 
gas proportional detector, 14 cm by 22 cm (322 cm2). The sensitive area 
of the Berthold LB122 Xe gas detector is 11.8 cm by 18.9 cm (223 cm2). 
The Berthold LB122 was selected as the detector for primary 
measurements on the hood surface. This instrument, in the 
configuration used, has a sealed xenon detector with a 5 mg/cm2 
titanium foil window. Using the electroplated 99Tc standard, the detection 
efficiency for 99Tc beta emissions was determined to be 0.0635 
counts/transformation. The background response rate in the vicinity of 
the hood was 13.1 counts/second. The response shown in Figure 3-2 is 
not indicative of a severe contamination problem, since the material was 
contained in a HEPA filtered fume hood. However, there was an 
increased frequency of higher than normal activity on smears outside of 
the hood, which could be attributed to the only source of high 99Tc 
contamination, the hood. 
The gel samples were collected from locations S1 through S15 
shown in Figure 3-2. Samples S1 through S5 were immediately analyzed 
for contained activity by direct measurement using the Berthold LB122. 
Direct measurements were taken on the front and back surfaces of each 
gel sample and then the samples were dissolved in water for analysis by 
liquid scintillation counting. These measurements did not reveal 
information about the depth of activity within the gel because the gel 
thickness varied between samples. To obtain a more complete 
 111 
 
assessment of the activity contained within the gel, each of the samples 
was dissolved in deionized (DI) water (18.0 M cm-1). Aliquots of 100 
microliters each were taken from the top, middle, and bottom of the 
beaker containing the solution created by the dissolved gel and analyzed 
on a Perkin Elmer 2700TR Liquid Scintillation Counter (LSC) [100]. This 
provided for the determination of the total activity in each gel sample. 
The liquid scintillation counting results are summarized in Table 3-1. 
The results of this analysis indicated that the activity in the gel 
was distributed evenly in the solution created by dissolving the gel in the 
DI water. This demonstrates that the activity was present as an even 
distribution on the surface and not attached particles with high 99Tc 
content. 






































S1 6.02 673.2 691.8 731.8 698.9 559147 9319 
S2 7.14 441.8 487.1 441.8 456.9 365520 6092 
S3 5.92 397.6 391.5 325.2 371.4 297147 4952 
S4 5.10 326.9 320.7 319.7 322.4 257947 4299 
S5 8.12 364.4 204.4 246.2 271.7 217333 3622 
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The next planned evaluation was a more detailed smear survey and 
a direct reading survey to identify the extents of the loose surface activity 
and the fixed activity on the hood surfaces. From there, the plan was to 
spread the Decon Gel™ 1101 onto the surface and allow it to dry. The gel 
would then be removed in grid squares and the gel squares analyzed by 
direct measurements using the Berthold LB-122, smears on the gel and 
on the surface where is was removed would be taken to determine if the 
gel encapsulated the activity and the fraction of the surface activity that 
was removed by the gel. Smears of the gel would be analyzed by a gas 
proportional counting system and the gel in solution would be analyzed 
using a LSC. 
3.6 Data Collection 
There data collected from the hood decontamination would answer 
many questions, including: 
 What fraction of the activity on the hood surfaces was collectable 
using a smear? 
 What fraction of the activity on the hood surfaces was removable 
with the decontamination gel? 
 Was the activity collected in the decontamination gel 
encapsulated? 





The importance of these questions is as follows: 
 The fraction of activity collected by a smear has been a question 
among radiation protection specialists for many years. The quantification 
of activity on surfaces has been “estimated over the years by taking a 
smear of 100 cm2, evaluating that smear and reporting the concentration 
of removable activity on that surface as the activity on the smear per 100 
cm2. This is incorrect; the actual surface activity is on the average 10 
times more. 
 The fraction of activity removable with the gel is important as a 
parameter of the gel that makes it useful. If you have some reason to 
believe that the gel will effectively remove the contamination, it is a 
useful decontamination product. 
 The fraction of the activity collected that is encapsulated by the gel 
is important because it determines the desirability to use the gel as a 
sample collection mechanism. If the gel can collect a sample and hold 
that sample without the spread of contamination, this is a useful 
property for movement of the sample as if moving a sealed container. 
 The fraction of activity collected by a gel that was recoverable is 
important because it may be desirable to use the gel as a collector of 
valuable material, and then recover the material from the gel. This may 
be by chemical or physical means. Only chemical means were 
investigated in this research. 
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In order to answer each of these questions, a plan was devised to 
do a more detailed evaluation of the activity on the hood surfaces. Direct 
measurements of accessible areas of the hood before and after 
application of the gel using the Berthold LB122 would be obtained. A 
smear survey of all areas of the hood before and after application of the 
gel would be conducted. Finally, the gel in each individual grid square 
would be collected for further analysis and possible recovery of the 99Tc. 
In following the plan, a detailed smear survey of the hood surfaces 
was conducted. The smears used were the common variety, sticky back, 
5 cm diameter, paper smears [101]. The pressure exerted when taking 
each smear was similar over all of the surfaces surveyed. Figure 3-3 
provides a distribution of the loose surface activity in the hood 
immediately after the initial survey. The back surfaces of the hood are 
used as examples to demonstrate the survey results and provide some 
perspective on the effectiveness of the decontamination methods. 
Although the activity on the back surfaces of the hood is higher than the 
other areas, activity on all hood surfaces showed similar activity 
distribution. 
The detailed smear survey showed that each of the areas where the 
decontamination gel was used had less remaining removable activity 
than those which did not have the gel applied. This result was expected 
and showed that the gel was effective in removing loose surface activity 
from the hood surfaces. This survey also showed that there was 
significant activity in some areas of the hood and much less in others. 
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The areas of highest activity were toward the back of the hood, following 
the flow of air, but there were some areas on each side of the hood that 
were also high and indicate possible sprays or spills that were not 
affected by air flow. 
 
 
Figure 3-3. Distribution of Removable Activity on the Back Hood Surfaces 
The most revealing measurements regarding the total activity in 
the hood were direct measurements of the hood surfaces. The total 
activity on the hood surfaces was found to be as much as 100 times 
more than the removable activity within a grid square. Figure 3-4 shows 
the approximate distribution of total surface activity concentration on the 






Figure 3-4. Distribution of Total Activity Before Decontamination 
When compared to the direct measurement of the surfaces in the 
same grids as the smears were taken, the distribution of total activity 
was found to be significant. Figure 3-5 shows a histogram of the fraction 
of activity that was removed by the smears. The average fraction of 
activity removed by the smear was calculated to be 14.7% with a median 
value of 12.8%. Of the 123 readings and smears taken on smooth 
accessible surfaces, 89% of the smears taken removed between 5% and 




Figure 3-5. Histogram of Fraction of Surface Activity Removed by Smear 
 
3.7 The Decontamination 
3.7.1 Decontamination Set-Up 
As indicated previously, the decontamination method used 
DeconGel™ 1101, a commercially available decontamination product 
from Cellular Bioengineering, Inc. The gel that was purchased for use in 
the radiochemistry laboratories at UNLV came in a 20 liter bucket. The 
gel is blue, viscous, and appears to penetrate into pores and tight places, 
but is easily removed after it dries. This project is our third large scale 
use of the gel; the other two uses were for cleanup of a 233U spill and a 
239Pu hot particle spill. The gel was effective in both cleanups. 
The decontamination gel was spread onto the hood surfaces using 
a small putty knife. It stuck easily to most surfaces although it tended to 
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drip from the hood ceiling, and collect in lumps from the vertical surfaces 
of the hood. Even though there was dripping from these surfaces, enough 
gel stayed on the surface to cause removal of radioactive contamination. 
The gel was allowed to dry for approximately 24 hours before removal. 
Figure 3-6 shows the hood surfaces after application of the gel. 
After the gel dried onto the hood surfaces, it was cut at the grid 
lines and peeled from the surface. Each grid square was labeled and 
placed between two sheets of paper for later analysis. After removal of the  
 
gel, the grids were surveyed by direct frisk using the Berthold LB122 and 




Figure 3-6. The 99Technetium Research Hood coated with the gel. 
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3.7.2 Results of Decontamination 
In the same fashion as before contamination removal, the survey of 
the hood surfaces was first done by direct measurement, then by smear 
to prevent further removal of activity prior to the evaluation of total 
activity. The results from the survey of removable activity are shown in 
Figure 3-7. The reduction in surface activity due to decontamination 
using the gel is significant with the removable activity almost completely 
collected by the gel. 
 
 




In addition, Figure 3-8 provides a display of the direct 
measurement survey results. This survey indicates that much of the 
activity displayed in Figure 3-4 was removed but there is an area of the 
back of the hood where the activity was not removed. To further evaluate 
this small area, more decontamination gel was applied to the area. There 
was some further removal of activity by this second application, but it 
amounted to less than 5% of the total activity that remained. A third 
application of decontamination gel to this area did not cause any further 
reduction in the activity on that surface. This indicates that the activity 
in these grid squares was much more strongly attached. There was no 
further attempt to remove the activity. 
  
 
Figure 3-8. Distribution of Total Activity on the Back Surfaces of the 
Hood After Decontamination 
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3.7.3 Decontamination Factors 
In radiation safety, the decontamination factor is a measure of the 
effectiveness of a decontamination process. It is the ratio of the original 
surface activity (before decontamination) to the remaining surface activity 
after decontamination: 1,000 and above is usually considered excellent; 
100 to 1000 very good and 100 and below are possibly valuable 
depending on the situation. In this situation, we are interested in the 
decontamination of the total hood activity which includes elimination of 
the removable activity and reduction in the fixed activity which has a 
stronger attachment to the hood surfaces. 
The decontamination factors observed for removable activity were 
determined from a comparison of smear results for the grid squares 
before the decontamination gel application to after gel removal. These 
decontamination factors averaged 450 with a range from 2 to more than 
7000. The distribution of decontamination factors for removable activity 




Figure 3-9. Decontamination Factor Distribution for Removable Activity 
The decontamination factors for total activity on hood surfaces 
were determined by comparing the direct measurement of surface activity 
before the decontamination gel was applied to the direct measurement of 
surface activity after the decontamination gel was removed. The average 
decontamination factor was found to be more than 7,000, however, the 
range of decontamination factors for total activity varied from 2 to more 
than 100,000. The distribution of decontamination factors for total 




Figure 3-10. Decontamination Factor Distribution for Total Activity 
From the survey data, the fraction of the total measured activity in 
the hood that was collected can be determined by subtracting the total 
activity remaining after decontamination gel removal from the total 
activity originally measured and dividing the result by the total activity 
originally measured. 
   




Equation 2-1    
Where: FR = The fraction of the total surface activity removed by the gel 
 AT = The total surface activity before the gel application 
 AF = The total surface activity after the gel removal 
 The value of the fraction of the total activity removed from the 
hood by the decontamination gel varied from 51.6% to 100% with a 
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median value of 95% and a mean value of 93.6%.  See Table 3-2 for 
details of this evaluation. 
The total accessible activity in the hood could be estimated from 
the hood surface area and the average surface activity concentration. 
Within the hood, there are 4 areas which contribute significantly to the 
total activity in the hood; the two walls, the base, and the back. Each 
grid square has an area of 322 cm2. The hood contains two walls each 
with 16 grid squares, a base with 36 grid squares, and a back containing 
44 grid squares. The remainder of the inside hood surfaces that was not 
included in the surveys contain the equivalent of approximately 40 grid 
squares. The total accessible surface area is approximately: (16 * 2 + 44 
+ 36 + 40) * 322 cm2 = 48944 cm2. With an average total surface activity 
concentration of 62,500 DPM/probe area, the total activity in the hood 
before decontamination is estimated to be 3x109 DPM (5.1x107 Bq). 
Since approximately 90% of that activity was recovered by the 
decontamination gel, the collected activity should be approximately (32 + 
44 + 36)/(32 + 44 + 36 + 40) * 0.9 * 5.1x107 Bq = 3.38x107 Bq. The 
specific activity of 99Tc is 6.27x108 Bq/gram; therefore, this represents 
approximately 53 mg of 99Tc.  
In order to determine if the 99Tc collected by the decontamination 
gel was encapsulated, smears were taken on the side of the hardened gel 
that contacted the contaminated surface. This result would be valuable 
in considering collection of samples of activity from the site of a 
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Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) [102] explosion. A first responder 
team could place the decontamination gel in a survey fashion at locations 
identified as areas of concern by portable instrument. The 
decontamination gel could be collected after drying without concern for 
contamination spread and the samples taken to a laboratory for analysis. 
Since the back of the hood showed the most significant surface 
activity concentration, the data from that area will also be used to 
demonstrate the findings for this evaluation. Each of the gel samples 
removed from the back was covered with paper and moved into a low 
background area. The background response measured in this area was 
12.6 cps. The response from the decontamination gel was measured with 
the Berthold LB122 at both sides of each sample. Each smear was taken 
over the entire surface of the dried gel that contacted the 99Tc 
contaminated surface of the hood and counted on a Berthold low level 
gas proportional counter. The maximum activity of a smear taken on the 
dried decontamination gel surface was 2.4 Bq. The maximum fraction 
removal of activity from a decontamination gel surface after it was 
removed from the contaminated surface was 2.21x10-3. The average 
fraction of activity removed from the decontamination gel was 3.3x10-4 
with a median fraction of 1.3x10-4. Some samples indicated that there 
was no activity available for transfer from the gel.  See Table 3-3 for 














Count Rate on 
Smears of Gel 
Side Facing the 
Contamination 
(CPM) 
Activity in Smear 












B1 123978 2.950 7 2 0.00006 
B2 172167 22.200 90 2 0.00052 
B3 186340 13.200 51 2 0.00028 
B4 114246 5.050 16 2 0.00014 
B5 95537 8.370 31 2 0.00032 
B6 111506 7.860 28 2 0.00025 
B7 112356 3.170 8 2 0.00007 
B8 137584 11.200 43 2 0.00031 
B9 137206 3.020 8 2 0.00006 
B10 135411 17.300 69 2 0.00051 
B11 110466 8.770 32 2 0.00029 
B12 180671 9.450 35 2 0.00020 
B13 192576 3.310 9 2 0.00005 
B14 135033 3.090 8 2 0.00006 
B15 122183 1.900 3 2 0.00002 
B16 125395 4.890 16 2 0.00012 
B17 196167 2.460 5 2 0.00003 
B18 221490 7.870 28 2 0.00013 
B19 227631 3.260 9 2 0.00004 
B20 242372 6.570 23 2 0.00009 
B21 278466 0.950 0 2 0.00000 
B22 192198 5.950 20 2 0.00011 
B23 39411 1.830 2 2 0.00006 
B24 41017 2.090 4 2 0.00009 
B25 61616 1.140 0 2 0.00000 
B26 68041 2.080 4 2 0.00005 
B27 72576 1.820 2 2 0.00003 
B28 44324 2.580 6 2 0.00013 
B29 31946 2.060 3 2 0.00011 
B30 49805 3.700 10 2 0.00021 
B31 46403 5.880 20 2 0.00043 
B32 27694 9.520 36 2 0.00128 
B33 17584 7.800 28 2 0.00160 
B34 26466 9.880 37 2 0.00140 
B35 33080 3.720 11 2 0.00032 
B36 47254 7.640 27 2 0.00058 
B37 44230 16.800 67 2 0.00151 
B38 65112 34.700 144 2 0.00221 
B39 60482 7.030 25 2 0.00041 
B40 33647 6.730 24 2 0.00070 
B41 26561 1.700 2 2 0.00007 
B42 37616 1.550 0 2 0.00000 
B43 14939 1.390 0 2 0.00000 
B44 13143 0.638 0 2 0.00000 
    
  
    
  





One attractive aspect of the DeconGel™ 1101 is its ability to collect 
materials that would otherwise go to disposal, and recover them for 
purification and conversion to usable forms for reuse in future 
experiments. Members of the radiochemistry community can utilize these 
compounds and this would also reduce costs for radioactive waste 
disposal. 
3.7.4 Analysis of Activity in the Gel 
 Liquid Scintillation Counting (LSC) provides a simple means to 
determine the activity of a sample of the decontamination gel in solution. 
For samples that are expected to provide a substantial response, the 
volume of solution required is a very small fraction of the volume of LSC 
cocktail required for the analysis. This minimizes the self-absorption of 
the emissions from the gel, and thus maximizes the detection efficiency 
of those emissions. Another desirable feature of LSC with emission 
analysis capability is the discrimination of beta energy. For example, the 
beta energy spectrum of 99Tc has a maximum energy of 293.7 keV with 
an average energy of 84.6 keV with a 100% beta yield. The beta emission 
spectra from [103] is shown in Figure 3-11. Using this information and 
the desire to minimize conflicts with other low energy beta emitters in the 
liquid scintillation counter, the regions of interest on the liquid 
scintillation counter were set up as channel A: 0-50 keV, channel B: 50-
300 keV, and channel C: 300 – 2000 keV. 
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 In order to improve efficiency, after it was found that there were no 
low energy interferences, channels A and B could be summed. For 99Tc, 
the expected detection efficiency is 95% to 100% (0.95 to 1 count per 
transformation). The gel is proven to be useful for decontamination of 
contaminated surfaces after it is reconstituted with water or ethanol. In 
the next section experiments are done to determine if radioactive 
contamination encapsulated in the gel can be recovered. 
 





3.8 Recovery of Tc from Decontamination Gel 
3.8.1 Introduction 
 The hood decontamination provided an opportunity to evaluate 
radionuclide recovery from the gel material. Analysis of the gel solution 
created from the dissolution of the gel in DI water was completed by LSC. 
The gel has proven to be useful for decontamination of surfaces and after 
it is reconstituted with water or ethanol it can be reused. In this section, 
experiments are described that will show radioactive contamination 
encapsulated in the gel can be recovered. 
 The tests for materials recovery from decontamination gel have 
shown that it can be made very dilute or can be broken down into a fluid 
aqueous solution that is filterable. Attempts at destroying the viscous 
nature of the gel were made using four types of concentrated acid: nitric, 
acetic, sulfuric, and hydrochloric. The selected acids may provide for 
future considerations such as evaluation of acidic gel solutions for 
corrosive decontamination on metal surfaces. The idea of this set of 
experiments was primarily to evaluate whether the gel could be broken 
down to the point where it could be filtered or otherwise treated and 
recovered for reuse. 
3.8.2 Experimental Set-up 
 In a very basic experiment with the gel, 10 mL of water was added 
to one gram of the gel, an attempt was made to force the water through a 
0.45 micron filter without success. The applied pressure allowed only a 
drop of liquid to pass though the filter. A second attempt was made with 
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a dilution of one gram of gel in 50 mL of water; a 5 mL aliquot of that 
sample could be filtered with high pressure on a syringe/filter assembly. 
 Based on these two simple tests, it seemed that a breakdown of the 
gel is necessary for recovery of particles in the gel matrix. From the four 
attempts at breaking down the gel, the method that appeared to have the 
most reasonable degree of success in a short time was determined to be 
the nitric acid dilution. The following sections provide more detail. 
 The gel was first put into water to make it liquid before the 
addition of the acids. A grid square consisting of a variable mass of the 
gel in a rectangle the size of the base of a Berthold LB-22 gas 
proportional detector was dissolved in 100 mL of deionized water. Twelve 
containers were prepared for each acid test; each container had 5 mL of 
the gel from a sample collected in decontamination of the fume hood, 
with known activity. To each sample, increasing volumes of acid were 
added to allow observation of the effects of the acid on otherwise similar 
solutions of gel and water with an entrained contaminant. A control 
sample of the gel for each dilution was also saved. 
3.8.3 Experiments with HCl 
 The hydrochloric acid (HCl) stock was concentrated HCl 
manufactured by Baker Analyzed, lot number E45048. This acid is a 
strong mineral acid with uses in cleaning metal surfaces and in 
production of gelatin. Perhaps its use in this set of experiments would 
lead to a stronger gel that had the ability to remove some depth of metal 
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surface in its decontamination of a metal surface. Increasing volume of 
HCl, varying from 0.1 mL to 1 mL was added to the 5 mL of gel diluted in 
deionized water. The viscosity of the gel at low HCl concentration was the 
greatest with only a slightly more fluid indication at the highest HCl 
concentration. In these experiments, the viscosity was observed as the 
ability of the gel and acid mixture to flow. A free flowing mixture would 
be considered less viscous than a slow moving gel. As can be observed in 
Figure 3-12, the color of the gel changed from blue (control) to light 
green, to translucent yellow with increased concentration of HCl. 
 
Figure 3-12. Hydrogel Polymer with Varying HCl (The control gel is on the left, 




 The HCl did not reduce the viscosity of the gel. This was 
determined by tipping the containers and watching the flow of the gel on 
the side of the tube. The color change indicates that there was a variation 
in the compound and was not investigated further. The HCl molar 
concentration is displayed in Figure 3-13 in a graphical form for each of 
the containers of gel. This display format was continued for each of the 
gel and acid mixtures. 
 
Figure 3-13. Hydrogel Polymer with Varying HCl – The molar concentration of 
HCl is displayed. 
 
3.8.4 Experiments with H2SO4 
 The sulfuric acid stock was concentrated H2SO4 manufactured by 
Baker Analyzed, lot number G44434. Similar to hydrochloric acid, 
sulfuric acid is a strong mineral acid, but it is not used in gelatin 
production. However, its use in corrosive decontamination of metal 
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surfaces may be of interest. Increasing volume of H2SO4 varying from 0.1 
mL to 1 mL was added to the 5 mL of gel diluted in deionized water. 
Figure 3-14 displays the color change that occurred with increasing acid 
concentration from the control sample with no added acid on the left to 
1.9 M H2SO4 in the far right sample. The gel with the lowest H2SO4 
concentration flowed more freely than the gel with the highest H2SO4. 
The color change was from blue to green then light green and a more 
solid yellow at the highest acid concentration than with the addition of 
HCl. Once again, the color change indicates a change in the compound; 
the similar viscosity indicates that the gel is still intact. 
 
Figure 3-14. Hydrogel Polymer with Varying H2SO4 (The control gel is on the 




3.8.5 Experiments with CH3COOH 
 The acetic acid stock was concentrated CH3COOH from Baker 
Analyzed, lot number J08N52. The selection of this carboxylic acid was 
based on its use in production of vinyl acetate and wood glue. It is 
commonly available in nature and could be an easy and inexpensive 
method to break down this polymer. The drawback in this acid is its 
strong corrosive effect on skin. Increasing volume of CH3COOH varying 
from 0.1 mL to 1 mL was added to the 5 mL of gel diluted in deionized 
water. The resulting molarity of the acid in the gel ranged from 0.2795 M 
to 2.7949 M. The viscosity of the gel did not change with the increased 
acid concentration as determined by visual observation of the movement 
of the gel-acid mixture as the tubes were tipped. The color also did not 
change, as is displayed in Figure 3-15. Since there was no color change 
or viscosity change with the addition of the acetic acid, it appears that 
there may have been no change to the hydrogel compound. The rationale 
for this, as with the reason for an observed change with the addition of 





Figure 3-15. Hydrogel Polymer with Varying CH3COOH (The control gel is on the 
left, acid concentration increases toward the right) 
 
3.8.6 Experiments with HNO3 
 The addition of nitric acid in the same fashion as the other acids 
showed a change of the gel at the higher acid concentration. This 
corrosive mineral acid is a strong oxidizing agent and has the highest 
potential as a useful method to break the polymer chains. The change 
caused observed in the gel and nitric acid mixture was a free flowing 
liquid. The concentrated nitric acid was prepared by Seastar Chemicals, 
lot number 1207060. Figure 3-16 displays the samples to which nitric 
acid was added, increasing acid concentration from left to right. The 
nitric acid appeared to change the gel to a non-viscous and nearly 





Figure 3-16. Hydrogel Polymer with Varying HNO3 (The control gel is on the left, 
acid concentration increases toward the right) 
  
 In the case of each acid except the nitric and the acetic, the 
viscosity became greater. However, only in the case of the addition of 
concentrated nitric acid did the gel completely breakdown More 
experimentation was needed to verify that the dissolved gel solution 
could be manipulated to remove the contaminants. The influence of acid 
concentration or neutralizing the solution and gel reformation needs to 
be examined. The color change in the gel with the addition of HNO3 is 




Figure 3-17. Hydrogel Polymer with Varying HNO3 (The control gel is on the left, 
acid concentration increases toward the right) – no scale. 
  
 A 10 mL sample of deionized water was added to the acid gel 
mixture. It demonstrated that the gel was indeed broken down by the 
addition of the HNO3 and did not have the original viscosity of the 
decontamination gel. A 5 mL sample of the liquid was then removed to a 
syringe and squeezed through a 0.45 micron filter. The gel and nitric acid 
solution, the diluted gel/nitric acid solution, and the diluted/filtered 
gel/nitric acid solutions were all sampled and analyzed by LSC. Table 3-
4 shows the results from the LSC analyses and indicates that the 
unfiltered and filtered solutions demonstrate that the 99Tc is in solution. 
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The differences in activity between the filtered and unfiltered samples are 
not significant. From this information, it is reasonable to believe that 
extraction techniques typically used to remove these radionuclides from 
nitric acid would be appropriate to remove them from the acid solution 
that remained after destruction of the decontamination gel. 
3.8.7 Discussion of Recovery Considerations 
 As shown in section 3.8.6, the nitric acid solutions appeared more 
fluid and could be pushed through a 0.45 micron filter. In the case of the 
other acids, the gel either did not change in viscosity or became more 
viscous. The viscosity was determined by a qualitative observation of the 
rate of movement of the gel when the test tube holding the gel/acid 
mixture was tipped to a 60o angle from the bench-top. 
 From this set of experiments, it was found that nitric acid is useful 
in changing the polymer to allow filtration. A nitric acid solution in the 
gel of 1.5M is the lowest concentration at which the liquid is clear. The 
final step is re-concentration of the 99Tc in the solution to see if the 
polymer is reconstituted. A further experiment could be to determine if 
the 99Tc can be removed from the solution by precipitation with 
tetrabutylammonium chloride. This was successfully attempted in 
removal of 99Tc from one of the residue recovery experiments. Table 3-4 
provides data from the attempt to filter the 99Tc from the mixture. This 




Table 3-3. Analysis of 99Tc in Unfiltered and Filtered Gel/Acid by LSC 
The original sample of gel was 
from decontamination of the 
MSM-173 hood. The solution 
was approximately 10 grams of 






Sample Description Solution Activity Concentration (dpm/0.1 mL) 
Tc Gel 0.1 mL Concentrated 
HNO3 + H2O 315 173 188 
Tc Gel 0.2 mL Concentrated 
HNO3 + H2O 342 191 168 
Tc Gel 0.3 mL Concentrated 
HNO3+ H2O 340 146 142 
Tc Gel 0.4 mL Concentrated 
HNO3+ H2O 376 161 146 
Tc Gel 0.5 mL Concentrated 
HNO3+ H2O 372 120 128 
Tc Gel 0.6 mL Concentrated 
HNO3+ H2O 358 124 123 
Tc Gel 0.7 mL Concentrated 
HNO3+ H2O 373 125 124 
Tc Gel 0.8 mL Concentrated 
HNO3+ H2O 399 137 135 
Tc Gel 0.9 mL Concentrated 
HNO3+ H2O 386 138 124 
Tc Gel 1.0 mL Concentrated 
HNO3+ H2O 384 145 141 
 
3.9 Considerations for Reuse of the Decontamination Gel 
 The Material Safety Data Sheet for the gel provides indications that 
the primary hazardous constituents of the material are ethanol and 
sodium hydroxide. The gel is relatively benign when compared with many 
chemicals in the radiochemistry laboratories but handling the gel does 
require hand protection to prevent drying, cracking, and defatting of the 
skin. The gel also has a flammability property which may be enhanced 
when reconstituted with pure ethanol or acetone. The gel dries to a 
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flexible solid, and envelops contaminants to remove them from surfaces. 
There may or may not be a chemical reaction with the contaminant, 
depending on its chemical characteristics and the gel is not selective in 
removal of materials from surfaces. The material used in the 
decontamination experiments is a hydrogel polymer. Hydrogel polymers 
can absorb large amounts of water without dissolving due to physical or 
chemical cross-linkage of the hydrophilic polymer chains [104]. 
 The developers of the decontamination gel indicated that they had 
not tested it for reuse [85], but based on the MSDS a reconstitution with 
ethanol or water should allow reuse. Some simple initial experiments by 
addition of arbitrary amounts of water, ethanol and acetone, and re-
application of this mixture to a contaminated surface in the 99Tc hood 
demonstrated that the gel seems to be reusable after reconstitution. 
Furthermore, the more volatile the additive, the quicker the gel would 
dry. This aspect of the gel was not pursued and is certainly an area 
where future work should be done. 
 Gels are generally affected by temperature and are observed to 
‘melt’ as the temperature increases and they ‘gel’ or harden as the 
temperature decreases. Furthermore, they seem to be incompressible but 
squeeze through spaces that are large enough for their molecules to 
pass. Hydrophilic gels will freeze but have a lower freezing point than 
water. In some cases, the gel may provide several uses for 
decontamination depending on the mass of material to be collected, the 
contaminants that may affect the performance of the gel, and the dose 
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rate from radionuclides collected. The gel that was collected in the 
decontamination of the chemical fume hood contaminated with higher 
levels of 99Tc was not degraded nor did its ability to collect more activity 
change noticeably after use. It is however possible, that there is a point 
at which the gel is no longer effective in collection of contamination, but 
that point was not reached during these experiments. This aspect of the 
gel is a subject for future work. 
 There may be a time when the gel could be used many times after 
a period of decay in storage. For example, if the gel was used for 
decontamination of surfaces that are contaminated with a short lived 
radionuclide, the material will be an extremely small mass and will not 
likely affect the performance of the gel for reuse. Consider 125I with a 
half-life of 60 days, a spill containing only 1 microgram of 125I will have 
an associated activity of 643 MBq. If the surface was clean except for the 
125I, the gel could be used to decontaminate the surface, stored as a dry 
solid mass for a time long compared to the half-life, then reconstituted 




 Consider that the mass of 131I in a 30 GBq dose can be calculated 
from the definition of activity: 
          
 
Equation 2-2 
Where: A = activity 
  = the decay constant for 131I 
 N = the number of 131I atoms 
For this situation: 
30 GBq = ln(2)/(8.05 days x 24 hrs./day x 3600 s/h) x N 
N = 3.0x1010 Bq / 9.97x10-7 s-1 = 3 x1016 atoms 
 Once the number of atoms is determined, the following 
relationship allows determination of the mass of the radionuclide.  
   
  
     (    
   )
  
Equation 2-3 
Where: m = mass (grams) 
 N = atoms of 131I 
 NA = Avogadro’s Number (6.02x1023 atoms/gAw) 
 M 131I = 130.9 g/gAw 
m = 3x1016 atoms/6.02x1023 atoms/g-mole * 130.9 g/g-mole  
 = 6.5x10-6 g 
m = 6.5 µg 
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 As you can see, this mass would be a very small fraction (<1x10-6) 
of the mass of the material spread onto a surface for decontamination 
which may be on the order of grams per 100 cm2. The most significant 
contaminant that the gel would collect would likely be surface dirt from 
the area decontaminated. Once the radionuclide collected has decayed, 
the gel will likely contain primarily non-radioactive contaminants (dirt, 
grease, etc.) that were on the surface with the radionuclide collected. The 
gel could be surveyed and disposed of as clean waste, or reconstituted by 
adding water and reused to collect more contamination. The number of 
times that the gel could be reused would then be extended by ensuring 
that the area contaminated for a procedure is cleaned prior to use of 
radioactive materials on that surface. This type of use in a medical 
setting where surfaces are required to be clean and short lived 
radionuclides are common may be a good match. Reuse of the gel for 
decontamination is most obviously best for use with radionuclides that 
are easily collected, are typical contaminants around a biology laboratory 
or medical facility, and have very short half-lives. The radionuclides 131I, 
32P, and 35S might be ideal candidates for decontamination and reuse of 
the gel. As with any chemical cleaner, some simple experiments to 
determine that the compound will be compatible with and collected by 




3.10 Radiation Attenuation by the Gel 
 A desirable property for use of the gel as a sampling tool is the 
ability to encapsulate the material that is sampled and not be affected by 
its emissions. This section provides a discussion of the efficiency with 
which the decontamination gel is able to attenuate the beta emissions 
from 99Tc. This attenuation would be associated with the constituents of 
the gel and its mass density thickness. For 99Tc, the only published rule 
that can be associated with the range of beta emissions of the energy 
emitted is published as equation 6.15 in [105]. This rule applies to all 
beta emissions with energy greater than 10 keV and less than 2.5 MeV. 
Therefore, for 99Tc emissions, the rule can be stated as follows: 
                      (                   )  
Equation 2-4 
Where:  
R is the range of the beta particle in the material in units of mg/cm2, and 
E is the beta particle kinetic energy in MeV. 
 Using equation 2-4 with the maximum energy of the beta 
emissions from 99Tc, 293.7 keV, the maximum range of beta emissions 
from 99Tc is 75.8 mg/cm2. The gel has a density similar to water, so the 
maximum linear range of beta emissions from 99Tc in the gel would be: 
 75.8 mg/cm2 ÷ 1000 mg/cm3 = 0.0758 cm or 0.758 mm 
Therefore, a thickness of 1 mm spread on a surface contaminated with 
99Tc will attenuate all 99Tc beta emissions from that surface. An 
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approximate mass absorption coefficient can be identified for any beta 
energy [106] in unit density material by the equation: 
                         
Equation 2-5 
From the Half Value Layer (HVL) for beta particles with kinetic energy E 
in MeV determined in equation 2-5, the approximate attenuation 
coefficient in unit density material is given by Equation 2-6. 
  
  
     




  is the linear attenuation coefficient for the beta particle in the material 
in units of cm-1, and E the beta particle kinetic energy in MeV. Using this 
relationship, the attenuation coefficient, , for the 99Tc maximum beta 
energy emission is 68.7 cm-1. Using this coefficient, the fraction of the 
emissions from a 99Tc contaminated surface that would penetrate 1 mm 
of the gel covering that surface would be: 
I/Io = e-x = e(-68.7 /cm *.1 cm)= 0.001 or 0.1%, where I/Io is the un-





 This chapter discussed removal of 99Tc from the surfaces of a fume 
hood and subsequently from the gel used. The details of the 
decontamination provided collection efficiency and breakdown of the gel 
was determined to be possible with concentrated nitric acid. 
Decontamination of equipment and facilities is always a concern from 
many viewpoints. The decontamination should be non-destructive in 
most cases, the cost should be reasonable and not prevent future work, 
and the operation must be safe for all participants and future workers. 
This fume hood decontamination produced acceptable results, the cost 
was reasonable, there was no detectable exposure of personnel 
associated with the decontamination, and the degree of hazard for work 
in this fume hood has been reduced for future workers. 
The fraction of surface activity removed with smears was found to 
average between 10% and 15% for most areas surveyed. The distribution 
of smear results shows that the range of activity removal for smears was 
between 5% and 20%. This result confirms the idea that smears remove 
approximately 10% of the surface activity. 
The ability to efficiently decontaminate surfaces without destroying 
or disabling functions that they perform is a goal of any decontamination 
operation. In a fume hood that will be used in the future, it is desirable 
to bring it back into operation as soon as possible. To facilitate this 
desire, a high decontamination factor is needed. In this case, the 
decontamination factor was the highest for fixed activity removal because 
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essentially all of the activity was removed from some of the grid squares. 
An important consideration here is that more than 90% of the activity on 
the hood surfaces that was removed by the decontamination gel in one 
application. 
The total activity of 99Tc on the accessible surfaces of the hood was 
estimated to be 3.38x107 Bq (approximately 53 mg of 99Tc). The majority 
of activity in the hood is considered to be under the back baffles, where 
oils and dusts provide an area for much greater collection of activity 
because they do not get cleaned. Currently, there is no estimate of 
activity in these areas. 
The smear survey of the gel squares provided reasonable evidence 
that the decontamination gel encapsulated the majority of the 99Tc. The 
fraction of activity removable from the gel by dry smear was small, 
averaging less than 3.3x10-4. This supports the idea that the gel could be 
used as a sample collection mechanism for materials that may have 
come from a radiological dispersal device. The samples should be 
collected in a container such as a bag, bottle, or box. In addition, the 
material collected in this evaluation did not cause any degradation of the 
decontamination gel as it was drying. However, some areas where 
sampling is desired may be wet, may include oils, alcohols or other 
liquids that would prevent the decontamination gel from drying. Some 
variations of this type of decontamination gel that would allow it to 
collect materials without regard for the solubility of the gel may be 
appropriate for those areas. Results from this study could be used to 
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address matrix issues in a future investigation of the decontamination 
gel in various environments. 
The decontamination gel can be broken down with concentrated 
nitric acid. A concentration greater than 1 M will remove the cross 
linking and cause the gel to become a free flowing liquid. This result is 
valuable in the removal of the encapsulated material from the gel. It is 
also important to note that for the case of technetium, filtration did not 
remove the Tc from the liquid. A chemical method such as the 
precipitation of Tc with tetrabutylammonium would be a reasonable 
method to remove the Tc from solution. The gel was not broken down 
with other acids, although this may also be a useful result as perhaps 
those gels may provide a corrosive decontaminant useful for fixed surface 
contamination on metal. 
3.12 Implementation 
A program for recovery of radionuclides from decontamination 
materials requires consideration of the emission characteristics of the 
radionuclides to be recovered.  In this section consideration is given to 
implementing a program for use of a decontamination gel for cleanup 
and recovery of radioactive materials. 
3.12.1 Abstract 
Decontamination materials that are not hazardous, shield soft 
emissions, are efficient and transportable, and can be reused are 
desirable in radiochemistry. A decontamination gel was tested and 
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results reveal an available gel that could be specialized to allow 
entrainment of a caustic solution to make the gel more effective for 
removal of fixed contamination on a solid surface. In addition, the gel 
may provide a means to remove surface activity from porous surfaces 
with minimal degradation of the gel, providing reusability. 
3.12.2 Discussion 
Hydrophilic polymers have been shown to be useful 
decontamination media and useful for collection of surface samples. A 
sample of a surface contaminated with radionuclides may be taken by 
simply applying the gel, allowing it to dry, and collecting the solid 
sample. The material collected may be a very small fraction of the 
surface, but analysis by gamma, x-ray fluorescence, of x-ray diffraction 
spectroscopy may provide a non-destructive analysis of the surface. 
Further analysis of the material contained within the gel may be made by 
breaking down the hydrophilic polymer and analyzing the solution by 
atomic emission or mass spectroscopy. 
Collection of the surface samples for containment and ultimate 
analysis is useful. Breakdown of the polymer through the action of an 
acidic or basic solution or by thermal destruction may provide a means 
to recover the material collected. Thus the purpose of the gel as a 
decontamination agent may be enhanced by using it as a sample 
collection mechanism and a recovery method. Non-destructive analysis 
techniques such as gamma spectroscopy, x-ray fluorescence or x-ray 
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diffraction could be used as needed to evaluate a sample within the 
matrix of a polymer with known composition. 
There are several important considerations regarding use of a 
decontamination solution that are important to recovery of a useful 
radioactive compound for analysis. These considerations are: 
 The decontamination solution should hold the radioactive 
compound without bonding with the compound. 
 The solution should be removable from the activity without 
production of an unacceptable amount of waste. 
 The removal of the activity from the solution should allow the 
activity to exist in a usable form for future research. 
For a sample collection mechanism, the action taken to remove the 
activity from the decontamination solution should: 
 Minimize the creation of radioactive waste while maximizing the 
radionuclide recovery. 
 Allow for a reasonably rapid collection and analysis in relation to 
the half-life of the radionuclide. 
 Consider techniques for removal of the radionuclide(s) from the 
solution if needed. 
 Maintain the radionuclide(s) in an unchanging matrix to ensure 
consistency in analysis. 
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The neutral nature of the gel is valuable to prevent damage to 
surfaces and encapsulate activity but removal of activity fixed on 
surfaces may require consideration of the following: 
 Adding a caustic agent to the gel may make it capable of removing 
the surface bound activity by breaking chemical bonds that are 
holding the activity or chemically etching the surface to take some 
of the surface with the activity. 
 The gel may be re-hydrated with solutions that allow for faster 
drying, weaker bonding with the activity, or less attachment to a 
surface. 
The re-hydratable nature of the gel used for decontamination allows 
recovery of activity with several methods using the following concepts: 
 The gel polymer could be broken down chemically or thermally. 
Then chemical methods may be useful in removal of the activity. 
 The radioactive component may be removed chemically or 
mechanically (centrifugation, magnetic attraction, or through 
bonding with another compound that allows other removal 
methods). 
3.12.2 Summary 
While the decontamination gel used in decontamination of a highly 
contaminated fume hood has properties that are attractive for activity 
collection, some changes may enhance its ability to remove fixed 
contamination from surfaces or improve the desired properties for use as 
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a sample collector. The gel used, Decon Gel 1101 from CBI Polymers Inc. 
provides an off the shelf solution to simple decontamination. There are 
many aspects of a radiochemistry program that may benefit from this gel, 






4. CHAPTER 4 
RADIONUCLIDE RECOVERY FROM EXPERIMENT RESIDUE 
4.0 Hypothesis 
 Mixed waste production can be eliminated and radioactive 
materials recovered for reuse with properly planned experiments and 
appropriate documentation of wastes created. Sustainability of a 
Radiochemistry Program can be enhanced by reducing the loss of 
resources to dispose of waste and recovery of radionuclides from 
experiment residues. 
4.0.1 Literature Review 
 In this chapter the removal of useful radionuclides from 
experimental residue to allow reuse is presented as a novel option. Reuse 
of radionuclides not previously used is a reasonable action because these 
materials are expensive to use, manage, and dispose [107]. Recovery for 
reuse is accomplished on a large scale; reprocessing of nuclear fuel [108] 
[109] and recovery of nuclear fuel from surplus nuclear weapons [110] 
are two examples. A key feature of reuse of radioactive materials is the 
savings realized by avoiding disposal of the residue as mixed waste [111]. 
This is allowed because the residue is in a transition between its original 
condition and a reusable product, since it is not ready for disposal, the 
regulation of a radioactive hazardous waste [112] is avoided. This 
concept is independent of radionuclide, hazardous components, or the 
expected chemistry to recover materials. As a component of any 
experiment, the chemistry to return the waste products to a hazard free 
 154 
 
form should be done. The recovery strategies are commonly used in 
experiments for separations of radionuclides from mixtures or 
environmental media. A resource for common extraction techniques for 
different radionuclides is the V.G. Khlopin Radium Institute [113].  
4.1 Constituents of Waste Products 
 
 Since the beginning of radiochemistry experiments at UNLV in 
2004, many liquid waste products have been received from experiments 
in the UNLV radiochemistry laboratories. The Laboratory Support Group 
[114] for the radiochemistry program collects these wastes in order to 
provide consolidation of like products, recovery of desirable materials, 
and proper disposal of hazardous wastes in accordance with safety 
requirements. These products, in general, have a documented content 
from hazardous waste logs [115] with the following chemicals: TBP (tri-
butyl phosphate), THF (Tetra-hydro Furan), AHA (Aceto Hydroxamic 
Acid), ethanol, methanol, oxalic acid, sodium hydroxide, ammonium 
hydroxide, nitric acid, bromine, vacuum pump oil, and radionuclides 
(238U, 239Pu, 244Cm, and 99Tc). There were no cases where documentation 
provided quantitative analysis of chemical content or activity of 
radionuclides. 
 Products from past experiments have not been accurately 
identified and documented due in part on the researcher’s desire to focus 
on the residues of the future and abandon those of experiments from the 
past. While this allows for the creation of more residues and valued 
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compounds through more research, a short time spent documenting the 
content of all products would provide for easier and less costly 
evaluations in establishing the value of recovery. This documentation 
would also assist the identification of chemical processes that could be 
used to return the products to a useable form. Although the primary 
radionuclides and the chemicals that are used for compound synthesis 
may be known, the mechanisms to recover radioactive materials from 
some of these residues are complex, time consuming, and could create a 
more hazardous situation. The procedure for evaluation of residues 
derived from this work will identify a method for documentation of the 
potential for radionuclide recovery. 
Radionuclides that are a component part of a solid mass 
containing metals, soils, and other difficult to dissolve materials, may not 
be reasonable candidates for radionuclide recovery. This statement is 
based on the concept that the radioactive material is a very small mass 
in a mixture or attached to a much larger mass. In this situation, these 
items might be quickly evaluated and the decision made to contain the 
hazard and dispose of the material as radioactive waste. 
 Based on the information available through discussions with the 
researchers [116], recovery of a usable fraction of radioactive material in 
residues is possible in many cases. This is most desirable for liquids 
where a quantity of valuable activity of a radionuclide could be easily 
recovered. This must be seriously considered when recovery is much less 
expensive than disposal. Also, from these same discussions with the 
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researchers who generated the most recoverable waste, it was evident 
that the chemicals that are most commonly used in the experiments 
comprise a short list. A table of the residues that were processed for this 
work is shown as Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1. Residues from Radiochemistry Experiments 
Residue 
Number 
Radionuclide Matrix Volume 
12-27-10-1 99Tc TBP-TcO4 100 mL 
12-27-10-2 99Tc Dark liquid – no label 200 mL 
12-27-10-3 239Pu & 238U n-dodecane 30 mL 
12-27-10-4 99Tc Organic acid 800 mL 
12-27-10-5 99Tc Organic 300 mL 
12-27-10-6 99Tc Organic 25 mL 
12-27-10-7 99Tc Organic 125 mL 
12-27-10-8 99Tc Organic 100 mL 
12-27-10-9 99Tc H2O 400 mL 
12-27-10-10 99Tc Waste 200 mL 
12-27-10-11 99Tc No notation 300 mL 
12-27-10-12 99Tc Orange liquid 800 mL 
12-27-10-13 99Tc Organic 500 mL 
12-27-10-14 99Tc H2O, NOx 200 mL 
12-27-10-15 99Tc (0.5 g) Organic acid 500 mL 
12-27-10-16 99Tc MeOH, Acid 50 mL 
12-27-10-17 99TcO4 Sn(II)Cl2 & thiourea 450 mL 
 
 From a labeling aspect, there is a need to provide much better 
information for the solutions that are turned in for radionuclide recovery 
or waste. A form such as that illustrated in Figure 4-1 is recommended 
for documentation of the production of a byproduct of experimentation 
that has both hazardous and radioactive properties. The form will 
possibly not fit all situations and will evolve with growth the program. 
Information important to recovery of materials from the waste and other 
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appropriate hazard data should be indicated by the researcher.  This can 
be accomplished with an in-process waste database. 
  UNLV Radiochemistry Program  
In-Process Experimental Products 
Products Produced by ____________ (Researchers Full Name) 
Date of Storage __________________ 
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes , No ) 
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes , No ) 
Volume of solution _________ mL Solution pH ______ 
Radionuclide (1):______ ; Mass (1)_______ g; Moles (1)_______; Activity(1)_____Bq 
Radionuclide (2):______ ; Mass (2)_______ g; Moles (2)_______; Activity(2)_____Bq 




Hazardous Components:  Flammable   Corrosive  
   Oxidizer      Toxic        
CAS Number of Hazardous components: _________________________ 
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is it 
possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as 
radioactive waste? Yes , No ) 
Hazardous waste + radioactive waste is mixed waste. If recovery of the 
radionuclides in this product is not desired and it contains hazardous 
material that cannot be rendered non-hazardous, then the product may 
be a mixed waste. Label the material as radioactive and hazardous and 
notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office. 
Figure 4-1. Documentation Form for In-Process Products 
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 Protocols are required at UNLV for current work with radioactive 
materials [117] [118]. Protocols should require documentation of in-
process products, with specification that mixed wastes are only allowed 
to be made with the permission of the UNLV Radiation Safety Officer so 
that provisions for their disposal can be made. Specification of ways to 
minimize the creation of undesirable waste should also be included in 
the protocol. When properly used, protocol waste specifications should 
help to prevent the creation of wastes that are dangerous to personnel 
and the environment or are prohibitively expensive to dispose. In the 
selection of the waste materials that were to be evaluated for recovery, 
there was little previous knowledge of the components of the waste. The 
researcher that created these wastes was consulted for information about 
the waste and the technique that he recommended for recovery of the 
99Tc. In all cases, the method recommended was addition of hydrogen 
peroxide to break down the organic constituents and recovery of the 99Tc 
from the liquid. The liquid in each of the containers was dried in glass 
beakers and hydrogen peroxide was added slowly as reactions were 
common. 
4.2 Recovery Decisions 
 
 The residue matrix documented on waste containers was not 
useful in determining the best chemical methods which could facilitate 
returning radionuclides in liquids back to a reusable form. There was no 
information allowing identification of the quantity of any of the liquids 
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that were in the samples or the amount of hazardous components 
created with the residues. Figure 4-2 is typical of the containers of 
material that were received for disposal. 
 
Figure 4-2. Waste Container from the Accumulation Area 
 
 Establishing a basis for recovery with samples that are well 
documented could be a simple minimum mass-to-recover or a minimum 
mass concentration to make it worthwhile. However, evaluation of other 
properties of the material should be a consideration, such as the amount 
and type of hazardous materials in the residue and the cost of disposal of 
the waste that will result from the recovery effort. 
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 A low residue volume with a high concentration of recoverable 
material may be quite attractive for recovery. Removal of the activity from 
the hazardous component of the residue may simply be a filtration and 
cleaning of the filter as in sample # 12-27-10-6 (Table 4-2). In this case a 
simple filtration, washing of the filter, and removal of the activity from 
the filter was all that was required. 
 Table 4-2 provides the results of analysis of 0.1 mL from each of 
the waste products that were available for recovery experiments and 
listed in Table 4-1. The analysis was completed using a LSC, while the 
volume was small for this analysis; the activity present in each sample 
was more than adequate to make a reasonable estimate of the 99Tc 
contained in each sample. With this data, the desirability for 















12-27-10-1 100 0.00456 0.5 7.28E-01 
12-27-10-2 200 0.00054 0.1 1.72E-01 
12-27-10-3 30 0.00031 <0.1 1.49E-02 
12-27-10-4 800 1.68751 1350.0 2.15E+03 
12-27-10-5 300 3.66804 1100.4 1.75E+03 
12-27-10-6 25 2.94610 29.5 4.70E+01 
12-27-10-7 125 7.93699 992.1 1.58E+03 
12-27-10-8 100 0.06937 6.9 1.11E+01 
12-27-10-9 400 0.08037 32.1 5.12E+01 
12-27-10-10 200 2.48515 497.0 7.92E+02 
12-27-10-11 300 0.01224 3.7 5.85E+00 
12-27-10-12 800 0.88036 704.3 1.12E+03 
12-27-10-13 500 0.74110 370.6 5.91E+02 
12-27-10-14 200 0.82096 164.2 2.62E+02 
12-27-10-15 500 2.74065 1370.3 2.18E+03 
12-27-10-16 50 0.29831 14.9 2.38E+01 
12-27-10-17 450 0.29630 133.3 2.13E+02 
 
4.3 Radionuclide Recovery Method 
 The researcher who created the waste for these experiments was 
consulted to ensure that recovery of the radionuclides by chemical 
methods would not make a more hazardous situation. The samples with 
the highest activity ratio were selected for simple recovery, first by 
evaporating the liquids, then attempting physical removal of the 
radionuclide to an aqueous solution by the addition of H2O2 to break out 
the technetium. After breakdown of the solids to the point where no 
further reaction was observed, the liquids were removed from the solids 
with disposable pipettes. The clear liquids were then analyzed for activity 
content and placed in separate containers. A model Standard Operating 
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Procedure for removal of radionuclides from experimental residue is 
provided in Appendix D. 
 Using a modified version of the form depicted in Figure 4-1, a 
visualization of how the decisions were made with concern for residues 
noted in Table 4-1. The completion of the data fields in either form 
contribute to the accuracy of the information presented in Table 4-2. 
Unless otherwise noted, these materials were collected from the satellite 
waste accumulation area in the Radiochemistry Laboratories. The 
methodology of sample liquid dispersal experiments is more completely 
covered in the Sample Material Analysis section. Tables 4-3 and 4-4 
provide the recovery results. The data from this set of experiments is 
included in Appendix E. 
4.4 Recovery Results 
 The result of experiments done to recover activity in a residue for 
reuse is presented in Table 4-3. This table lists the original volume of 
solution, the original radionuclide mass based on LSC analysis of an 
aliquot of the solution, and the mass recovered, also based on LSC 
analysis. This table appeared to indicate that higher activity solutions 
will have a larger loss in the recovery process and thus less recovery. 
This is also shown in Figure 4-3. As discussed in Appendix D, there are 
many other methods for recovery of materials from solution, however, 









Estimated 99Tc Mass 
Available for Recovery 
(mg)  
Estimated 99Tc Mass 
Recovered from Residue 
(mg)  
12-27-10-4 800 2152  21.6  
12-27-10-5 300 1754  168  
12-27-10-6 25 47  10  
12-27-10-7 125 1582  30.3  
12-27-10-10 200 792  77.4  
12-27-10-12 800 1122  5.9  
12-27-10-13 500 591  31.1  
12-27-10-14 200 262  24.7  
12-27-10-15 500 2184  13.2  
12-27-10-16 50 24  3.8  
12-27-10-17 450 213  17.2  
 
Most importantly, the recovery yield of technetium from the waste 
solutions was very low. This is indicative of the need for solution specific 
protocols for extraction of radionuclides from residues such as this. In 
general, these attempts at recovery demonstrate that it is not a difficult 




Figure 4-3. Graph of Percent Recovered vs. Original Radionuclide Mass 
 






















Original Radionuclide Mass in Solution (mg of Tc) 
Recovery of 99Tc from Residue 
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4.5 Simple Material Analysis 
A rapid technique for evaluation of the liquids as to their 
desirability for recovery was evaluated by portable instrument analysis of 
the filter paper used for determination of the dispersion of the liquid from 
each sample. A dispersal experiment is conducted where ~100 µL is 
pipetted to the center of a 15 cm diameter Whatman #1 filter. The sample 
color on the filter paper is observed and documented. The dispersion 
continues to a previously undetermined diameter and the presence or 
absence of a discernible ring is noted. A visual observation of this 
technique is noted in Figure 4-5. 
Table 4-4 was constructed to indicate the difference in response for 
each liquid on the filter for a GM detector and a thin window alpha/beta 
scintillation detector. The response data is listed for each of the residues 
evaluated. Measurements with each instrument were taken directly over 
the center of each filter sample at a height above the sample of 
approximately 1 centimeter. Knowing the radionuclide as 99Tc and the 
approximate average emission energy as 100 keV, the nominal detection 






Figure 4-5 Dispersion Filter for Residue # 12-27-10-10 
 
Table 4-4. Portable Instrument Response to Residues 
Sample 
Number 
GM Response Scintillation Detector Response 
(CPM) Alpha (CPM) Beta (CPM) 
Background 100 2 160 
12-27-10-1 200 4 3145 
12-27-10-2 130 0 229 
12-27-10-3 100 6 196 
12-27-10-4 11,000 4 154,395 
12-27-10-5 44,000 1 789,244 
12-27-10-6 10,000 22 308,254 
12-27-10-7 45,000 2 846,860 
12-27-10-8 250 2 4,545 
12-27-10-9 450 12 12,068 
12-27-10-10 17,000 2 369,803 
12-27-10-11 220 2 1,378 





Table 4-4 demonstrates that a simple direct measurement from a 
filter may provide adequate information to qualitatively determine 
whether the residue contains sufficient activity to be considered for 
recovery. Since the majority of these residues were unknown and 
unlabeled mixtures, it was incumbent on the researcher to have an 
evaluative process for initial discrimination. 
Table 4-5. Comparison of Instrument Response to Residue 
Sample 
Number 
GM Response Scintillation Detector Response 
(CPM) LSC (CPM) Portable Beta (CPM) 
Background 100 20 160 
12-27-10-1 200 27382 3145 
12-27-10-2 130 3245 229 
12-27-10-3 100 1866 196 
12-27-10-4 11,000 10125070 154,395 
12-27-10-5 44,000 22008215 789,244 
12-27-10-6 10,000 17676626 308,254 
12-27-10-7 45,000 47621954 846,860 
12-27-10-8 250 416217 4,545 
12-27-10-9 450 482218 12,068 
12-27-10-10 17,000 14910872 369,803 
12-27-10-11 220 73440 1,378 
12-27-10-12 6,500 5282170 107,624 
 
 
The last step to determine the value of the simple analysis 
technique used was a comparison of the results of the GM (Ludlum 
Model 3 rate-meter with 44-9 GM probe and Ludlum 2360 rate-
meter/scaler with 43-93 alpha/beta scintillation detector response to the 
LSC response. Table 4-5 provides that comparison. This information 
provides a simple technique to determine an estimate of the activity 
concentration of a solution and decision criteria regarding the suitability 
of that solution for activity recovery. There is not a true calibration of 
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such a technique, but a nominal estimation of the detection efficiency, 
using the unattenuated efficiency for the detectors used, for the radiation 
emitted from the activity in the solution will provide a reasonable 
estimate of the activity on the filter. 
4.6 Material Recovered in Experiments 
This section describes the recovery of 99Tc from the residues 
available as indicated in Table 4-1. Some of the residues were found to 
be unsuitable for recovery as noted in Table 4-6, those solutions 
highlighted had sufficient activity to attempt recovery. In some cases, 
recovery was attempted but an unrecoverable product was identified or 
created. The lesson learned from these unsuccessful recoveries is to use 
only a small fraction of the solution for initial testing with several 
different methods, then select the best method and use that one for the 
larger scale recovery. 
For each of the residues listed in Table 4-6, the solutions were 
evaporated in a HEPA filtered fume hood in their original containers, this 
allowed for a very slow removal of the liquid with no external power or 
possibility for higher level contamination of glassware or other 
apparatus. This also minimized the probability that some volatile 
compounds of Tc would be lost. Since virtually any compound of Tc 
could be present in the solutions, a quick summary of the volatility of 
these solutions is presented in [119]. In that document, it is reported 
that the melting point of Tc2O7 is 118ºC and its boiling point is 350ºC. 
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Complete volatility of 99Tc when calcining an acid solution was attained 
at 350ºC. Mixed oxides have melting points to 1200ºC. 
 











12-27-10-1 100 0.00456 0.5 7.28E-01 
12-27-10-2 200 0.00054 0.1 1.72E-01 
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12-27-10-4 800 1.68751 1350.0 2.15E+03 
12-27-10-5 300 3.66804 1100.4 1.75E+03 
12-27-10-6 25 2.94610 29.5 4.70E+01 
12-27-10-7 125 7.93699 992.1 1.58E+03 
12-27-10-8 100 0.06937 6.9 1.11E+01 
12-27-10-9 400 0.08037 32.1 5.12E+01 
12-27-10-10 200 2.48515 497.0 7.92E+02 
12-27-10-11 300 0.01224 3.7 5.85E+00 
12-27-10-12 800 0.88036 704.3 1.12E+03 
12-27-10-13 500 0.74110 370.6 5.91E+02 
12-27-10-14 200 0.82096 164.2 2.62E+02 
12-27-10-15 500 2.74065 1370.3 2.18E+03 
12-27-10-16 50 0.29831 14.9 2.38E+01 
12-27-10-17 450 0.29630 133.3 2.13E+02 
 
The dried and semi-dried residues were transferred to 250 mL 
polyethylene containers and a 30% solution of hydrogen peroxide was 
added in steps to allow transfer of the 99Tc to the solution and the 
creation of 99TcO4-. The volume of concentrated H2O2 used was typically 
less than 10 mL. Commonly available 6% solution of by H2O2 was used 
to dilute the product and wash the residue. This was done to minimize 
impact on the available 30% solution, reducing the cost of the project. 
The final amount of H2O2 added was different for each residue and was 
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only based on the time required for breakdown of the residue and 
removal of Tc to a liquid. In some cases this was easily identified as the 
solid was eliminated, in others it appeared that any reaction had 
stopped. The approximate amount of H2O2 added was 0.1 mL of H2O2 per 
gram of solid residue; this data was not collected for each recovery. The 
materials that were present in the original residues were unknown. One 
residue, sample number 12-27-10-9, did not breakdown and was disposed 
as solid waste.  
 Some important safety concerns for use of H2O2 in high 
concentrations are that it can give off vapors that can detonate above 
70oC at atmospheric pressure. This can then cause a boiling liquid 
expanding vapor explosion of the remaining liquid. In small volumes, this 
volatility is less of a concern, but to be safe, samples 12-27-10-4, 12-27-10-
5, 12-27-10-12 through 12-27-10-15 and 12-27-10-17 used in these experiments 
were placed in water baths to maintain the solution at a temperature 
below 50ºC. It should be noted that with a rotovap or other similar 
equipment, processing time and efficiency could be improved. 
Hydrogen peroxide vapors can form sensitive contact explosives 
with hydrocarbons such as greases [120]. Hazardous reactions ranging 
from ignition to explosion have been reported with alcohols, ketones, 
carbolic acids (particularly acetic acid), amines, and elemental 
phosphorous [121] [122]. Concentrated hydrogen peroxide if spilled on 




Considering these potentially hazardous situations and selecting to 
use 30% H2O2 and keep it cool, seems to be an adequate method to 
recover 99Tc from many of the products that have been cast aside for 
recovery. However, it certainly is not the most efficient.  In the situation 
where the content of the residue is not known, it may be one of the safer 
methods. For Tc recovery, many of the compounds of Tc, two important 
aspects are: 
 The reaction of Tc(III), Tc(IV) and Tc(V) with hydrogen peroxide in 
aqueous solutions immediately yields Tc(VII). 
 Tc(VII) is easily lost upon evaporation of acid solutions unless a 
reducing agent is present or the evaporation is conducted at low 
temperature. [124] 
The reaction of hydrogen peroxide with other compounds of Tc in 
medicine has been shown for example to decompose 99mTc- 
pyrophosphate to pertechnetate (99mTcO4-) [125]. The mass of 99Tc was 
determined from LSC analysis of a clear solution before and after 
recovery. The solution before recovery consisted of solvents, acids, and 
various solids. The effect that the H2O2 may have had on the LSC 
cocktail could have been a cause for underestimate of the 99Tc 
concentration, however, these samples were analyzed again four months 
later and the deviation from the original analysis was minimal. The 
maximum deviation from the original values in the 99Tc activity was 7.6% 




After recovery, the solutions were transparent and were removed 
from the solids by pipetting. The purity and cleanliness of the 99TcO4- in 
solution was not a concern to this research, other than a more pure 
solution may be needed for further use of the 99Tc solution. The results 
provide evidence that the recovery of the 99Tc from products previously 
considered as waste products for disposal is possible. The concept that 
radioactive materials in waste products could be recovered is valid. The 
purity of the final product will again cause a loss of some of the product 
but it is reasonable to indicate that recovery efficiency would be improved 
with the use of other techniques. 
 Table 4-7 provides the recovery yield of 99Tc from the residues 
processed. The total mass of 99Tc recovered was approximately 393.2 mg. 
The average recovery fraction was 6.21%. The minimum recovery fraction 
was 0.5% and the maximum 15.8%. The difference in the initial activity 
determined to be in the residues and the activity determined to have 
been recovered may have been due to a number of issues such as a 
higher affinity of the 99Tc for another component of the residue. The 
consistently low yield of recovery appears to indicate that the 
determination of the activity in the residue was reasonable because there 
were no unreasonably high estimates of the original activity in the 
residue. Another reason for the appearance of a low activity yield might 
be enhanced detection efficiency for the determination of activity in the 
residue by materials in the residue that may have caused a detectable 
luminescence. This was not investigated. 
 173 
 
The establishment of recovery goals was not possible because the 
residue compounds were unknown. It appears that a reasonable 
minimum goal should be on the order of 5%. It also appears that most of 
the activity was disposed of as solid waste with the hardened organic 
remains after extraction of the 99Tc using H2O2. In cases where the 
residue contains a very valuable product it might be reasonable to take 
further action to remove the product. In cases where the solid completely 
dissolved in the hydrogen peroxide, other loss mechanisms such as 
evaporation must have occurred. 





Estimated 99Tc Mass 
Recovered from Residue 
(mg)  
Estimated Percentage of 
the Original 99Tc in 
Residue that was 
Recovered (%)  
12-27-10-4 800 21.6  1.0%  
12-27-10-5 300 168  9.6%  
12-27-10-7 10 30.3  1.9%  
12-27-10-10 125 77.4  9.8%  
12-27-10-12 400 5.9  0.5%  
12-27-10-13 200 31.1  5.3%  
12-27-10-14 800 24.7  9.5%  
12-27-10-15 500 13.2  0.6%  
12-27-10-16 200 3.8  15.8%  
12-27-10-17 500 17.2  8.1%  
 
To identify the degree of cost savings by this small scale research 
effort, one must consider the cost of disposal for unknown chemical 
compounds with radioactive components in addition to the cost of 
recovery using simple methods and minimal analyses costs and the fact 
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that activity was recovered and could be reused. The cost avoidance of 
disposal of these materials as mixed waste is the real cost savings. 
With the information known thus far, this cost avoidance can only 
be guessed to be significant, and it depends on many factors such as the 
content of hazardous materials in the waste. Consider an unknown 
mixed waste consisting of toxic and radioactive characteristics. The 
process for recovery would require a safety analysis to prevent personnel 
exposure to, and cause destruction of, the toxic material. Analysis must 
identify and quantify the hazards and in addition, the hazardous 
component must be abated or confined. These costs may be substantial 
for a small waste management program of a research organization. Based 
on past experience with hazardous waste disposal and information from 
a simple web search, in the recent past, costs of disposal for mixed waste 
may exceed $40.00 per liter. 
In this study, the volume of residue collected was almost four liters 
of waste that had an easily detectable concentration of 99Tc. The 393.2 
mg recovered can be estimated to be worth approximately $800.00 at 
$2.00 per mg. The materials put into the recovery of the 99Tc cost less 
than $100.00, so the cost avoidance can be estimated to be close to 
$1000 for this simple attempt at recovery of 99Tc from the waste residue. 
Greater cost avoidance with less risk to the researcher would be expected 
if the content of the residue was known and the chemistry was more 




4.7 Safe Practices in Recovery of Radioactive Materials 
Whenever something is made that has multiple hazardous 
constituents, the behavior of that compound or solution is not likely to 
be well known. If the constituents react with one another at different 
temperatures or in different atmospheres, the hazard may be evident 
when those components are first combined. Sometimes incompatible 
components that are combined in a waste container may ignite or 
explode immediately, or at some time post mixing. 
 There are many safety reasons such as prevention of explosions or 
generation of poisonous or dangerous gases, to investigate the 
compatibility of chemicals that will be mixed together. If it is unknown 
what will happen when chemicals react, it is suggested that the 
chemicals are added together in small quantities first. The Material 
Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) provide information about the properties of 
the chemicals, but may not be detailed enough for certain experiments. 
In addition, the MSDS may not provide sufficient information to ensure 
continued safety of those working in the laboratory. 
Whenever possible, appropriate ventilation and the sash of a fume 
hood should be used to protect the researcher from potentially 
dangerous solutions splattering or venting on the face, hands, or any 
other body part. Personal protective equipment such as safety 
glasses/goggles or full face shield to protect the face, whole body 
protection with a laboratory coat and plastic or rubber apron, and hand 
protection with gloves appropriate for the chemicals that are handled are 
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some ways to protect researchers working with highly reactive or 
unknown solutions. Recovery of radionuclides from unknown solution 
matrices requires an extra effort to be safe. If it is suspected that there 
may be a hazardous situation created, action must be taken to protect all 
researchers and the laboratory from damage and consider that 
contamination control may be an important issue. It is always important 
to ensure that radioactive material stays in the controlled workspace, 
therefore it is always important to consider that actions taken to heat, 
shake, or bubble a solution may cause activity to become airborne or 
spread from the work area. 
The first step to radionuclide recovery is to determine what may be 
in the solution. The second step is to determine properties of the 
hazardous components and whether any attempt at recovery is a 
reasonable thing to do. Next, determine the radionuclides and activity of 
each in the solution and calculate the approximate mass of radionuclide 
that is present in the container.  
If the analysis of the solution indicates that the radionuclide 
recovery is feasible, then the next step is to remove all liquid from the 
residue, if possible. After drying the residue, add the appropriate 
chemicals to extract the radionuclide of interest from the solid residue 
into a liquid phase. Finally, collect the liquid phase and determine how 





The current practices used to document liquid radioactive waste in 
the Radiochemistry Program are inadequate to identify hazardous 
materials in the waste and allow safe recovery of radionuclides.   
Waste labeling can be effectively used to identify hazardous 
constituents and methods to make those characteristics harmless.  
Experimental methods should include waste management techniques. 
Mixed waste production can be eliminated in the radiochemistry 
program by requiring researchers to either recover radioactive materials 
from their experimental residue or destroy the hazardous components of 
that residue to enable disposal as radioactive waste. 
4.9 Implementation 
Recovery of radionuclides from residues of radiochemistry 
experiments is attractive for two primary reasons; it allows for 
sustainability of the radiochemistry program through increased 
availability of materials and it reduces the cost of disposal of radioactive 
waste. However, a program to allow recovery of radionuclides from 
hazardous residues of radiochemistry experiments may also present a 
hazard to the researcher that will complete the recovery. Implementation 
of a program for radionuclide recovery, and associated precautions and 





Radiochemistry research has led to great discoveries of the 
elements and their isotopes. Recovery with intent to recycle has always 
been a part of larger programs where the value of radionuclides is high, 
such as removal of enriched uranium or plutonium from used nuclear 
fuel. In research laboratories, the financial incentive to recover is not 
always present, but the desire to reduce waste costs may be the driver 
that makes recycling feasible. In this document a plan for recovery is 
proposed for an academic radiochemistry operation. The plan drives 
hazardous waste compliance and provides a reasonable basis for a 
financially feasible radionuclide recovery program. Considerations 
required for incorporating the recovered radionuclides into the 
accountability system are identified. 
4.9.2 Discussion 
Mixed waste is an undesirable consequence of radiochemistry due 
to the need to evaluate the properties of radioelements when subjected to 
various chemicals in search of the unknown. In some cases, the 
hazardous component of the waste can be made to be less hazardous or 
non-hazardous, or the radioactive component of the waste may be 
recovered for reuse making the waste only hazardous and not 
radioactive, or in many cases, less radioactive. A radiochemistry program 
has the unique opportunity to do whatever chemistry is required. Other 
programs where radioactive materials are used or waste is collected for 
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disposal, processing of the waste for radionuclide recovery or for 
concentration of the waste is not allowed. 
Academic radiation safety programs provide detailed services for 
researchers to ensure their protection and the protection of faculty, staff, 
students, and members of the public. To devise a scheme for that 
indicates the controls provided, consider that the following questions 
should be asked by an academic RSO for each of the researchers: 
 What am I responsible for? 
 Where is it? 
 Who has it? 
 What are they doing with it? 
 What will they do with it when they are done with it? 
The reason for these questions is simple and logical and is based on 
the premise that radioactive material must be properly controlled to 
prevent dispersion and maintain dose to all people ALARA. Some 
important concepts are required to be identified so that hazardous 
conditions are not created during the recovery. 
The method used for recovery of radionuclides from waste residues 
or for destruction of the hazardous component of those residues is 
devised by the researcher or the research supervisor based on knowledge 
of the content of the residue. In the experiments done for radionuclide 
recovery, the researcher that created the waste was consulted and 
provided the advice to dry the waste to remove solvents and breakdown 
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the dried organic residue with hydrogen peroxide to recover the 
technetium in the waste. While this was not a detailed chemical 
procedure and it provided poor recovery results for several of the 
compounds, it was a method that required careful observation of the 
materials and did not result in a hazardous product. It is however 
essential that all recovery efforts be closely observed and all appropriate 
safety measures are taken. 
Another important consideration in the recovery of radionuclides is 
accountability of the radioactive material. A clean way of doing this is 
subtract the activity in the residue (waste) from the inventory and add in 
the activity recovered.  In this way, any radionuclides that were not 
recovered from the residue go into the waste that is disposed and only 
recovered radionuclide(s) are added back into the inventory. In the 
inventory control system it may be desirable to maintain the recovered 
material as a separate entity since it may not have the same chemical or 
radiological makeup as the stock material. The method selected is only 
important to the completeness of the inventory. 
The separation of activity from a mixed waste is not always 
complete and the destruction of a hazardous material does not ensure 
that a hazardous component of the waste does not still exist. After 
removal of as much of the activity possible, the residue should again be 
evaluated to determine if a hazardous component exists. This may be 
possible from knowledge of what material went into the waste and what 
is likely to remain after the operations to recover activity were completed. 
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Advice on disposal of the residue may be sought from a Certified 
Hazardous Materials Management professional. 
The incentive for radionuclide recovery is inherent in several 
aspects of working with radioactive materials that are not often 
considered. Some of them are listed here: 
 The cost of radioactive solutions is typically high and purchase 
may be restricted by license. 
 The purchase may require several weeks depending on the 
radionuclide, the chemical compound, and preparation time for the 
vendor. 
 A recovered compound is available when needed and use is only 
restricted administratively. 
 Disposal of mixed waste is costly because waste sites in the United 
States cannot accept it. Typically a waste site will accept a sample 
of a waste provisionally to determine if it can be made into an 
acceptable waste. If it can be processed, a fee is applied to cover 
that cost and the cost of burial. 
4.9.3 Summary 
Radionuclide recovery is desirable for radiochemistry programs. 
The changes to accountability systems are simple and administrative 
control of waste products is simplified if hazardous components are less 
hazardous, radionuclides are less concentrated, or radionuclides are 
completely recovered and the waste is non-hazardous. The measures to 
 182 
 
be taken to recover radionuclides or make hazardous components non-
hazardous should be devised by those who know what constituents went 
into the residue and what was done to the residue that could have made 





5. CHAPTER 5 
RECOVERY OF URANIUM FROM COAL ASH 
5.0 Hypothesis 
Samples of coal and ash from a coal fired plant in Oklahoma 
contain uranium at a sufficient concentration to use that material as a 
source of uranium for nuclear power generation. 
5.0.1 Resource and Criteria 
 Using the samples provided, identify the concentration of 
uranium. The economic feasibility of uranium extraction from coal ash 
occurs at approximately 200 grams of uranium per 900 kg of coal ash 
[126]. A total of 24 samples of coal ash, 18 samples of coal, and 6 
samples of liquid from plant tanks were received from an AES 
Corporation [127] coal fired generating station in Oklahoma. 
5.1 Coal as an Energy Source 
Coal is very important to the production of electricity worldwide. 
According to the World Coal Association, coal fired plants currently 
provide 41% of global electricity [128]. In 2011 the United States 
electricity production was 42% by coal [129]. When coal is burned to 
make steam for an electric plant, ash is produced that contains all of the 
heavier elements that were present in the coal. According to the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), coal combustion generates ash 
(SiO2-Al2O3-Fe2O3-CaO and element impurities) equal to about 10% of 
the original volume of the coal and typically about 95% of the ash is 
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initially retained at the site [130]. Typically 70% to 80% of the coal ash is 
disposed of in dry landfills [131]. The annual production of coal ash in 
the United States alone of about 90,000,000 kg of ash provides a large 
waste volume and takes up large land areas for disposal of the ash at 
each site [132]. The chemical structure of coal ash varies with the type of 
coal burned. Each type has different elemental constituents that are 
heated to different temperatures and thus form different fundamental 
compounds [133]. 
5.2 Uranium Content of Coal 
Uranium is present in the earth’s crust and is concentrated in 
many minerals [134]. The USEPA has published values for uranium and 
thorium content of coal in 1984 between 1.3 ppm and 3.2 ppm [135]. 
Natural uranium contains the fissionable isotope 235U at a natural 
abundance of 0.71% [136]. The primary interest in uranium is as the fuel 
source for nuclear power. To be used for nuclear power in commercial 
light water nuclear reactors in the United States, the concentration of 
235U is increased by enrichment to approximately 2.5 to 4% [137]. 
Nuclear power has once again become a power source of interest as fossil 
fuels have more control of the economies of the world; as a result 
economic outlook for uranium is increasingly positive. 
 As uranium for use in nuclear reactors is once again considered a 
valuable commodity, there is interest created by some publications [138] 
[139] which indicated that the concentration of uranium oxide in coal 
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ash could be high enough to indicate that recovery is feasible. Values of 
uranium concentration in coal ash were reported at 281 ppm U, citing a 
study in Yunnan province China [140]. Most of the available information 
from these sources cites the coal from this area of China having a 
uranium concentration of as much as 300 ppm with an average 
concentration of about 65 ppm. With approximately 90,000,000 kg of 
ash created each year from burning coal in the United States alone, this 
could be a tremendous resource for uranium if the mechanism for 
removal is financially reasonable. At 300 ppm, the amount of uranium in 
the ash produced is 2.7E4 kg/year, at 2 ppm; it is 180 kg/year. Even 
though there are richer deposits of uranium such as high grade ore 
which is 20,000 ppm or greater to low grade ore which is 1000 ppm to 
20,000 ppm the higher of these concentrations could be financially 
acceptable for recovery. However, as shown in this research and in peer 
reviewed literature including a USGS study [141], the uranium 
concentration cited in the China coal ash are very rare and indicate a 
high concentration of uranium in the coal that is burned. 
 As a result of the publication of this information in trade journals, 
many people in the coal industry have shown interest in the use of the 
coal ash created at their plant to produce uranium. This section 




5.3 Sample Description 
 Several samples of coal ash, and coal from an AES Corporation 
power plant in Oklahoma were received for analysis. The coal was labeled 
as Hartshorne Coal and the samples were from separate piles of coal and 
coal ash. The initial focus of the project was evaluation of the ash. It is a 
reasonable consideration that the highest concentration of uranium in 
these samples would be in the ash because the waste water has a low 
concentration of the coal before burning and much of the mass of the 
coal is lost as combustion gasses with the heavier elements becoming 
more prevalent in the ash. The ash is a waste product at the plant and 
potentially the most plentiful and available reservoir for uranium 
recovery. 
5.4 Uranium Content of Samples 
In order to determine the uranium content of the ash, the most 
desirable method from a radiochemistry standpoint was high resolution 
gamma spectroscopy. Coal and its ash are very messy and undesirable to 
handle in any quantity outside of a closed container. Sample preparation 
was simple and utilized inexpensive plastic containers as sample holders. 
The instrument of choice was a high purity germanium detector 
interfaced through a Canberra DSA 1000 Digital Signal Analyzer. A 
uranium standard was prepared using uranyl nitrate in a candle gel. The 
gel maintained the uranium in a homogeneous geometry that remained 
throughout the project. The standard has similar density characteristics 
as the ash without the natural radionuclide content. The spectra 
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obtained for both the standard and the coal ash were analyzed using 
Genie 2000 gamma spectrum analysis software. Gamma spectroscopy is 
possible for determination of 238U content because of the immediate short 
lived daughters of 238U, 234Th, 234mPa, and 234Pa. The first analyses using 
this method showed insufficient analysis time to identify the 
concentrations of uranium present in the samples based on the 
concentration of the Pa progeny expected to be present in the sample in 
equilibrium with the 238U parent. A second analysis proved that this 
analysis technique was usable but the analysis time must be in excess of 
250,000 seconds per sample. 
Another method selected that required minimum sample 
preparation time was x-ray fluorescence analysis of the coal ash. The 
actual analysis time was short, a few minutes, but since sample 
preparation and analysis required the Geoscience department at UNLV, it 
was decided to look into other analysis techniques for further 
confirmation. This method would ultimately provide a technique that 
confirmed the results obtained by gamma spectroscopy and mass 
spectroscopy. 
Samples were prepared for analysis by the Thermo iCAP 6000 Duo 
Inductively Coupled Plasma-Atomic Emission Spectroscopy (ICP-AES) by 
partial digestion of the coal ash with hydrofluoric acid (HF) and leaching 
with concentrated hydrochloric acid (HCl). This method would allow 
detection of concentrations of uranium in the low part-per-million (ppm) 
range. The dilution required for this analysis was approximately 100. 
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A separate analysis of uranium in coal ash was conducted with the 
Perkin Elmer Elan DRC II, Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass 
Spectrometer, and (ICPMS). Due to the sensitivity of the ICPMS, each 
sample was diluted to enable detection of a concentration of uranium in 
the part-per-billion (ppb) range. The short sample analysis times allowed 
for many samples to be analyzed in a reasonable time. 
5.4.1 Sample Preparation 
 In this section the sample preparation for each analysis technique 
is discussed. The sample preparation may be as simple as placing the 
sample in a standard geometry, such as is done with gamma 
spectroscopy. Alternatively, it may require digestion and filtration as was 
done to prepare the samples for ICP-AES and ICP-MS analysis.  
5.4.1.a High Resolution Gamma Spectroscopy 
Samples were placed into plastic jars that provided a consistent 
geometry to standards that were prepared with uranyl nitrate and a 
suspending gel. In the preparation of the standards, 500 grams of the gel 
was melted at 200 ºC and a known mass of UO2(NO3)2*6H2O of 1.8 g was 
added to the melt. This relates to a total uranium activity of 1.06x104 Bq. 
The activity concentration of the melt was then 2.13x101 Bq/g. The net 
mass of the uranium and gel melt in HRC-185 was 405.42 g and the 
activity of this standard was therefore 8.62x103 Bq. Figure 5-1 shows a 




Figure 5-1. Uranium Coal Ash Standard for Gamma Spectroscopy 
 
The standard solution was stirred for 1 hour and the stir bar was 
removed before allowing the solution to cool and solidify to a consistent, 
mostly homogeneous solid. A second standard was made with 10% of the 
activity of the first standard. The jars used in the analysis were the same 
jars that the standards were made in. The standards were analyzed to 
provide a spectrum that would be representative of materials that 
contained uranium. Samples were placed atop an intrinsic germanium 
detector for analysis. The activity in the standards was sufficient to 
provide energy and efficiency calibration for the 234mPa in a short count 
time. The long count time for analysis at the level of the activity found in 
the samples prevented further analysis due to demand for use of the 
instrument by other researchers. 
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5.4.1.b X-Ray Fluorescence Spectroscopy 
One 15 g sample of coal ash that was analyzed using this method 
was prepared by packing the sample media into a metal container that 
would present one surface to the x-ray beam for analysis. The sample 
thickness (greater than 1 cm) would be considered infinite compared to 
the depth of penetration of the x-ray beam. The PANalytical X-Ray 
Fluorescence spectrometer was used to analyze the samples. The 
analysis parameters were selected by the system operator and were not 
provided with the analysis result. No other XRF analysis of these samples 
was done. 
5.4.1.c Inductively Coupled Plasma Atomic Emission Spectrometry 
For analysis using ICP-AES, coal ash samples were first digested 
then leached [142]. Two mL of hydrofluoric acid (HF) was added to 1 g of 
coal ash for each sample and allowed to set for 24 hours. A 6 mL sample 
of concentrated hydrochloric acid (HCl) was added to the partially 
digested ash to leach out the released uranium. The mixture was allowed 
to leach for 72 hours prior to dilution for analysis. A total of 100 mL of 
5% HNO3 was added to provide dilution to a concentration more suitable 




5.4.1.d Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry 
Dilution of an aliquot of the solutions prepared for the ICP-AES 
analysis by 1:1000 was accomplished with 5% HNO3 then analyzed using 
ICP-MS. 
5.4.2 Sample Analysis and Results 
 This section presents the results for each analysis technique. The 
results may be in units of activity as in the case of gamma spectroscopy, 
or in mass units as reported by the other techniques. In order to 
compare the results, they were all put into units of grams of uranium per 
metric ton of coal ash. 
5.4.2.a High Resolution Gamma Spectroscopy Results 
Coal ash sample number 2 (353.1 grams) was counted on a high 
purity germanium detector for 50,000 seconds. Coal ash sample number 
3 (449.19 grams) was counted on a high purity germanium detector for 
5000 seconds. Both of these analyses did not identify the immediate 
progeny of 238U; however both spectra did show some of the short lived 
progeny of 222Rn, 214Pb and 214Bi indicating that perhaps the 
concentration of 238U was lower than the detection limit for the analysis. 
Hartshorne coal sample number 14 (568.1 grams) was counted on 
a high purity germanium detector for 50,000 seconds. The decay progeny 
234mPa was considered to be in equilibrium with the 238U parent. The 
activity identified was 0.107 ± 0.026 Bq of 234mPa per gram of ash. This 
relates to a mass concentration of 238U of 8.61x10-6 grams/gram of 
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sample (ash). This concentration equates to approximately 7.8 grams of 
238U per ton (900kg) of coal with a 1 sigma uncertainty in the analysis of 
1.9 grams/ton (900kg) of coal. The previous analyses were unable to 
identify the 234mPa at that level. 
A calibration spectrum was produced using uranyl nitrate in a gel 
solution that would simulate 238U in coal ash. The spectrum was 
collected for 20,000 seconds and the photo-peak of interest for 234mPa, 
1001 keV was easily identifiable in the spectra. This is displayed in 
Figure 5-2. A long background spectrum was obtained for this 
calibration to identify any conflicting photo-peaks. There were no 
conflicting photo-peaks at the energy of concern. This is displayed by 
Figure 5-2; notice the region of interest markers around the 1001 keV 
Figure 5-2 Calibration Spectra for 238U in Coal Ash 
 193 
 
photo-peak in all of the spectra. These are present only for identifying the 
region and not for quantitative evaluation of the region. 
 
Figure 5-3 Background Spectrum for Energy Region of Interest 
Coal ash sample number 15 (412.35 grams) was again counted on 
a high purity germanium detector but this time for 300,000 seconds. The 
decay daughters of 238U, 234Th and 234mPa establish equilibrium within 
months of separation of the uranium and provide detectable emissions 
that can be identified as specific to 234mPa. Since the coal ash is in the 
form in which it was made, no chemical processes have affected the 
uranium content of the ash and it is reasonable to consider the 
immediate progeny to be in equilibrium.  
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The radionuclide of interest in this analysis, 234mPa is formed from 
the beta minus decay of 234Th, the immediate progeny of 238U. The half-
life of 234Th is 24.1 days and the half-life of 234mPa is 1.2 minutes. The 
equilibrium from 238U is well established within 10 half-lives (241 days) 
of purification of the uranium.  Since purification for the standard batch 
was conducted many years prior, and the ash is at least moths old, 
equilibrium of the short lived immediate progeny 234Th and 234mPa is 
reasonable. 
The most reasonable photo-peak associated with the determination 
of 238U in the sample is the 1001 keV photo-peak from 234mPa. This peak, 
although associated with an emission with a low yield (0.837 %), it is in a 
low background region of the energy spectrum and not affected by other 
photons with similar energy. Figure 5-4 provides display of the spectrum 




Figure 5-4 Gamma Spectroscopy Analysis of Coal Ash Sample #15. 
The activity of this radionuclide in the sample was 0.141 ± 0.016 
Bq/gram. This relates to a mass concentration of 238U of 1.13x10-5 
grams/gram of sample. This concentration equates to approximately 
10.3 grams of 238U per ton (900 kg) of coal ash with a 1 sigma 
uncertainty in the analysis of 1.1 grams/ton (900 kg) of coal ash. Table 
5-1 shows the gamma spectroscopy results for analysis of coal and coal 
ash from the stockpiles at an AES Corporation plant in Oklahoma. 
The results that are presented for coal ash for gamma spectroscopy 
and the other methods are reasonably consistent with the results of Coal 
Ash presented in NIST Standard 1633b [143]. Since the coal from this 
site was only analyzed by gamma spectroscopy, the results presented in 
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Table 5-1 may present a question about the closeness of the 
concentration of uranium in coal versus the concentration in the coal 
ash.  There is approximately a 10% uncertainty in the analysis as 
presented.  In addition, there is indeed release of uranium from the stack 
of the facility, a difference in the uranium content of coal ash and bottom 
ash, and possibly a difference in the type of coal burned to produce the 
ash that was analyzed and the coal that was analyzed in this work. 
A more detailed analysis of naturally occurring radionuclides in 
coal, fly ash, and bottom ash [144] indicates a distribution between the 
concentration of natural uranium in coal: bottom ash: fly ash as 1:2:3. 
This document provides similar information for other naturally occurring 
radionuclides.  
Table 5-1 Gamma Spectroscopy Results of Uranium in Coal Ash 
Sample Type Uranium (Bq/g) Uranium (ppm) 
Uranium  
(g/900 kg)* 
Hartshorne Coal 0.107 8.61 7.82 
Coal Ash  0.141 11.3 10.3 
* Uranium (g/900 kg) is g of uranium per ton of coal or coal ash as appropriate. 
 
5.4.2.b X-Ray Fluorescence (XRF) Spectroscopy Results 
 
A sample was taken from coal ash sample number 3. The sample 
mass was 15 grams and it was packed into a container for fluorescence 
analysis. The analysis results indicated that there was 3.1 ppm ± 1 ppm 
of uranium in the ash. This equates to approximately 2.8 grams of 
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uranium per ton of coal ash with a 1 sigma uncertainty in the analysis of 
approximately 1 gram of uranium per ton (900 kg) of coal ash. Table 5-2 
provides the complete element analysis for the coal ash sample. 













Sc 46.7 Nb 9.3 Rb 59.1 Hf 1.4 
V 161 Mo 9.8 Sr 423.3 Pb 22.8 
Ni 75.2 Cs 17.4 Y 33.2 Th 14.4 
Cu 57.3 Ba 939.8 Zr 113.6 U 3.1 
Ga 13.9 La 42.9 
 
 The results presented by X-ray Fluorescence analysis are similar to 
the expected value as identified in published values for coal ash from 
burning coal in the United States as indicated in NIST standard SRM 
2689 [145].  Table 5-3 provides a comparison of some of the elements in 
the results with the certified values (c) or information concentrations (i) 
for the NIST standard.  It is unknown what standard was used in this 
analysis, the laboratory did not provide that information. The comparison 





Table 5-3 Comparison of XRF Results with NIST Available Standards 
Constituent 
Element 
NIST 2689 (ppm) NIST 1633b (ppm) Analysis Result 
(ppm) 
Barium (Ba) 800 (i) 709 (i) 939.8 
Cesium (Cs) 11 (i) 11 (i) 17.4 
Lead (Pb) 52 (i) 68.2 (c) 22.8 
Scandium (Sc) 32 (i) 41 (i) 46.7 
Strontium (Sr) 700 (i) 1041 (c) 423.3 
Thorium (Th) 25 (i) 25.7 (c) 14.4 
Nickel (Ni) 122 (i) 120.6 (c) 75.2 
Uranium (U) Not Reported 8.79 (c) 3.1 
Vanadium (V) Not Reported 295.7 (c) 161 
 
5.4.2.c Inductively Coupled Plasma AES Results 
The leaching introduced a dilution factor of 106 as 100 mL of 
deionized water (DI) and 6 mL of HCl were used for a 1 gram sample of 
ash. No method blank was used because the solid digestion procedure 
was sufficient to dissolve the solid and clear yellow solution remained. 
Filtering of the solution was used to ensure there were no extraneous 
particulates in the sample that could possibly clog the AES sample 
introduction tubing or nebulizer. All uranium in expected to have been in 
solution and have passed through the filter without retention. The 
Thermo iCAP 6000 was operated with a nebulizer gas flow of 0.51 L/min, 
an auxiliary gas flow of 0.5 L/min, a coolant gas flow of 12 L/min and a 
pump speed of 50 rpm. The analysis included 3 replicates for each 
sample and the wavelength of concern was selected as 367.007 nm. The 
results indicate a concentration of total uranium as shown in Table 5-4. 
However, no other analysis of this ash showed any results even close to 
this concentration of uranium. A review of the analysis indicates that the 
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results presented in this table were due to an interference peak from 
other elements in the sample [146].  Figure 5-5 indicates the analytes 
that might interfere at that wavelength. This wavelength (367.007) was 
considered to be the most reasonable wavelength to use because other 
wavelengths for uranium are less significant.  The interference from other 
elements in the sample was significant because of their high 
concentrations. 






per (900 kg)  
of ash Sample U (ppm) 
 
(ppm)
FA-4 3.156 0.084 106 303.76 g 
FA-8 2.773 0.125 106 266.9 g 
FA-16 2.634 0.123 106 253.52 g 
FA-20 2.99 0.057 106 287.78 g 
FA-24 3.372 0.1 106 324.55 g 
 
Since the result indicated was so very high compared to other 
analysis results (gamma spectroscopy, x-ray fluorescence spectroscopy, 
and mass spectroscopy) any signal from the uranium in these samples 




Table 5-5 Interference Wavelengths from Sample Constituents 
Uranium wavelength of 
Interest (nm) 
Element and wavelength of 
interference (nm) 
263.557 Molybdenum 263.553 
367.007 
Iron at 367.002 
Iron at 367.009 
Thorium at 367.006 
385.466 Barium at 385.476 
385.958 Scandium at 385.96 
393.203 Scandium at 393.202 
409.014 Zirconium at 409.051 
 
This analysis did not verify the existence of uranium at the 
concentrations indicated in these samples. In conclusion of this section, 
ICP-AES is not a good technique to use for the determination of uranium 
concentrations in coal ash because of interference from naturally 
occurring analytes present in the ash. 
5.4.2.d Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry Results 
The dilution of the coal ash sample placed the concentration in the 
ppb range. The Perkin Elmer SCIEX Elan DRC II mass spectrometer was 
operated at a nebulizer gas flow of 0.96 L/min, an auxiliary gas flow of 
1.2 L/min, a coolant gas flow of 15 L/min and a pump speed of 24 rpm. 
The lens voltage was 6 V, the analogue stage voltage was -1562 V and the 
pump stage voltage was 900 V. The monitored masses (M/z) were 
234.041, 235.044, and 238.05. There were 10 sweeps per reading, 1 
reading per replicate, and 3 replicates per sample. 
 201 
 
The results indicated a practical concentration of between 1.7 and 
11.4 ppb of uranium. Since the samples were diluted by a factor of 1000, 
the concentrations of uranium in the coal ash samples were 1.1 to 9.5 
ppm, or 1.1 to 9.5 micrograms of uranium per gram of ash. Two samples 
were excluded from the analysis results because the filters used to 
remove the solids broke through (FA15 and FA17). The results indicate a 
range of uranium in coal ash of 1.0 to 8.5 grams of 238U per (900 kg) of 
coal ash. This result appears to be consistent with the most common 
results in the literature, 0.4 to 3.0 ppm in coal, and 0.8 to 30.1 ppm in 
coal ash. The samples from the scrubber tank at the coal plant did not 
show any significant difference from the coal ash samples indicating that 
this tank is not a concentration mechanism from the plant systems. 
Table 5-6 provides the result of the sample mass spectroscopy analysis 




Table 5-4. Mass Spectroscopy Results for Coal Ash Samples 
Sample 







B1- Blank U 238 11318.042 0.455 0.020 
FA01 U 238 92776.227 2.827 0.049 
FA02 U 238 49599.752 1.329 0.060 
FA03 U 238 45189.494 1.175 0.046 
FA04 U 238 46880.944 1.234 0.045 
FA05 U 238 43634.356 1.122 0.046 
FA06 U 238 48110.877 1.277 0.054 
FA07 U 238 159180.614 5.131 0.075 
FA08 U 238 57045.655 1.587 0.049 
FA09 U 238 56386.8 1.564 0.049 
FA10 U 238 55461.66 1.532 0.046 
FA11 U 238 66611.842 1.919 0.060 
FA12 U 238 57002.71 1.585 0.046 
FA13 U 238 282733.261 9.418 0.128 
FA14 U 238 283678.641 9.451 0.092 
FA15 U 238 1171622.894 40.265 0.274 
FA16 U 238 167569.231 5.422 0.067 
FA17 U 238 482149.831 16.339 0.157 
FA18 U 238 193883.179 6.336 0.075 
FA19 U 238 156677.984 5.044 0.067 
FA20 U 238 166408.023 5.382 0.067 
FA21 U 238 158776.976 5.117 0.092 
FA22 U 238 128273.136 4.059 0.060 
FA23 U 238 153241.641 4.925 0.067 
FA24 U 238 150133.964 4.817 0.067 
















B1- Blank 11318.042 0.455 0.020 
FA01 92776.227 2.827 0.049 
FA02 49599.752 1.329 0.060 
FA03 45189.494 1.175 0.046 
FA04 46880.944 1.234 0.045 
FA05 43634.356 1.122 0.046 
FA06 48110.877 1.277 0.054 
FA07 159180.614 5.131 0.075 
FA08 57045.655 1.587 0.049 
FA09 56386.8 1.564 0.049 
FA10 55461.66 1.532 0.046 
FA11 66611.842 1.919 0.060 
FA12 57002.71 1.585 0.046 
FA13 282733.261 9.418 0.128 
FA14 283678.641 9.451 0.092 
FA15 1171622.894 40.265 0.274 
FA16 167569.231 5.422 0.067 
FA17 482149.831 16.339 0.157 
FA18 193883.179 6.336 0.075 
FA19 156677.984 5.044 0.067 
FA20 166408.023 5.382 0.067 
FA21 158776.976 5.117 0.092 
FA22 128273.136 4.059 0.060 
FA23 153241.641 4.925 0.067 
FA24 150133.964 4.817 0.067 
5 ppb 155388.587 5.000 0.060 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
5.5.1 Gamma Spectroscopy Analysis 
After the initial research on the likely radionuclide concentration in 
the coal and coal ash, it was decided to conduct gamma spectroscopy 
analysis of these materials. This selection was made because this 
analysis is non-destructive and the 1.001 MeV photo-peak from 234mPa is 
an excellent indicator of the amount of uranium present in the coal 
because it is considered to be in equilibrium with the uranium. The 
decay scheme in Table 5-8 identifies the 238U decay emissions. 
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γ 0.09238 (26%) 
γ 0.0928 (28%) 
β- 0.086 (2.9%) 
β- 0.106 (7.6%) 
β- 0.107 (19.2%) 






β- 2.281 (99%) 




0.548 to 1.244 
234U 





230Th 4.774 (71.4%) 
γ 0.053 (.123%) 
 
 
The alpha emission from 238U creates 234Th, this radionuclide 
decays by beta emission to 234mPa which decays by gamma emission to 
the ground state of 234Pa. This gamma emission is the 1.001 MeV 
emission which has a photon yield of 0.837%. Because of the short half-
life of 234Th and 234mPa, these radionuclides are in equilibrium with their 
parent, 238U. In equilibrium, the activity of 238U is the same as the 
activity of 234mPa. Therefore, with the determination of the activity of 




The difficulty that appeared in this analysis was due to the low 
photon yield associated with the decay of 234mPa. The analysis time 
needed to achieve a statistically valid result for the 234mPa concentration 
was 300,000 seconds (83.33 hours). While this may be acceptable for 
single samples, it is not acceptable for 48 samples. So a more rapid 
analysis technique was sought. 
5.5.2 X-Ray Fluorescence Analysis 
 In XRF analysis, uranium was determined directly as was the 
determination of many other metals and compounds. With XRF it is not 
necessary to bring solid samples into solution and then dispose of 
solution residues, as is the case with all wet-chemical methods. The 
main prerequisite for exact and reproducible analysis is a plain, 
homogeneous and clean analysis surface. For analysis of very light 
elements, e.g. beryllium, boron and carbon, the fluorescence radiation to 
be analyzed originates from a layer whose thickness is only a few atom 
layers to a few tenths of micrometer and which strongly depends on the 
sample material. 
5.5.3 ICP/Mass Spectroscopy Analysis 
In order to do a more complete analysis of the many samples that 
were received, even though they could not be traced to a specific location 
or source of the ash or coal, it was decided to do a detailed analysis of 
the samples by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry. Samples 
were prepared to have an approximate anticipated uranium 
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concentration in the ppb range. This was the most detailed of the 
analysis methods and provided the most comprehensive set of results 
with reasonable consistency except for two samples that showed signs of 
cross contamination (FA-15 and FA-17). 
5.5.4 Comparison with Viable Sources 
 Three primary methods confirm the results of uranium analysis in 
coal and coal ash as between the values of 1.5 grams of uranium per 900 
kg of coal ash and 10.3 grams of uranium per 900 kg of coal or coal ash. 
The coal ash analyzed in this evaluation contains uranium, but not at 
concentrations that are useful for uranium recovery. At the current time, 
uranium recovery is viable at approximately 200 grams per 900 kg of 
coal ash. The results are in the range of many other analysis results of 
coal and coal as in the United States. 
5.6 Implementation 
When coal ash deposits are identified as viable for recovery of its 
components that are identified as valuable, the methods to remove those 
components need to be identified and optimized. The composition of coal 
ash is such that recovery of uranium is possible via leaching, filtration, 
and solvent extraction. IAEA Technical Report Number 359 “Uranium 
Extraction Technology” provides for methods of removal with extraction 
efficiency of more than 99%. This is a research field that is periodically 
evaluated for application of new technologies and implementation is a 
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large scale operation. This document provides no new concepts for 





6. CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
6.1 Radiation Safety for Radiochemistry 
 An important contribution of this work was creating a radiation 
safety program for a Radiochemistry Program in an academic setting. 
There were many challenges as it expanded into the program it is today 
and the faculty and staff provided many solutions to make controls as 
good as they could be with the facilities and resources provided.  
Radiochemistry researchers should always minimize liquid 
radioactive waste as it is important to the survival of any radiochemistry 
program. A program should be established for the minimization of liquid 
radioactive waste and the elimination of mixed radioactive waste through 
recovery and reuse. The current system of passing the waste on for 
disposal regardless of its contents is not desirable from a radiation safety 
management standpoint. The creation of undesirable waste can be 
reduced through radiochemistry. 
 It is recommended that all of the exhaust stacks that allow for 
removal of potentially contaminated air from radiochemical fume hoods 
be HEPA filtered and monitored for radioactive material releases. This 
was a plan many years ago that was put on hold until the 
Radiochemistry Program used more material or there was an indication 
that releases from filtered hoods could be significant. At the current time, 
the Radiochemistry Program has reached that threshold and exhaust 
from laboratories where radioactive materials are used should be 
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monitored for release. This demonstrates appropriate controls to 
regulators and answers questions about releases without extensive 
investigation into events that might have caused them. 
 In 2006, the UNLV Radiation Safety Advisory Committee decided to 
seek a Type A radioactive materials license as it was deemed appropriate 
for the future work with radioactive materials that would be done at 
UNLV [147]. A Type A license would help UNLV to communicate better 
among all Users, effect collaboration regarding safety issues, and allow a 
more detailed evaluation of some of the programs that have significant 
potential for increased risk to researchers and members of the general 
public. The pursuit of a Type A license should be restarted to support 
continued growth of the Radiochemistry Program. 
 Consistency and expertise is required to efficiently protect 
personnel using radiochemicals from inhalation and ingestion. The 
future administration of the radiation safety program at UNLV should 
consider these qualities for members of the radiation safety staff or for 
additions to the laboratory support staff. 
6.2 Recovery of Materials from Decontamination Solutions 
 The recovery of radionuclides or other valuable material from a 
decontamination gel used to remove radioactive contamination from a 
surface has been demonstrated, but more testing is needed to prove the 
feasibility. The decontamination gel is a relatively new removal agent that 
has been shown to be more useful than other products used for 
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collection of high surface activity concentrations in the past. We use 
many of them each day such as masking tape and protective film to 
protect surfaces. However, their use in decontamination of surfaces is 
limited and typically causes more radioactive waste than is necessary. 
The gel has a benign nature, is not caustic or toxic and has low 
flammability. These features alone make it more desirable to use than, 
for example, the strippable coatings of the past that were used for 
surface protection or decontamination. These coatings typically had a 
characteristic hazard or were more difficult to work with, were not 
reusable, and materials could not be easily recovered. 
 It has been shown that a decontamination gel could be used to 
remove technetium from a contaminated surface and a fraction of that 
material could then be recovered from the gel. Using the gel for 
decontamination and then recovering the contaminant may be valuable 
in the case where a material is spilled that has great value, the gel is 
used to recover the spilled material and some action is then required to 
remove the material from the gel. 
 Another feature of the decontamination gel that could be valuable 
that has not been researched is its value in sampling. The 
decontamination gel encapsulates materials and appears to encapsulate 
the hazard associated with materials as it dries. This feature may be 
useful in the sampling of hazardous or radioactive materials in the 
environment or the area near a detonated radionuclide dispersion device. 
In working with the gel for decontamination, it is apparent that its use as 
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a sampling tool could be valuable. Many properties of the 
decontamination gel have not been fully evaluated but its ability to 
encapsulate and collect loose surface contaminants is demonstrated. 
 Additives to a decontaminating hydrogel may increase its 
effectiveness in removal of fixed contamination from metal surfaces. 
Mineral acids with corrosive properties may be held on the metal surface 
with the gel and remove a fraction of the surface over some period of time 
depending on the concentration and type of acid used. 
6.3 Recovery of Materials from Planned Disposal 
  Recycling of natural resources occurs whether humans participate 
or not. In the case of radioactive materials for use in a laboratory or for 
use in a nuclear reactor, the benefits from recycling radionuclides in the 
form of waste products such as experimental residue, used nuclear fuel, 
or weapons can be enormous. In general, it results in cost savings to the 
researcher or the general public, and reduced environmental impact 
because of a lower, less toxic waste volume. In small scale recycling, the 
benefits may not be readily apparent, the cost savings may be small and 
the waste reduction may be small, but the act of decreasing the volume 
of toxic waste in the environment is desirable. In large recycling 
operations, such as recovery of usable fuel from previously used fuel 
bundles, the saving of our natural resources is more obvious. 
 When work at any facility using radioactive material is completed, 
the majority of the time, there are materials left over and work must be 
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done to verify that the facility can be released without the need for 
special controls. In many cases too much original stock material was 
procured and the remainder must be disposed of as waste, held in 
storage for future use, or provided to other people who are doing work 
with those radionuclides. In the case of the ‘UNLV Radionuclide Recovery 
Program’, established to obtain radionuclides for the UNLV 
Radiochemistry Program, the recovery of kilogram quantities of uranium 
compounds, kilogram quantities of thorium compounds, and 500 
milligrams of plutonium is considered a very successful procurement. 
The savings from disposal costs on the part of the donors was a success 
for their programs and the availability of these materials for the 
Radiochemistry Program will yield many successful research projects in 
the future. 
 In order to successfully achieve the procurement of radioactive 
materials from donors, solid communication and cooperation with the 
donating organization was fundamental. By continuing this program, the 
Radiochemistry Program could be successful in the procurement of even 
more actinides. Consideration should be given to establishing acceptance 
criteria to prevent receipt of materials that are not usable. 
 Recovery of radionuclides from planned disposal may require an 
acceptance criteria be established to prevent a facility from sending a 
waste product that is not useful. The criteria may simply be that the 
donated compound be in its original container or that a detailed 
evaluation of the purity of the compound is provided. These methods 
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may provide protection against receipt of a waste product. A more formal 
protection method may be written into a binding contract that requires 
the donation to be useful. This last criterion may reduce the number of 
donations as it has legal implications. 
6.4 Recovery of Materials from Experiment Residue 
 The recovery of materials from waste generated in researchers’ 
experiments may have already saved many thousands of dollars in 
disposal costs simply by destruction of the characteristic hazards of 
materials that could be classified as mixed radioactive and hazardous 
waste. Over the years many facilities have devised methods of dealing 
with a mixed waste problem by focusing on the destruction of the 
hazardous material, Some of the techniques used were thermal 
destruction, making the waste into a non-toxic chemical product, 
neutralizing it, or changing its chemical structure so that it is a more 
benign radioactive product that can be disposed of with other radioactive 
wastes. 
 The work discussed for this research focused on the removal of the 
radioactive material from the hazard so that the activity might be reused. 
This process is a partial solution to a mixed waste problem. The 
radionuclide concentration may be reduced, but the resulting waste 
product will still contain licensed material and if the hazard was not 
destroyed, mixed waste still exists. The future of this work is in the work 
of all research in radiochemistry that uses hazardous material. 
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Radiochemistry programs should recognize that the creation of a 
radioactive waste with a hazardous component is undesirable with our 
current technology. Putting radioactive materials that have hazardous 
components into storage, in the ground, or in tanks should be prevented 
and leaving the problem for future generations to solve has never been 
an appropriate solution. The end result of all future radiochemistry 
experiments should be a non-hazardous, minimally radioactive waste 
where the radioactive materials that could be reused have been removed 
from the residue and put into safe storage. 
6.5 Recovery of Uranium from Coal Ash 
 The coal ash samples analyzed from an AES plant in Oklahoma do 
not represent ash with economic feasibility to recover uranium. When 
compared with documents regarding the concentration of uranium in the 
United States, this material seems to have similar concentrations. The 
availability of uranium in a form that is easy to process drives the cost 
that industry is willing to pay. The cost of recovery of uranium in coal 
ash where the concentration is in the ppm range would require chemical 
methods that are similar to current methods to extract the uranium, but 
with a larger volume of feed material. As a result, the cost to recover the 
uranium from fly ash drives the cost of this uranium to a higher price 




Appendix A – Comparison of UNLV Radiation Safety Program 
Table 2-1 Comparison of Radiological Controls at UNLV Before and After 
Establishment of the Radiochemistry Program 
 
Radiological Control Procedures Before the 
Radiochemistry Program was Established 
 
Radiological Controls Established for the 
Radiochemistry Program 
 
Type B Radioactive Materials License 
issued by the State of Nevada – 03-13-
0305-01. Allowance for gram quantities of 
plutonium and uranium. 
 
Type B Radioactive Materials License 
issued by the State of Nevada – 03-13-
0305-01. Line item changes to allow gram 
quantities of technetium, neptunium, 
americium, and curium. 
 
Special Nuclear Material, Source Material, 
and other Radionuclides were allowed for 
research in any form with low activity 
limits for other radionuclides (100 
microcuries). 
 
Special Nuclear Material, Source Material, 
and other Radionuclides were allowed for 
research in any form.  Limits were 
increased for actinides. NMSS limits 
imposed for control of SNM. 
 
Smears from all UNLV laboratories using 
radioactive materials were analyzed by 
Liquid Scintillation Counting. 
 
Smears analyzed by Liquid Scintillation 
Counting for laboratories using 3H, 14C, by 
gas proportional counting for other 
laboratories. 
Training conducted annually for all groups 
without regard to their use of radioactive 
materials. 
 
Training provided specifically to the 
radiochemistry program participants 
because of the increased use of actinides 
and high activity of technetium.  Monthly 
newsletters specifically for radiochemistry. 
 
Contamination controls established to 
prevent removal of contamination from 
work areas. 
 
Radiochemistry contamination controls 
are established to prevent removal of 
contamination from laboratories because 




Dose rates in laboratories typically not 
measureable except from sealed sources or 
radiation producing machines. 
 
Dose rates in radiochemistry laboratories 
measureable in source storage areas. 
Ventilation from laboratories where 
radioactive materials are used is not 
filtered. 
 
New radiochemistry laboratories built with 
filtered ventilation.  Similar controls for 







Radiological Control Procedures Before the 
Radiochemistry Program was Established 
 
Radiological Controls Established for the 
Radiochemistry Program 
Visits to most laboratories at least weekly 
by radiation safety staff. 
 
Radiation Safety staff established to 




Number of personnel contaminations and 
spills of radioactive material not a 
concern. 
 
Increased number of spills and 
contamination spread noticeable from 
radiochemistry laboratories. 
Concern for inhalation or ingestion intake 
of radioactive materials is low.  There is no 
formal bioassay program as part of the 
radioactive materials license. 
 
Concern for inhalation or ingestion intake 
of radioactive materials increased as the 
activity of radioactive material used by 
some researchers approaches and exceeds 
an Annual Limit on Intake. State 
mandates formal bioassay program for the 
radiochemistry program.  RSO 
incorporates program for protocol controls. 
 
Laboratories are primarily the 
responsibility of one Authorized 
Radioactive Material User. 
 
Workload in the radiochemistry 
laboratories requires many users to work 
together providing supervision of many 
projects simultaneously.  New controls to 
ensure coverage are provided in a “Plan of 
the Week Form”. 
 
Work with radioactive materials was 
described in an Authorized Users 
application to become a User and seldom 
after that. 
 
Work done by researchers in the 
Radiochemistry Program is reviewed each 
week to ensure that proper controls are 
considered by the researcher and the 








Appendix B - Radiation Safety Training Program Newsletters 
 This appendix includes the technical content of 37 radiation safety 
newsletters produced as described in the main text of the dissertation. 
When published each newsletter was provided an identifying header and 
a message at the end that included contact information for the Radiation 
Laboratory Director. When training the instructor must be approachable 
and available and when people review the information later and 
questions arise there must be a way to resolve those questions. Indicate 
time of availability, office location, office phone, cell phone, etc. Make 
every reasonable effort to ensure that people believe you to be truthful 




Newsletter 1 – Contamination Surveys 
Whenever you work with radioactive materials, there is the possibility 
that some of the radioactive material evaded your control mechanism 
and may be spread to other parts of your laboratory or even outside of 
your laboratory. While the contamination spread is not likely to be 
hazardous to anyone, it may be in excess of our license conditions.  
In order to prevent this type of situation from developing, we take 
measurements of our work areas with portable instruments or in some 
cases we take smears for laboratory analysis to identify the level of 
surface contamination (or absence of it) in our work areas.  
When are contamination surveys required? 
Contamination surveys are desired in each laboratory where radioactive 
material is used, weekly, or immediately after unsealed radioactive 
materials are used in an area, whichever is more frequent. If you are 
using high-energy beta emitters, you should also evaluate your body and 
clothes for the presence of contamination after each procedure.  
What instrument should I use? 
The instrument that you use depends on the radionuclide that you use 
in your work area. For example if you are using isotopes of Uranium, 
Plutonium, Neptunium, Curium, or other radionuclides that have strong 
alpha or beta emissions, you should use a Geiger counter with a thin 
window to evaluate the surfaces of your work area and the area around 
it. These radionuclides are beta emitters whose emissions can be 
detected with portable instruments. If you are using 3H (tritium), 63Ni, or 
another radionuclide with very low energy emissions, you should 
consider use of a liquid scintillation counter (LSC) to evaluate smears of 
the work area and the area around it. 
What is a smear and how do I take one? 
A smear is a small (2 inch diameter) piece of paper or cloth that is wiped 
on a potentially radioactive area and then analyzed to determine the 
activity of radioactive material present in the area smeared. A smear is 
taken wearing gloves by rubbing the paper over an area of approximately 
100 cm2 (4 inches by 4 inches). If the area is very dry use a drop of water 
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on the smear. Contamination control limits are expressed in units of 
activity per 100 cm2. 
How do I know when an area is contaminated? 
An area is considered contaminated if there is any detectable radioactive 
material in that area. It is considered contaminated above limits when 
the activity found on a smear is greater than the activity indicated in the 
following table for each type of radioactive material listed. 
How do I convert count rate from an instrument to activity? 
The conversion of count rate to units of activity depends on the detection 
efficiency of the instrument. Consider the following two examples: 
You are using a Geiger counter with a thin window probe such as the 
Ludlum 44-9 and you observe a count rate of 100 counts per minute 
above background. If the radionuclide emits a higher energy beta particle 
such as 32P, the efficiency is about 15% or 0.15 counts/disintegration. 
The activity is then 100 cpm/0.15 = 667 dpm. Since the 44-9 probe 
(frisker probe) has an area of 20 cm2, the contamination level is 667 
dpm/ 20 cm2, or 3333 dpm/100 cm2. We always convert the surface 
activity to dpm/100 cm2 for comparison to the limits. 
If you are using smears for a low energy beta emitter such as 3H or 14C, 
take 100 cm2 smears. Each LSC has a certain detection efficiency for 3H 
and this is noted on your calibration documents. Usually this is around 
60% or higher for 3H beta particles. If you have a count rate of 100 cpm 
for a certain sample (in the 3H channel of course), the activity indicated 
by the smear = 100 cpm / 0.6 c/d / 100 cm2 = 167 dpm/100 cm2. 
  
Area  Alpha Emitters  Beta/Gamma Emitters  
Uncontrolled  11 dpm/100 cm2  110 dpm/100 cm2  
Controlled  22 dpm/100 cm2  220 dpm/100 cm2  




How do I survey for activity on my body? 
When surveying yourself for contamination, hold the probe so that the 
window opening faces the surface that you are surveying. Move the probe 
slowly over the surface (skin or clothing) at a distance of 1 cm or less 
from the surface. If the meter starts clicking faster, stop moving the 
probe and evaluate that area more closely. If the meter indicates a count 
rate more than 2 times the normal background count rate, there may be 
contamination present. 
What should I do if I identify activity on my body? 
In many cases, simple washing with water will remove activity from the 
skin. For clothing, it may be possible to remove the activity by applying 
tape to the surface and pulling it off. In some cases the activity may stick 
to the tape. In many cases where you are working with organic 
chemicals, the materials may bind to the clothing or skin. Some fraction 
of the material will then be absorbed into the skin and some will 
eventually slough off with dead skin or may be removed by further 
washing. 
Notify an authorized user or the RSO if there is contamination on the 
skin that is difficult to remove or if there is clothing contamination. 
The best means of preventing the spread of radioactive materials in 
laboratories is prevention of spills. The UNLV Radiation Safety Manual 
provides the following safe work practices: 
1. Good housekeeping is required where radionuclides are used. Work 
areas must be clearly defined and uncluttered. 
2. Work surfaces shall be covered to facilitate easy decontamination. 
Bench coverings shall be changed frequently, i.e., weekly, or whenever 
the covering is noticeably soiled, torn, or contaminated. 
3. Locate work areas away from heavy traffic or doorways. 
4. When moving radioactive solutions between approved locations, place 
the material within covered secondary containers that contain sufficient 




There are many good general rules for radiological control that I have 
picked up over the years regarding contamination control. Here are a 
few: 
When you are working with liquids and there is a potential for a spill or 
spray of the liquid, wear a face shield and a plastic apron. 
When you are surveying any area with a portable instrument, move the 
probe very slowly, 1 to 2 inches per second is the fastest that you should 
move a probe over an area. The faster you move the probe -the less likely 
that you are to detect the presence of activity on a surface.  
In general, you don't have to be concerned about radioactive material 
being in high airborne concentrations unless you are dealing with higher 
quantities of unsealed activity (greater than 1 millicurie) or the material 
is volatile (such as Iodine). If there is a potential for airborne radioactive 
materials the work should always be done in a ventilated hood (and the 




Newsletter 2 - Dosimetry 
Radiation Dosimetry is used to determine how much radiation dose we 
receive during our work with radioactive materials or radiation producing 
machines. In general, we can wear it to identify the dose that we receive 
from radiation exposure or to prove that we have not been exposed to 
radiation higher than background levels. 
The dosimetry that is used at UNLV is from a company named Landauer 
and the type is Luxel. 
When is dosimetry required? 
It is required that we wear dosimetry when the RSO has determined that 
it is possible that you could receive in excess of 10% of the Nevada 
Administrative Code (NAC) limits for radiation dose. All persons working 
with radioactive material in the laboratories at the HRC are trained in 
radiation safety and issued dosimetry for 2 month monitoring periods. 
Dosimetry is required for work with most radioactive materials at the 
HRC because the potential exists for someone to receive a dose in excess 
of 10% of the limits. However, you should be aware that no one working 
in the HRC in the past 5 years has received a dose in excess of 10% of 
the limits. Also, it is very unusual for people working in the HRC 
radiochemistry laboratories to receive any exposure at all! 
 
One great thing that dosimetry provides is a feeling that because we are 
doing things right, we don’t receive measurable dose – and the dosimetry 
results prove it. 
How does the Luxel dosimeter work? 
The Luxel optically stimulated luminescence (OSL) dosimeter measures 
radiation exposure due to x-ray, beta, and gamma radiation using a thin 
layer of aluminum oxide. After use, the aluminum oxide is stimulated 
with a laser and produces luminescence in proportion to the amount of 




The Luxel dosimeters have several advantages over the monitors of many 
other manufacturers, the Luxel dosimeters are: 
 more durable, 
 water resistant, 
 more sensitive, doses possible down to 1 mrem, 
 more accurate, 
 allow determination of whether or not the exposure was static. 
What are the UNLV Occupational Dose Limits? 
The annual limits for exposure to ionizing radiation at UNLV are the 
same as those published by the State of Nevada, 5 rem per year Total 
Effective Dose Equivalent. 
UNLV also has an administrative control level of 500 mrem/year, 
investigation is required if any person exceeds 83 mrem for the two 
month monitoring period. This is 10% of the annual limits stated above. 
What if I lose my assigned dosimeter? 
The Luxel dosimeter is the legal means for determination of your dose 
due to occupational exposure to ionizing radiation at UNLV. If the RSO 
does not get your dosimeter back at the end of the monitoring period, a 
dose estimate is made to determine your dose based on the work that 
you did or the dose determined from another person doing the same type 
of work for the same time period. 
 
If you turn in a lost dosimeter report, the RSO will issue you another 
dosimeter. There is no penalty associated with losing the dosimeter. But, 
if you lose a dosimeter and do not turn in a lost dosimeter report, the 
RSO may not issue you a new dosimeter and will put a hold on your 
records with the registrar until either your dosimeter is returned or a lost 
dosimetry report is provided so that the RSO can complete your dose 
records for you. 
What if I'm Pregnant? 
If you discover that you are pregnant and you declare your pregnancy in 
writing to the Radiation Safety Officer, RMS will provide two dosimeters 
to you - one for monitoring you and one for monitoring your future child. 
The limits for exposure of your unborn child are more restrictive (500 
mrem/ 9 months) than your exposure limits. Depending on your job and 
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past radiation exposure history, the Radiation Safety Officer may 
recommend that you be reassigned to a job with less exposure. The 
Radiation Safety Officer keeps exposure records for your badge and for 
your fetal badge. 
How do I get a report of my exposure? 
While you are monitored for radiation exposure by UNLV, the UNLV 
Radiation Safety Office maintains your exposure records. After you are 
officially hired by another company, your records are maintained by 




Newsletter 3 – Training 
One of the most important aspects of radiation safety is training all 
people that will be working with radioactive materials or radiation 
producing machines. Without a fundamental knowledge of radiation 
protection, people would not know how to protect themselves from 
radiation emissions or prevent the spread of contamination. 
When is training required? 
It is required that every person that will be exposed to radiation 
associated with radiation producing machines or radioactive sources at 
least annually. 
What courses are required? 
There are three basic courses for radiation safety at the Harry Reid 
Center. The course sessions that you attend depend on what your job is 
and whether you will be working with sealed sources of radiation and 
radiation producing machines, unsealed sources of radioactive material, 
or working in the laboratories but not working with radioactive materials. 
If you are a radioactive material user or assistant researcher and work 
with radioactive materials in liquid or other unsealed form, you will 
receive unsealed sources training. 
If you work with sealed sources or x-ray machines, you will receive 
radiation producing devices training. 
 
If you require access to the laboratory areas but do not work with 
radioactive materials, you need to attend the Basic Radiation Safety 
course. 
How will I know when to attend training? 
You will be notified by the Radiation Safety Officer or by the Radiation 
Laboratory Director when training is required. Failure to attend training 
after two notifications will result in loss of privileges to use radioactive 
materials, to operate radiation producing devices, or to enter areas where 




What if I miss the training? 
If you do not attend training, you should not enter areas where 
radioactive materials or radiation producing machines are in use. If you 
miss the training you should reschedule a session with the Radiation 
Safety Office. 
Is Computer Based Training Allowed? 
No, computer based training for initial or re-qualification training for 
work with radioactive materials or radiation producing machines at the 
HRC is not allowed. If you take the computer based training provided by 
the RMS department, you will also have to take the radiation safety 
course offered by the Radiation Laboratory Director. 
Does Training from Other Facilities Count? 





Newsletter 4 – Radioactive Waste  
When radioactive materials are used in an unsealed form, radioactive 
waste is usually created. Typically, this waste is laboratory supplies, 
protective clothing, pipettes, liquid scintillation samples, and the vials 
that the radioactive material came in. 
We have several important rules for radioactive waste disposal that 
anyone working with unsealed radioactive materials must know and 
abide by. 
How do I dispose of radioactive waste? 
All radioactive wastes are collected by the Radiation Safety Office for 
disposal. If you have wastes that should be removed from your laboratory 
simply notify Tom or Trevor, and we will package the waste and call the 
Radiation Safety Office to schedule a waste pickup. Appropriate and 
legible records of waste content must be in order and accompany the 
waste. 
Where do the wastes go? 
Radioactive wastes from laboratories are transported to the Radiation 
Protection Laboratory for evaluation, packaging, storage for decay, or 
eventual transport to a licensed radioactive waste site. 
The exact handling, packaging, and destination site for the waste 
depends on the type of material, radionuclide content, radionuclide 




How do I segregate radioactive waste in my laboratory? 
For laboratory disposal, there are basically 7 types of radioactive waste 
as follows: 
1. Short-lived solid radioactive waste. This waste consists of materials 
contaminated with radionuclides that have a short half-life (less than 
90 days), such as 32P, 35S, 125I, etc. 
2. Long-lived radioactive waste is solid waste that contains radionuclides 
with half-lives greater than 90 days, such as 3H, 14C, 239Pu, 238U, etc. 
3. Liquid waste can be the remains of experiments that are liquid and 
contain concentrations of radioactive material. If you will be 
generating liquid waste you should discuss your process with the 
Radiation Laboratory Director or the Radiation Safety Officer. 
4. Mixed waste is radioactive hazardous waste. It contains two 
components: 1. a radioactive material and 2. a hazardous material. – 
Do not create a mixed waste without written permission from the 
Radiation Safety Officer and approval of the Radiation Safety Advisory 
Committee. 
5. Radioactive bio-hazard waste. As the name implies this waste is both 
a radioactive material and a bio-hazard. Before delivery of such waste 
to the RSO, the bio-hazard must be removed through autoclaving. The 
RSO should be involved with the autoclave process for radioactive 
waste. Bags containing the waste and waste records must indicate 
that it has been autoclaved. 
6. Radioactive needles, razor blades, broken glass, or other puncture or 
cutting hazard. Do not include these with any other type of waste – 
package them separately in a labeled sharps container. 
7. Other waste – for other types of waste (those not fitting the definitions 
above); please discuss options with the Radiation Laboratory Director 





Important Information and Directions 
You should use a different container for each type of radioactive waste 
that you will create. There are many reasons for this, so let me explain a 
few that are very important: 
Do not mix long lived and short lived wastes because short lived wastes 
are stored in the RPL until they become non-radioactive and can be 
disposed of in normal trash. 
Do not mix hazardous and radioactive waste because mixed waste is 
approximately 20 times as expensive to dispose of as radioactive waste. 
Also, special handling of this waste type is required. 
Do not throw non-radioactive waste in radioactive trash. All waste in a 
radioactive waste container is treated as radioactive and this will 
unnecessarily increase costs of radioactive waste disposal. 
Do not place containers of liquids in bags. They might leak and cause a 
serious spill of radioactive materials onto non-radioactive materials 
increasing waste volume and associated cost of cleanup. 
Do not place sharps (needles, razor blades, broken glass) into any 
radioactive waste bags. They may cause puncture injury to persons 
carrying the waste or break through the bags to cause a spill of 
radioactive material. 
How does the RSO keep track of radioactive waste? 
Each user of unsealed radioactive sources that creates radioactive waste 
must document this by using a Waste Disposal Inventory, RSO form 
number 3 or equivalent method approved by the RSO. Each time 
material is put into a radioactive waste container, the appropriate waste 
inventory log should be updated. Records must be legible. 
The RSO must take the log from each user as the waste is picked up and 
provide an accounting of the radioactive material in each radioactive 
waste container that we send to a licensed radioactive waste site. 
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The waste log from each user must be accurate regarding what 
radionuclides and the activity of each radionuclide in the waste. 
How much does it cost to dispose of radioactive waste? 
It really depends on the type of waste but a general figure that could be 
used to determine the cost of bulk solid radioactive waste disposal is 
approximately $1000 to $2000 per drum including packaging, handling, 
waste site fees, regulatory agency fees, and transportation charges. 
With everyone’s help we can reduce the amount of radioactive waste that 
is generated. Think about what you are throwing away as radioactive. Is 
it really radioactive? 
High activity sources and high concentration waste may significantly 
increase the cost associated with disposal or transportation or both. 
Of course the most important aspect of radioactive waste disposal is 
associated with its final resting place. Ensure that radioactive waste is 
properly controlled, properly disposed, and does not represent a hazard 




Newsletter 5 – Security of Radioactive Materials 
Areas where radioactive materials are used or stored must have special 
security precautions to prevent unauthorized exposure of untrained 
personnel to radiation and also to prevent theft of the material. 
The State of Nevada Radiological Health Office and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission have increased their efforts to ensure that 
facilities using radioactive materials properly control and secure those 
materials. 
What if the sources are very low in activity? 
Many sources of radioactive material at the HRC are very low in activity, 
however, some are not. The radiation hazards are minimal to trained 
people, but the degree of regulatory concern is significant. All radioactive 
sources must be secured when not in use. If we don’t live by the rules, 
we can lose our authorization to use radioactive materials. 
How should sources be stored? 
When not in use and under the direct supervision of an authorized User 
of radioactive materials, they must be locked in a secure location. 
The UNLV policy for radioactive material security is as follows: 
 
All areas where radioactive materials are used shall be posted with a 
“Caution Radioactive Materials” sign. All radioactive materials shall only 
be used by trained personnel. All personnel working in a laboratory 
where radioactive materials are in use shall be aware of the presence of 
the material in the laboratory. All radioactive materials not in use shall 
be in a locked container. 
 
If at any time, radioactive materials are identified as missing from the 
laboratory, the RSO shall be contacted immediately. Contact numbers for 





Why is security of low level sources of radiation important? 
Although low activity radioactive sources have virtually no potential for 
health effect, if they are handled correctly, public fear of radiation has 
caused regulatory agencies to provide enforcement actions that minimize 
public outcry. 
These actions are intended to prevent untrained persons from getting 
radioactive materials so that fear of perceived health effects is also 
minimized. 
What if sources are missing? 
Radioactive material users should always be aware of the status of 
radioactive materials that have been trusted to them by the RSO and the 
State. If you identify that one or more radioactive sources are missing, 
search the area, notify the radioactive material user – if it is gone, the 




Newsletter 6 – Contamination Control  
Radioactive contamination is radioactive material where it is not 
wanted.  
Control of radioactive contamination in the laboratory is the responsibility of 
each Radioactive Material User at UNLV. In controlling the spread 
radioactive material we minimize the potential for intake and reduce 
external dose rates in the laboratory. 
Contamination control is discussed here for all personnel who enter the 
HRC laboratories to enable an understanding of the radioactive material 
user’s responsibility. 
Things you should do to maintain control of radioactive material: 
1. Delineate a work area in your laboratory. Ensure that the area is not 
subject to high personnel traffic that may cause items to be touched or 
knocked off of the laboratory bench. 
2. Wear protective clothing (gloves and laboratory coat) to prevent the 
spread of contamination. 
3. Complete surveys each time that you use radioactive materials to ensure 
that no material is spread to other parts of your laboratory. Surveys may 
be done by direct monitoring for some radionuclides but must be done 
using smears and liquid scintillation counting for others. 
4. Ensure that you monitor any items that are taken out of the 
contaminated area. Remember, anything in that area is suspected of 
being contaminated until proven not to be. 
5. There must be no food, drink or cosmetics stored or used in any 
laboratory where there exists a potential for intake of radioactive or 
hazardous materials. 
6. All containers for radioactive or hazardous materials must be labeled 
appropriately and should not be food or drink containers. 
7. Alpha emitting radionuclides and volatile radioactive materials must be 
maintained in sealed containers to prevent an unknown spread of 
contamination. These items can escape an open container and cause 
contamination outside the container if just left open. 
8. Work areas should be covered with an impermeable material to protect 
the work bench from getting contaminated from small spills. 
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9. If the technique used for transfer of radioactive materials to your samples 
causes splashing or splattering – you are doing something wrong. Use a 
technique that prevents these phenomena. 
10. When transferring materials from your work area to an analysis area or 
other location, ensure that the material cannot spill. Always use a 
secondary container with enough absorbent to contain twice the 
amount of liquid in the container. 
11.  Remember, gloves are not just to protect you from getting materials on 
your skin. They are also to prevent the spread of contamination from 
one area to another. If you suspect that your gloves are contaminated, 
don’t touch other items, change your gloves. Only wear your gloves 
when handling potentially contaminated materials. Take them off to 
handle materials outside the contaminated area. 
12. Never leave a container of radioactive material uncovered. Remember 
Murphy’s law, only vials that are uncapped will fall over. 
13. If you use a detection instrument, have it turned on and adjacent to 
your work area so that you can check your hands or items moved from 
the contaminated area to the clean area frequently. 




Newsletter 7 – Transporting Radioactive Materials at UNLV  
Whenever working with or transporting radioactive materials you must 
ensure that the samples or sources are protected from damage or spills. 
The best ways to do this is to provide a secondary container for the 
material, select a path for transportation that is not crowded or difficult 
to get through, and ensure that someone else knows that you are 
transporting radioactive materials in case you need help. 
What are the requirements for transporting radioactive materials? 
Radioactive materials have different transportation requirements 
depending on whether they will be transported on campus or off campus. 
The Department of Transportation has many requirements for transport 
of radioactive materials on public roads. These have to do with 
packaging, labeling, security, documentation, emergency procedures, 
posting, placarding, and contents of packages. 
Only the UNLV RSO can authorize transport of radioactive materials 
from UNLV on public roads. Do not transport radioactive materials off 
campus without specific permission of the UNLV RSO. 
Persons, who transport sources off campus must be trained in DOT 
requirements, understand the source control measures needed for 
transportation of their specific source; know how to use the 
transportation checklist for radioactive materials, and how to provide the 
DOT required documentation for their shipment. 
What about transporting radioactive material between laboratories? 
Whenever transporting radioactive materials between laboratories in the 
same building or in different buildings on campus, you should be 
primarily concerned with preventing a spill of the material. The radiation 
safety manual provides guidance as follows: Always use rubber or plastic 
gloves when handling radioactive material. Laboratory coats shall be 
worn in the laboratory and left in the laboratory. Do not wear gloves or 
laboratory coats out of the laboratory unless PPE is required when 




Some Other Transportation Considerations 
Always work over trays or work surfaces lined with absorbent material. 
Keep and transport radioactive materials doubly contained. 
When moving a radioactive solution to another approved location, place 
the solution in a covered secondary container to prevent a spill. 
When moving radioactive material between non-connecting rooms, fluids 
must be in closed containers to prevent spills and solids must be 
completely enclosed. The exterior container must be free of 
contamination. The transfer shall be made directly, such that radioactive 
material is not carried about more than is necessary and is never left 
unattended. Hard beta and gamma sources must be adequately shielded. 
There are many other logical control measures that should be taken 
when transporting radioactive materials, consider the following: 
Bring protective clothing on your transportation journey (a minimum of 
gloves) just in case you have a spill. Use absorbent in the transport 
container and bring some extra absorbent material to recover from a 
spill. 
Carry a cell phone or have another person with you to ensure that you 
can contact help if you need to. In case you are transporting a sensitive 




Newsletter 8 – Using Radiation Detectors 
The only way to identify the immediate presence of ionizing radiation is 
through the use of a radiation detector. There are many different types of 
radiation detectors depending on the type and quantity of radiation you 
must measure. 
What kind of instrument do I need? 
The type of instrument required for your application must take into 
account the type of radiation emitted from the material or machine that 
you are using, the energy of that radiation, and how much radiation is 
emitted. 
If you are using 3H or 63Ni, the energy of the beta radiation emissions 
from these radionuclides is very low and a portable instrument is not 
very useful to detect them. Control should be by the use of smears 
counted on a liquid scintillation counter. 
If you are using 99Tc, 33P, 32P, 35S, or 14C, a pancake GM is adequate for 
contamination control because the energy of the beta emissions can be 
detected with this type of instrument. 
If you are using 241Am, 239Pu, or other alpha emitting radionuclide, the 
most appropriate instrument may be an alpha scintillation detector for 
contamination control. 
 
If you are working with high intensity x-ray machines (analytical), the 
most appropriate instrument is a thin wall ionization chamber. This type 
detector will adequately alert you to a high dose rate hazard associated 
with scatter from this type of machine. 
 
If you have a new application or use for radioactive materials or radiation 
producing machines, please contact me. I will evaluate your situation 




What is the basic procedure to use an instrument? 
Before you use any radiation detector to measure radiation you must:  
1. Look at the instrument for damage, 
2. Look at the calibration sticker to see if it is in calibration (the 
calibration due date should be in the future),  
3. Turn the instrument on and check the battery (there may be a battery 
check position on the dial, or you may have to push a battery check 
button),  
4. Turn the instrument to the scale that you want to use and place the 
detector over the check source. You should get a response as 
indicated on the calibration sticker, 
5. Write down the reading on the survey form for your laboratory.  
What if the battery check indicates a less than satisfactory 
reading? 
In this case, don’t use the instrument until you change the batteries. 
The readings will only be valid with a satisfactory battery check. 
You can replace the batteries just as in a flashlight or TV remote control. 
Find the compartment and identify the battery orientation. Remove the 
old batteries and place the new batteries in the compartment – close the 
battery compartment cover and once again check the batteries. 
When do I have to take measurements? 
You should take measurements each time that you use radioactive 
materials or use a different scattering configuration for the radiation 
producing machine. These measurements may be for dose rate or surface 
contamination. The instrument will give you an idea if the magnitude of 
dose rate or contamination where the measurement is taken. If 
measurements are different than expected, contact the RSO. 
What is background and why must I measure/record it? 
Background radiation is the radiation emitted from the materials that 
make up our earth and from materials and machines in our laboratories. 
Any response from your instrument that is not what you want to 
measure can be considered to be from background emissions. These 
measurements should be subtracted from your readings of the things 
that you do want to measure. The net result is the measurement that 
you are interested in and all measurements must be recorded. 
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What is the difference between dose rate and count rate? 
Dose is the deposition of ionizing radiation energy in a material like our 
bodies. Dose rate measurements from an instrument indicate how much 
energy would be deposited in our bodies in a time period. The units of 
measurements on dose rate meters are usually millirem/hour or micro-
rem/hour. 
Count rate is typically associated with the response of an instrument 
designed to measure surface contamination. The “count rate” is due to 
the number of radiation interactions in the detector per unit of time. The 
unit of measurement for count rate meters is typically counts per minute 
(CPM). 
What do the readings mean? 
If you have a dose rate meter, the reading on the meter is the dose rate in 
the units for that meter setting (millirem/hour or rem/hour). Don’t forget 
to use the scale multiplier. Take a reading outside of your laboratory – 
this is the background dose rate. If the readings in your laboratory are 
similar, you are only exposed to background radiations. The background 
dose rate is usually less than 20 micro-rem/hour in our buildings and 
outside. If you have dose rates in excess of 1 millirem/hour and the RSO 
is not aware of your operation, please contact him or her. You may have 
a condition that warrants further control measures. 
If you have a contamination measurement instrument such as a pancake 
GM detector, the reading indicates CPM or counts per minute. Take a 
reading on a surface outside of your laboratory; this is background 
(typically between 20 to 200 CPM for a beta/gamma instrument and 0 to 
20 CPM for an alpha instrument. 
How do I convert CPM to surface activity concentration? 
The conversion of count rate to surface activity is dependent upon the 
type and energy of the emissions from the radionuclides that you use in 
your laboratory. The detector used will have different detection 
efficiencies for the emissions from different radionuclides. This efficiency 
is indicated in percent or in counts per disintegration. 
Consider that the count rate from a smear is 2000 CPM, the radionuclide 
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is 14C, background is 100 CPM and the detector is a Ludlum 44-9 probe. 
The detection efficiency for this detector, for this radionuclide’s emission 
is approximately 10% so the surface activity “seen” by the detector is 
approximately: 
A = (2000 CPM – 100 CPM) / 0.1 C/D  
A = 19000 DPM. 
19,000 DPM /60 Bq/DPM 




Newsletter 9 – Laboratory Access 
Laboratory access to the radiochemistry laboratories is strictly controlled 
via proximity cards and keys to provide security for our instruments, 
radioactive materials, and experiments. 
Who has access to the radiochemistry laboratories? 
General access to the laboratories is authorized by the Directors and 
Primary Investigators of the HRC. People allowed access include faculty 
and staff of the Nuclear Science and Technology Division, students in the 
radiochemistry program, safety personnel who may provide an 
emergency function, and visitors from other universities or national 
laboratories working with the radiochemistry program. 
CAUTION 
 
Do not allow anyone that you do not know to use your proximity card. 
Each card provides information to the proximity card tracking system 
that identifies the card used to open any door. If you loan your card to 
someone else and they are not trustworthy – you are responsible for any 
loss of material, loss of instrument function, or damage to the laboratory 
that was entered.  
How are keys and proximity cards controlled? 
The Radioactive Materials Laboratory Manager is responsible for 
proximity card access to the laboratories through coordination with the 
lock shop. The Facility Director controls key access to any part of the 
Center. Laboratory access using keys is only allowed for emergency 
purposes or special access to rooms that do not have proximity access. 
What if I do not have a proximity card and need one? 
Contact your supervisor and have them submit a key or proximity card 
request. If they need assistance, then have them contact the RSO, or 
Laboratory Manager. If your request is granted, a card will be delivered to 
you within a week. If it is not, then you may contact the Laboratory 




What if I need access to another room that was not on my 
original authorization? 
Similar to the authorization for a proximity card, contact the Laboratory 
Manager and indicate your need. The need will be discussed with your 
supervisor and you will be notified of the decision regarding your access 
to the room. 
What if someone else needs access and I have it? Can I let them in? 
If someone that has access to the laboratories needs something from a 
laboratory that they do not have access to, then consider the need and 
provide access if the request is reasonable. However, if you allow 
someone into a laboratory, ensure that you accompany them for the 
whole time that they stay – otherwise don’t let them in. All authorized 
people should be very cautious to only allow access to people that they 
know and trust. 
What if someone is outside of the laboratories and doesn’t have a 
proximity card? 
If the person does not have a proximity card and you don’t know them as 
a part of the program, then have them contact the Authorized User for 
the laboratory or the Laboratory Manager. Do not let anyone into the 
laboratory area unless you absolutely know that they are allowed to be 
there. 
What if a maintenance technician needs access to fix something in 
the laboratories? 
In the case of an emergency, let them in and stay with them so that they 
can check themselves out of the area. Be sure that our contamination 
control measures are always followed. Contact the Laboratory Manager 
immediately. 
If it is not an emergency, then do not allow them to enter, contact one of 
the Authorized Users so that the person can be escorted into the area 
and assist them if equipment needs to be moved or turned off and so that 
the can check themselves out of the area. The Laboratory Manager is the 




What if I find a door to one of the laboratories open or unlocked? 
If a door is open and should be closed, close it. If a door is unlocked that 
should be locked, then call the laboratory manager and let him/her know 
about the door. 
What if I see someone in the laboratory area that I have never 
seen before? 
In this case, introduce yourself and find out who they are. If they don’t 
belong in the laboratories, then either ask them to leave or contact the 
Laboratory Manager to help them find their way out of there. 
Some Final Words: 
Every person who does work in the Radioactive Materials laboratory area 
is allowed to work there based on the fact that they received training and 
understand that work in the laboratory is governed by a radioactive 
materials license that defines controls. Compliance with the rules is not 
an option, it is a necessity! 
The risk associated with allowing unauthorized people to enter 
laboratories without controls cannot be understated. The ability to do the 
type of research that is allowed here is based on the ability to meet the 
conditions of the radioactive materials license. It is up to each person 
authorized to work in the laboratories to ensure license compliance so 




Newsletter 10 – Personnel Contamination 
Personnel decontamination methods should be of interest to all 
personnel using radioactive materials. If you are an “Authorized or 
Assistant User”, the people that you supervise are under your direct 
care and as such may need your assistance for decontamination. If 
there is any instance of personnel or clothing contamination ensure 
that there is appropriate documentation of the event. 
The most important response will ensure that the contaminated 
person is not injured by the material either as a result of its 
chemical or radiological properties. In most of our laboratories the 
chemical properties of the materials handled will present the most 
important hazard. If personnel are contaminated with chemicals, 
ensure that there is immediate response to any event that may 
cause injury. 
In documentation identify the people involved, the radionuclide(s), 
chemical form, activity, body location, skin area, and other 
information pertinent to estimation of skin dose as a result of this 
occurrence. If you have a camera, get a picture. 
Please review this newsletter to identify the proper technique for 
decontamination and your responsibilities should you, your 
assistants, visitors, or students, experience personnel 
contamination. 
Skin Contamination: Your Own or Someone Else's. 
Upon finding contamination on the skin, use the proper survey 
instrument for the radionuclide present to determine the highest contact 
response rate and the highest response rate at 10 cm from the 
contaminated body location. Use a Geiger counter, gas proportional 
detector or scintillation detector, as appropriate and note the meter 
readings (measured in counts per minute CPM) and the estimated size of 
area that is contaminated. 
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Do not use abrasive soaps or brushes to remove the contamination. 
This may remove the protective layer of the skin, opening up the 
body for intake. 
Wash the contaminated area with soap and warm water. Cold water will 
constrict the pores of the skin making it more difficult to remove the 
contamination. However, hot water may expand the pores of your skin 
that may allow the contamination to further penetrate the skin surface. 
Notify the Radiation Laboratory Director or the RSO as soon as 
possible.  
After the first washing, re-survey the contaminated area, noting the 
response and determine if the decontamination has caused a reduction 
in the response of the meter. 
If there has been no reduction, do not proceed with further 
decontamination. Wait for the Authorized User or the RSO to assess the 
contamination and prescribe any further actions. 
If the contamination has been removed, record the information required 
on form RSO-D1. Notify the Authorized User and the RSO of the event 
and ensure that you have documentation of the individual’s name, date, 
the model number of the instrument used, the maximum response of the 
instrument used, duration of activity on the skin, location where the 
event occurred, and reason for the contamination. 
If the first decontamination attempt was somewhat successful, conduct 
another wash (do not exceed two washes without the Authorized User or 
the RSO present). After the second wash re-survey the area with the 
appropriate contamination survey instrument and record the 
instrument response and information similar to the previous paragraph. 
After the contamination has been removed, the information will be sent 
to the RSO who will document a dose assessment. Knowing the activity 
of the material that was on the skin and the time it was there will 
greatly assist in RSO's efforts to accurately estimate a skin dose. 
Remember, contamination of the skin can be avoided with good 
laboratory practices as well as using the appropriate personal protective 
equipment such as laboratory coat, gloves, etc. 
Clothing Contamination 
Remove contaminated items immediately. Monitor the skin under the 
contaminated clothing. If skin is contaminated, use the skin 
decontamination procedure. Place all clothing items that are 
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contaminated in a bag and label with the individual’s name, date, 
radionuclide used, the type of meter used (model and serial number), 
and the count rate observed. 
Notify the Radiation Laboratory Director or the UNLV RSO as soon 
as possible. 
Contamination of the Eyes 
NOTE: Chemical contamination of the eyes is the greatest threat 
to loss of sight and must be of primary concern. 
Immediately flush eye(s) with water. Evaluate the results of the flushing 
periodically to determine its effectiveness. Do not flush more than twice 
without one of the HRC Users or the RSO present. Each flushing 
should not exceed 2 minutes. 
If there is apparent damage and sight is not immediately restored, notify 




Newsletter 11 – Protective Clothing 
Protective clothing is worn when working with radioactive materials to 
prevent contamination of the skin and minimize the spread of 
contamination from the work area. 
When working with radioactive materials in the radiochemistry 
laboratories, always wear your laboratory coat, gloves, and safety glasses 
as the minimum PPE (Personal Protective Equipment). Consult your User 
for additional requirements. 
The UNLV Radiation Safety Manual provides the following guidance 
for protective clothing use (page 21): 
"F. PROTECTIVE CLOTHING POLICY 
1.  Personnel working in areas designated on laboratory maps where 
radioactive materials are in use or stored must wear protective 
garments. Open toed shoes and sandals are not permitted. The usual 
laboratory coat and disposable gloves are considered minimum 
fulfillment of this requirement. Persons working with greater than 1 
mCi of an unsealed source of radioactivity must cover their legs with 
pants or a long skirt to protect them against absorption of activity in 
the case of a spill. Additional protective garments may be required by 
the User or the UNLV RSO. 
2.  Maintenance/custodial personnel shall receive access clearance and 
protective clothing requirement instructions prior to entering and 
working in designated radioactive material storage and use areas." 
Protective clothing is the responsibility of the Authorized User of 
radioactive materials. If there is ever a question about the need for more 
than the minimum requirement the appropriate User for the material 
that you are using should be contacted. 
Every effort must be made to use engineering controls to ensure that 
personnel are not exposed to unnecessary levels of airborne radioactive 
materials. In the unusual case where engineering controls are not 
available or cannot provide adequate control, respiratory protection may 
be required. If respirators are required, you must be medically evaluated 
to ensure that the respirator will not damage your respiratory system, 
you must be fit tested, and you must be trained to use the specific 




Check Your Protective Clothing Before Wearing It! 
Any time that you will be wearing protective clothing; take the time to 
ensure that it will provide the proper protection. 
For gloves, check to ensure that they do not have holes and are not 
degraded to where they will develop holes or tears when you wear them. 
For laboratory coats, leg covers, or coveralls, ensure that they do not 
have holes or rips in the fabric. If you are using liquids, wear a fabric 
that will not allow transmission of the liquid to you or your clothing. 
Plastic clothing or Tyvek
®
 will usually provide this protection. 
For face masks, ensure that they do not obscure your vision as a result 
of scratches in the mask. Also, ensure that the head straps are adequate 
to hold the mask firmly in position over your face. 
For respirators, check to ensure that the mask is clear, the straps are 
not worn or abraded, the inlet and outlet valve work properly, and you 




Newsletter 12 – Ventilation of Radiological Laboratories at HRC 
Laboratories where radioactive materials are used or stored have 
ventilation requirements to minimize or prevent inhalation or ingestion of 
radioactive materials. This ventilation may be provided by a chemical 
fume hood approved for the radionuclides and/or chemicals used in the 
laboratory. 
The following are details of the UNLV Chemical Fume Hood Guide: 
Facilities Maintenance Personnel shall contact the person responsible for 
the laboratory to schedule service, and shall not enter a laboratory or 
area posted for radiation safety unless accompanied by the authorized 
user or Radiological Safety Office personnel. Written Radiological Safety 
Officer (RSO) approval shall be posted on a radiological hood prior to 
servicing. 
Any person working on or assisting with fume hood repairs in radioactive 
materials laboratories must be under the direct supervision of the 
responsible laboratory director or a member of the Radiation Safety 
Office staff. The only exception is work that has the specific written 
approval of the RSO. 
The RSO shall routinely monitor fume hoods during inspections, routine 
surveys, at the request of the authorized user, or prior to scheduled 
repair or maintenance. 
The authorized user of radioactive materials shall control 
radioactive materials used in hoods as follows: 
Radioactive materials shall be secured against unauthorized removal, 
and all surfaces decontaminated and surveyed to assure that no 
contamination remains when unattended. This is to ensure that no 




The authorized user or his assistants shall promptly notify the RSO 
of any spill, accident, or any operation which may have 
contaminated the hood or released any contamination through the 
hood to ductwork or air in an uncontrolled area. THIS IS 
IMPORTANT! 
The ventilation systems in the radioactive materials laboratories 
discharge through High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) systems. 
Surveys 
If you do work with radioactive materials in a hood you should recognize 
that some materials may easily spread from the work location to other 
parts of the hood because of turbulence and air movement in the hood. 
OBJECTS SHOULD NOT BE PLACED AT THE REAR OF THE HOOD 
WHERE THEY MIGHT IMPEDE AIR FLOW. 
Smear surveys should be done in the hood right after any use of 
radioactive materials especially if work is done with other materials that 
are not radioactive. 
A hood is not necessarily a shield for your material and high activity 
gamma or neutron emitting sources may cause high dose rates on the 
other side of the wall that the hood is mounted on. 
REMEMBER THAT ANY TIME YOU CAN SMELL A CHEMICAL OR 
SOLVENT, YOU ARE BEING EXPOSED TO THAT SUBSTANCE. 
NOTIFY YOUR SUPERVISOR IMMEDIATELY IF YOU THINK THAT 




Newsletter 13 – Postings for Radiation Safety 
This month's newsletter discusses how areas and materials are labeled 
or posted to provide awareness of potential hazards. Signs are used to 
identify the presence of radioactive materials or radiation producing 
devices in rooms or buildings on campus. Labels are used to identify the 
radionuclides, activity, or hazard class of radioactive materials or the 
emission location for x-rays from a machine. 
Rooms or buildings where radioactive materials are used or stored are 
posted with a "Caution Radioactive Materials" sign. This type of sign may 
have many different phrases. A typical sign on campus where radioactive 
materials are used may be as follows: A common feature of radiation 
safety signs is the trefoil, the international symbol for radiation or 
radioactive materials. The trefoil is usually magenta on a yellow 




Areas where the dose rate is greater than 5 mrem/hour are posted 
"Caution - Radiation Area". If the dose rate is greater than 100 
mrem/hour, the area is posted "Caution - High Radiation Area". We do 
not have any High Radiation Areas or Very High Radiation Areas in the 
Radiochemistry Laboratories. The posting for a radiation area may be as 
follows: 
When you are in a laboratory where a radiation area exists from a source 
or a radiation producing machine, be aware of the location of the highest 
dose rates and minimize the time that you might be close to the source 
or to the location where radiation is emitted from a machine. 





There may be any number of ways a source of radioactive material is 
labeled. A typical label indicates the radionuclide, activity, and dose rate 











X-ray machines are required to be posted with specific wording to alert 






Other signs and labels may be used on campus to identify radioactive 
materials or the existence of radiation at levels higher than normal 
background radiation. Be aware of the postings and labels used, the 
location of sources of radiation, and how to minimize your dose. If you 






Newsletter 14 – Radioactive Materials Regulations 
All people using radioactive materials at UNLV are required to ensure 
that the regulations of the State of Nevada and our radioactive materials 
license are complied with. This newsletter provides you with some simple 
reasons why these regulations are important and the ways that 
compliance is typically achieved. 
Why is radioactive material licensed? 
Most governments require the control of radioactive materials or 
radiation producing devices to ensure that they are used safely and their 
use does not cause harm to other people or to the environment. 
Radioactive material licenses require the submission of an application 
that describes what material is licensed, why the material is required, 
how the material will be controlled to prevent unnecessary exposure of 
people, safety procedures, emergency procedures, worker’s training and 
experience, facility diagrams, personnel and facility monitoring 
information, and environmental protection. 
What regulations govern work with radioactive materials at 
UNLV? 
The State Radiological Health Section in accordance with the provisions 
of NAC 459.010 through 459.794 regulates radiation sources at UNLV, 
and has specified its own rules and regulations for the control of 
radioactive material and radiation producing devices (RPDs). 
These regulations are available at the RSO offices and on the 
internet at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/NAC/NAC-459.html. 
While regulations may be subject to interpretation, they are interpreted 
by the regulators in the strictest possible way for UNLV because we are 
expected to be working with these materials correctly and by the rules. In 
the words of a regulator, we set the example for our students and thus 
we are “held to a higher standard”. 
The State of Nevada issued UNLV our radioactive materials licenses. It is 
required that we not only abide by the regulations, but that we also 
conduct our work with radioactive materials in accordance with our 




What is a radioactive materials license? 
This is a privilege bestowed upon the University to enable the use of 
radioactive materials for research. UNLV has two radioactive materials 
licenses to enable use and storage of radioactive materials and also to 
provide radioactive material analysis services to customers outside of the 
University. 
The license indicates how much of each radionuclide we are allowed to 
have in our possession, who the Radiation Safety Officer is and what 
his/her qualifications are, how we will work with radioactive materials, 
and where we will work with these materials. 
How does UNLV comply with these regulations? 
UNLV has established a Radiation Safety Office to be headed by a 
qualified Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) who is responsible for developing 
and implementing policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the 
regulations (with approval from the State Radiological Health Section). 
The RSO is directly responsible to the State of Nevada in all matters of 
radiation safety. 
The RSO is specifically indicated by name on the Radioactive Materials 
License as the supervisor of all radioactive materials use and radiation 
producing machine operation on the campus. Any operations that are 
considered out of compliance by the RSO may be paused or terminated 
by the RSO to ensure that we will achieve compliance. 
The Radiation Safety Office ensures that training is provided to all UNLV 
personnel that use radioactive materials or radiation producing 
machines (X-ray machines, lasers, particle accelerators, etc.); maintains 
inventories of radioactive materials, evaluates areas where radioactive 
materials and machines that produce radiation are used, collects 
radioactive waste for proper disposal, provides personnel dosimetry, and 
maintains records of personnel radiation exposure. 
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What is the RSO’s job? 
According to the Nevada Administrative Code, the Radiation Safety 
Officer shall: 
(a) Investigate overexposures, accidents, spills, thefts, unauthorized 
receipts, uses, transfers, disposals, mis-administrations and other 
deviations from approved radiation safety practices and implement 
corrective actions as necessary. 
(b) Establish and implement written policies and procedures for: 
(1) Authorizing the procurement of radioactive material; 
(2) Receiving and opening packages of radioactive material; 
(3) Storing radioactive material; 
(4) Keeping inventory of radioactive material; 
(5) Safely using radioactive material; 
(6) Taking action if radioactive material is lost; 
(7) Performing surveys of radiation periodically; 
(8) Performing checks of instruments for surveying; 
(9) Performing checks of other safety equipment; 
(10) Training personnel who work in restricted areas or are 
otherwise occupationally exposed to radiation; and 
(c) Brief management at least once per year on the usage of radioactive 
material at the facility; 
(d) Establish levels of exposure for personnel which, when exceeded, will 
be investigated by the radiation safety officer to determine the cause of 
the exposure and methods that can be used to prevent recurrence of the 
exposure; and 
(e) If the licensee has a committee on radiation safety, assist the 
committee in the performance of its duties. 
What are the consequences of non-compliance? 
If anyone at UNLV fails to provide compliance with regulations for the 
safe use of radioactive materials or radiation producing machines, we 
(UNLV) could lose our authorization to use these materials or machines. 
Any research that requires use of these materials or devices would be 
required to stop and perhaps continue at another University. 
Usually before a regulator will take an action such as this, the offending 
licensee would be allowed to show reason why they should be allowed to 




How do we prove that we have complied with regulations? 
Compliance with regulations is demonstrated by maintaining records 
that show that we have: properly evaluated all radiation hazards, taken 
precautions to protect our personnel, taken precautions to protect the 
environment, and have trained all personnel to protect themselves from 
unnecessary radiation exposure. 
If you are working with radioactive materials, the surveys that you do of 
your work area and laboratory are very important to demonstrate that 
we provide compliance with the regulations. Please ensure that these are 
done and documented regularly. 
All people working with radioactive materials or that provided services to 
laboratories where radioactive materials are used must ensure that their 
training and experience provide for the safe use of these materials. The 
intent of our radioactive material licenses are to provide for the 
protection of ourselves and the people that we work with, always keep 





Newsletter 15 – X-ray Producing Devices 
Two new x-ray producing machines were obtained by the Radiochemistry 
Program in 2007 to provide new sample analysis capability for the 
nuclear group. 
These machines are located in the radiation laboratories and provide for: 
X-ray diffraction analysis of powders, and 
X-ray crystallography analysis of single crystals. 
X-Ray Diffraction (XRD) is a non-destructive technique for analyzing a 
wide range of materials, including fluids, metals, minerals, polymers, 
catalysts, plastics, pharmaceuticals, thin-film coatings, ceramics and 
semiconductors. Throughout industry and research institutions, XRD 
has become a useful method for materials investigation, characterization 
and quality control. Example areas of application include qualitative and 
quantitative phase analysis, crystallography, structure and relaxation 
determination, texture and residual stress investigations, controlled 
sample environment, micro-diffraction, nano-materials, laboratory, and 
process automation, and high-throughput polymorph screening. 





Chemical Crystallography provides accurate and precise measurements 
of molecular dimensions in a way that no other science can begin to 
approach. Historically, single crystal X-ray diffraction was used to 
determine the structure of what was thought of as "small molecules". 
Twenty years ago, it was possible to solve structures with an average of 
only 100 non-hydrogen atoms. However, thanks to developments in 
hardware and software, the upper limit has risen to about 500 and 
recently, even a 1000-atom structure was solved. Chemical 
crystallographers study compounds which are both of chemical and 
biological interest - new synthetic chemicals, catalysts, pharmaceuticals, 










Figure 2 - Single Crystal XRD  
What are the radiation hazards associated with these machines? 
X-ray diffraction machines generate very large numbers of very low 
energy x-rays. The x-rays interact with the material under investigation 
to provide information about the structure of the material, so as you can 
imagine, the primary beam dose rates are very high and represent the 
most important hazard in the machine. This hazard is only within the 
cabinet of the machine and the x-ray beam is “turned off” when the 
cabinet is opened due to an interlock on the doors. Operators should 
always ensure that the x-ray beam did turn off when the cabinet was 




A survey was done when we first received the machines in order to 
assess the radiation levels outside of the machines during operation. The 
readings all indicated only a background response and no indication of 
x-rays penetrating the cabinet walls or doors of the machines. 
Are there other potential hazards associated with this room or the 
XRD instruments? 
Yes, some of the sample preparation equipment and some of the 
operation support equipment may present a hazard to researchers or 
people who enter an XRD laboratory. 
During sample preparation for single crystal analysis, the preparer will 
heat up a glass rod and pull it to a very fine point for mounting the 
sample. The heating uses an open flame and is done on a desk inside the 
XRD laboratory. The sample preparer must be careful to abide by fire 
safety regulations and the glass sample holder is very sharp and 
represents a potential “stick” hazard. 
General Safety in the XRD Laboratories 
Everyone should immediately recognize that the XRD laboratories are 
very small and more than 3 people in the laboratories may present an 
overcrowding situation where things may get bumped or spilled. In order 
to minimize the probability of a spill with powders or crystals, you should 
minimize the amount of material brought into the room and ensure that 
you are working with only what you need. 
Gasses are used to provide cooling to the single crystal detector (liquid 
nitrogen), and provide fuel for the torch (oxygen and propane). Be sure 
that any gas tank is properly secured so that it will not fall over and that 
all connections are appropriate. 
Radioactive Materials in XRD Samples 
If the samples contain radioactive materials, then there is a concern that 
a spread of contamination is possible. All areas where the samples have 
been prepared or have resided, should be evaluated for the presence of 
radioactive contamination after each use. Since the samples that are 
being analyzed have only small amounts of activity, the contamination 
will not present much of a hazard to personnel, but we do have to keep 
track of all material and control is necessary for license compliance. 
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Newsletter 16 – Instrument Calibration and Periodic Checks 
Portable Instruments are used in all radioactive material laboratories for 
control of radioactive contamination. 
What is Instrument Calibration? 
Calibration is simply a verification of proper operation and adjustment to 
ensure that the value of a response is the same as the expected response 
from the same energy emission. Calibration of our portable 
contamination control instruments is done by the UNLV Radiation Safety 
Office and calibration of dose measuring instruments is done at a facility 
certified to provide that function. 
When are Portable Instruments Required? 
Instruments are required in laboratories that have emissions that are 
detectable by portable instruments. For example, laboratories that use 
normal form radionuclides such as 99Tc, 233U, 238U, 241Am, 239Pu, must 
have an instrument in their laboratory to aid in control of radioactive 
contamination. 
How Often is Calibration Required? 
Portable instruments are required to be calibrated annually or when 
significant changes are made in the detector assembly or when repairs 
are made. Calibration is not required if only the batteries are changed or 
the same type GM tube is used to replace a broken GM tube. 
How do I know when an instrument has been calibrated last? 
Each instrument has a sticker attached to the side of the instrument 
case that indicates, who calibrated it, when it was calibrated, when it is 
due for calibration, and who the instrument belongs to. 
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How Often are Periodic Checks Required? 
Each time an instrument is used a check must be made to ensure that it 
responds to radiation as it did when it was calibrated. This is a 
requirement in the Nevada Administrative Code. In order to demonstrate 
this requirement, a record of each check should be documented. 
A radiation detection instrument is the only way to identify the presence 
of radiation or measure its intensity. You should always: 
1. Check the instrument that you are about to use for damage. 
2. Check the battery to ensure it is OK to use. 
3. Check the response to ensure that it responds to radiation. 
4. Place it in a safe and ready position for the next person. 
 
What if the Instrument is Contaminated? 
If the response of the instrument is above 100 cpm, then it may be 
possible that the instrument screen or detector face are contaminated. 
DO NOT ATTEMPT TO CLEAN IT YOURSELF! Please contact me so 
that I can clean the detector. 
What kind of Documentation is Required for Instrument Checks? 
Whenever an instrument is checked, that check must be documented. 
Remember, if you did not write it down, you did not do it. Checks of 




Newsletter 17 – Background Radiation 
Many of the natural elements on the earth have unstable isotopes that 
emit radiation during radioactive decay. The radiation emitted may be 
alpha particles, beta particles, or x-rays or gamma rays (photons). 
Because we live on the earth, our bodies are always exposed to radiation. 
The largest source of natural background radiation exposure to humans 
is terrestrial radon, a colorless, odorless, chemically inert gas that causes 
approximately 55% of our average non-occupational exposure. 
There is another source of background radiation that we are exposed to, 
and it originates in outer space. Cosmic radiation interacts with our 
atmosphere and causes particles and rays that penetrate to the surface 
of the earth. 
"Everything on this planet, including every living thing, is bathed in a sea 
of radiation from these sources. This is commonly referred to as 'natural 
background', 'background radiation', or more simply, 'background'" - 
NUREG 1501. 
Wherever you are on the earth, on the average, thousands of photons 
impinge on your body every second, and some interact and deposit 
energy. In addition, we breathe, drink, and eat radioactive atoms because 
of natural activity in the soil, food, water, and air. Our background 
radiation exposure in the course of a year is approximately 360 millirem. 
In addition to natural sources of radiation, people are exposed to 
manmade sources of ionizing radiation such as x-rays in dental and 
medical facilities. Manmade sources provide only a fraction of the dose 
that non-radiation workers typically receive from natural sources. 
Depending on your job in radiation work you may receive up to 5000 
millirem in a year. Under very unusual circumstances, limits may be 
even higher. 
 
Total of all Sources - Natural + Man-made = 360 millirem 
 
This information is from Regulatory Guide 8.29 by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission - February 1996. The NCRP reported in report 
160 that medical exposure increased to the point where it causes an 
average of 50% of the annual exposure of the people of the United States 





What effect does background radiation have on my job? 
The primary effect that background has on our ability to control 
radioactive materials is the nuisance that it provides when we monitor an 
area or a person. Background radiation causes a response on our 
instruments that is not related to the activity we are trying to control. If 
this response is minimized, we can more accurately measure any low 
activity material that may be present in the radioactive materials work 
area. 
For example, consider that you are working in an area with 
concentrations of radioactive material that are very low. The bench that 
you are working on is made of a mineral that contains low levels of 
natural activity and the walls and floor of the building are made of 
concrete (that also contains low levels of natural activity). 
When we place your dosimetry on a rack near your work area, the 
dosimetry is exposed to natural emissions from radioactive material in 
the floor and walls of the structure. We also place control badges that 
monitor all emissions that the rack is exposed to, so that we can subtract 
the background exposure from the badge you are wearing to get your 
occupational exposure (the dose that the badge accumulated while on 
your body). If the control is lost or not turned in with the badges that we 
wear, the dose on the control badge cannot be subtracted so the 
resultant dose on our badges is higher. 
So you see, background emissions do affect our ability to monitor 
emissions from the materials we work with. The typical control badge on 
a dosimetry rack at UNLV accumulates approximately 15 to 45 millirem 
during a monitoring period (2 months). 
How can I minimize the response due to background when I am 
surveying my work area? 
The best way is to ensure that usable radioactive materials are not in the 
work area when you survey. This will reduce the number of emissions 
that may cause a response in your detector. Another way is to shield 
your detector from the work area. Let’s say you are using the portable 
instrument to count your smears. If the detector is shielded from the 
work area, the response from source emissions in the area will be lower 
and your ability to detect low level activity on the smears will be 
enhanced. 
You use the same methods to minimize background exposure to your 
equipment as you use to protect yourself from external radiation 
exposure; time, distance, and shielding. 
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Is Background Radiation Harmful? 
Background radiations, alpha, beta, gamma, x-ray, and subatomic 
particles, are the same as radiations emitted from man-made radioactive 
materials or radiation producing machines. Since humans have always 
been exposed to radiation, it may be an important part of our existence 
to be exposed to low level radiation. 
To say background radiation is "harmful" would be difficult since it is an 
effect associated with a phenomena that may actually sustain life or even 
make biological (human) systems stronger. However, for radiation 
protection purposes, we consider that any radiation exposure may be 




Newsletter 18 – Liquid Scintillation Counters 
 
Many of the radionuclides 
used in research at HRC 
may require analysis 
('counting") using a 
Liquid Scintillation 
Counter (LSC), and use of 
the LSC is very common 
in surveys and 
contamination control. 
Sample preparation may 
be simple or complicated, 
but operation of the 
instrument is usually 
straightforward. The 
activity that can be 
detected is very low, and 
samples with very little 
activity can yield 
excellent data. 
 
How does a liquid scintillation counter work? 
A liquid scintillation counter (LSC) is a simple device that measures the 
amount and the energy of light pulses given off by chemicals after 
excitation by energetic particles (radiation). The sample is dissolved, 
suspended, or otherwise thoroughly mixed with a solvent and a "fluor"— 
from "fluoresce" (another organic compound), and other additives such 
as surfactants and emulsifiers. These chemicals may or may not be 
regulated as hazardous. 
The radiation imparts energy to the solvent, which in turn imparts 
energy to the fluor. The fluor can return to a stable state by emitting 
light, and it is these tiny light emissions that are detected by 
photomultiplier tubes in the counter. The amount of light emitted by the 
fluor is proportional to the amount of activity in the sample, and the 
energy of the light produced is proportional to the energy of the radiation. 




The photomultiplier tubes (PM tubes) which detect the tiny light 
emissions are very heavily shielded, as is the sample compartment, to 
reduce the instrument's response to background radiation. The 
instruments are thus very heavy. Great care should be taken in moving 
these instruments. 
All work at this time in the Radiochemistry Laboratories use an 
environmentally friendly cocktail from Perkin Elmer called Ultima Gold. 
This cocktail has a much higher flash point, is non-volatile (has a very 
low vapor pressure), has low toxicity, is biodegradable, and is classified 
as non-flammable. This cocktail is recommended for all future work at 
the radiochemistry laboratories. If a different cocktail is desired, it must 
be evaluated by the Authorized User or the UNLV Radiation Safety Office. 
Where can I prepare samples for the LSC? 
In the Harry Reid Center, samples containing radioactive liquids may 
only be prepared in the radiochemistry laboratories where work with 
normal form radioactive a material (liquids, powders, or gases) is 
allowed. Samples for liquid scintillation counting should never be 
prepared in the LSC laboratory as a spill may affect not only your 
results but the results of others as well. 
How sensitive are they? 
Liquid scintillation counters have very good sensitivity to directly ionizing 
radiation (alpha and beta particles). They have moderate sensitivity to 
indirectly ionizing radiation such as gamma and x-ray radiation. 
The background response is typically very low (less than 50 counts per 
minute) and the detection efficiency very high (more than 50%). As a 
result these detectors can detect as low as a few picocuries in a 10 
minute count. 
Are there safety hazards associated with their operation? 
If operated properly, there are no safety hazards associated with LSC's. 
Some instruments have an internal calibration source, usually Cs-137, 
on the order of 20 to 30 μCi. These are well shielded and manipulated 
mechanically. Never try to remove an LSC source, and notify the 
radioactive material user or the RSO if background counts increase 
suddenly. The calibration source may be leaking or another source in the 
area may be causing this response. 
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Sample conveyor apparatus can move suddenly, but mechanical hazards 
are few. Never take the LSC apart as high voltages (~2000 volts) are 
required to run the photomultiplier tubes. Samples with very high dose 
rates should never be run in an LSC (not only for personal protection) 
because the photomultiplier tubes would be damaged. 
Chemicals used may be toxic, flammable, corrosive, or all three, and 
must be handled carefully. Know your radionuclides and your chemicals, 
and treat both with appropriate respect. Always use secondary 
containers to contain spills, and always clean up any spills as soon as 
practical. Double check the screw caps of the vials for tightness, but do 
not over tighten to the point of stripping threads. Wear gloves and 
appropriate personal protective equipment. 
What type of vials should I use? 
There are a few different options here. Glass vials or plastic vials and 20 
ml or 7 ml. Since we work in an analysis laboratory (MSM-242) where 
sample preparation is not allowed and every precaution should be taken 
to prevent spills, plastic vials are strongly encouraged. Also, since we 
would always like to minimize consumption of LSC cocktail and also 
minimize the creation of radioactive waste, the smaller vials are 
encouraged. 
However, everyone has special needs for their research and that 
consideration is the most important. The sensitivity of the LSC for your 
particular needs may require the use of the larger size glass vials. It is 
necessary that you evaluate your needs and consider the issues of waste 
creation and accident avoidance. 
Are there regulatory issues associated with LSC media? 
There may be. Recall that some chemicals in the cocktails may be 
regulated as hazardous materials. The solvents used in some of the 
common LSC cocktails have a low flash point (are flammable) and are not 
biodegradable. These become hazardous wastes. When radionuclides are 
present, these materials become mixed waste. The pickup of these 
wastes starts a regulatory clock. They cannot be stored indefinitely, 
they cannot be treated, and they cannot be rendered non-hazardous. 
Disposal of mixed waste is very expensive. 
Short-lived radionuclides can be allowed to decay, but long-lived nuclides 
may present a problem with the creation of mixed waste. This is not to 
say that these regulated chemicals cannot be used in LSC cocktails, 
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when in the judgment of the researcher no satisfactory substitute can be 
found. In such a case, provision for the disposal of mixed waste should 
be made PRIOR to its generation, and sufficient funds be made available 
for disposal. There is no typical provision in the Radiological Safety 
Office budget for the disposal of mixed waste. 
What do I do with the samples after the analysis? 
WAIT!! Don't just throw your samples into a bag! Don't throw 
samples into the clean waste or the radioactive waste! Please place 
the samples in the box that the vials came in from the 
manufacturer. 
There are some important considerations here as well. One is “can 
you recycle the material in the samples?” If recycling is possible, it 
may save many thousands of dollars of your research funds. Even 10 
mg of 239Pu is $5,000.00. 
If recycling is not possible, place a waste information log on the box 
indicating the radionuclide(s), the activity, and your initials. Place the 
vials into their cardboard racks, and place them in the liquid waste 
disposal area in MSM-163. The RSO will pick up the vials and the liquid 
waste and the attendant paperwork. 
There are many issues associated with the use of an LSC for sample 
analysis. However, the information collected from this incredible analysis 




Newsletter 19 – Transportation of Radioactive Materials 
Radioactive material has been shipped in the U. S. for more than 50 
years with no occurrences of death or serious injury from exposure to the 
contents of these shipments. 
As you can see from this table, there are thousands of shipments of 
hazardous material in the US each day. All radioactive shipments in the 
United States are regulated by the Department of Transportation 
(DOT) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 
 
Since transport accidents cannot be prevented, the regulations 
are primarily designed to: 
• Ensure safety in routine handling situations for minimally 
hazardous material  
• Ensure package integrity under all circumstances for highly 
dangerous materials. 
These goals are accomplished by focusing on the packaging and its 
ability to: 
• Contain the material (prevent leaks) 
• Prevent unusual occurrences (such as criticality) 




How is radioactive material packaged for transport on highways? 
There are many different types of packaging used for radioactive 
materials, some are simple packages such as boxes or cans, more robust 
packaging such as tested drums or even steel canisters are used for very 
high levels of radioactive material. 
Excepted Packaging is designed to 
survive normal conditions of 
transport. 
Excepted packaging is used for 
transportation of materials that are 
either Low Specific Activity (LSA) 
or Surface Contaminated Objects 
(SCO) and that are limited quantity 
shipments, instruments or articles, 
articles manufactured from natural 
or depleted uranium or natural 
thorium; empty packaging is also 
excepted (49CFR 173.421-428). 
Excepted packaging can be almost 
any packaging that meets the basic 
requirements, with any of the above contents. They are excepted from 
several labeling and documentation requirements. Most of the material 
that we ship to other locations are shipped in excepted packages. 
Industrial Packaging (IP) is designed to survive normal conditions of 
transport (IP-1) and at least the drop test and stacking test for Type A 
packaging (IP-2 and IP3). 
Industrial packaging (IP) is used for transportation of materials with very 
small amounts of radioactivity (Low Specific Activity [LSA] or Surface 
Contaminated Objects [SCO]). Industrial packaging (IP) is usually metal 
boxes or drums. 




handling, and minor accidents. They are used for the transportation of 
quantities of radioactive material (RAM) that would not result in 
significant health effects if they were released. Type A packaging may be 
cardboard boxes, wooden crates, or drums. The shipper and carrier must 
have documentation of the certification of the packages being 
transported. 
Type B packaging must be able to survive severe accidents. They are 
used for the transportation of large quantities of radioactive material. A 
Type B packaging may be a metal drum or a huge, massive shielded 
transport container. Type B packaging must meet severe accident 
performance standards that are considerably more rigorous than those 
required for Type A packages. 
What about labeling? 
Labeling radioactive materials is as important as packaging for the 
prevention of problems. Markings on the package detail the proper 
shipping name, an emergency response identification number, the 
shipper’s name and address and any other relevant information. 
Labels are placed on opposite sides of a package to identify the contents 
and activity level. The label is determined by the type of material shipped 
and radiation levels of the package’s contents. Labels also provide a 
hazard index to ensure correct handling. Shippers use one of three 
labels; Radioactive White, Radioactive Yellow II or Radioactive Yellow III. 
Shipments with extremely low levels of radioactivity may be excluded 
from labeling requirements. 
In some cases, there is also a requirement for the vehicle transporting 
radioactive materials to have a placard on the front, rear and sides. 
How do I ship Radioactive Material? 
If you are asking this question, the answer is quite simply, you can’t! Any 
person who ships radioactive material must be trained to do so. Any 
person who presents radioactive material for shipment or assists in the 
preparation of packages for shipment must be trained in accordance with 
49CFR (Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations). 
The way that you ship radioactive material is to provide your material to 
a trained shipper. The shipper will get all important information from you 
and prepare the package and its labeling in accordance with 49CFR. The 
shipper will then take the package to a transportation company (such as 
FedEx) and put the material on the road. 
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What are the Consequences of Not Shipping IAW 49CFR? 
Shipping radioactive material correctly is extremely important. Proper 
packaging and labeling have prevented many problems from occurring 
and are responsible for the excellent safety record of radioactive material 





Newsletter 20 - Emergency Equipment in the HRC Radioactive Material 
Laboratory Areas 
As you work in the radiochemistry laboratories, you focus on your 
projects and only think of emergency equipment when you need it. 
However, you should be aware of what is in the laboratories, how to use 
it, and how to ensure that it is always available when you need it. During 
some recent inspections of the laboratories we found emergency 
equipment that was made unavailable because of actions taken by 





The emergency equipment map is placed on the entry door to the 
laboratories and is located at each phone throughout the laboratories. 
This should serve as a continuous reminder to be aware of the location of 
all emergency equipment and ensure that you do not prevent the use of 
this equipment by obstructing its location or depleting its resources. If 
any of the emergency resources that we have are not available, please 
contact Gary, Ken, Trevor, or me so that we can get it back. 
Emergency Showers – There are six emergency showers in the 
laboratory area, two in MSM-165, one in MSM-164, one in MSM-167, 
and two in the hallways on either side of MSM-165. No one should ever 
block access to any of the showers. These showers are fed by a dedicated 
water line and are tested every week to ensure that they are available. 
Eye Wash Stations – There are four permanent eye wash stations and 
several smaller eye wash bottles in the laboratory area. No one should 
ever block access to these stations by putting things in front of the 
handle that operates the water flow or preventing immediate access to 
the water. 
Fire Extinguishers – There are 17 fire extinguishers placed throughout 
the laboratories and hallways in the first floor laboratory area. Fire 
extinguishers are checked weekly. If you use a fire extinguisher, please 
make sure that it is put aside for recharging and not put back in its 
“ready” position. Never change the location of a fire extinguisher. 
Fire Pull Boxes – There are three (3) fire pull boxes located in the 
hallways between the laboratories at the location of the emergency exits. 
 
Fire Blankets – There are three (3) large fire blankets. Large fire 
blankets, for use in laboratory and industrial situations, are often made 
of wool (sometimes treated with a flame retardant fluid). These blankets 
are mounted in vertical quick-release cabinets so that they can be easily 
pulled out and wrapped round a person whose clothes are on fire. 
Alternatively, they could be used to smother a small fire. The fire 
blankets are located at the control point adjacent to the PCM, outside of 
MSM-164, and in MSM-168 near the source storage room. 
 
First Aid Kits – There are ten (10) first aid kits in the laboratory area, 
nine in the laboratories and one in the hallway outside of MSM-164. The 
contents of each kit are checked monthly. If you use the contents of a 
kit, please let Trevor know that it needs replenishment. 
 276 
 
Telephones – Each laboratory has a telephone. The numbers are as 
follows: 
This section lists the phone number for each laboratory. 
Emergency Exits 
There are four (4) emergency exits from the laboratory area and one 
designated emergency exit from MSM-173 – near the PCM. These exits 
are for emergency exit only. They must not be used for routine access 
and egress from the laboratories in order to ensure that contamination 
control of the facility is maintained. 
Evacuation 
If there is an emergency situation in the laboratory area or in case of a 
fire in the main building, put your work in a safe configuration and leave 
the area. As you exit the building, warn others of the situation and the 
need to leave the area. Take a contamination control detector with you. 
Gather outside of the laboratories near the entrance to MSM-162 if 
possible. Avoid contact with others before you check yourself for 
contamination. At this location, you should survey yourself and allow 
others to do the same so that you can all verify that you are free of 
radioactive contamination. 
Emergency Phone Numbers  
Name: Here you should list the name and contact information for all 
personnel crucial to the response and recovery from the accident. 
Medical or Fire 
Radiation Safety Officer Occupational Safety Officer Biological Safety 
Officer Laboratory Safety Officer Fire and Life Safety Officer 
 
In case of an injury in the laboratories, contact the laboratory 
manager and the laboratory director immediately. In case of a 
contaminated and injured person (life threatening injuries) do not 
delay medical treatment for radiological contamination control. If 
hospital care is required, be sure that a radiation safety trained 
individual accompanies or meets the contaminated patient to the 





Newsletter 21 – Access to Laboratories Containing Radioactive Materials 
Laboratories containing radioactive materials are "controlled to ensure 
the security of radioactive materials and to prevent unnecessary 
exposure of personnel to radiation". 
While this concept is very simple, in practice, preventing unauthorized 
access to rooms containing radioactive materials is sometimes difficult. 
Everyone must be aware of the rules in order to ensure that the meaning 
of the term unauthorized access is understood by all. 
So what is unauthorized access? 
If you are not a member of the radiation safety staff or you are not a 
member of a professor's laboratory staff or if you are a member of one of 
these groups but have not received your annual radiation safety training, 
you are not authorized to enter a laboratory where radioactive material is 
in use. 
What about laboratory visitors? 
Visitors to the radiochemistry laboratories must be escorted at all times. 
The escort must be a trained member of the Radiochemistry Program 
staff. An Authorized User or the Laboratory Manager must be aware of 
any tours. 
Visitors may become radiation workers for collaborative work with HRC 
scientists. All work with radioactive materials must be done under the 
authorization of a UNLV Authorized Radioactive Material User. 
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What are the dose rates in the radiochemistry laboratory areas?  
The dose rate in the laboratory areas are 10 to 20 times background in 
areas where the largest amounts of radioactive material are used or 
stored. There are no dangerous levels of external dose rate in any areas 
of the laboratories. This map shows a display of the common dose rates 
in the laboratory areas in units of micro-rem/hour: 
You can see from this map that the dose rates in the hallways and in 
many of the laboratory areas are similar to the normal background dose 





What are the rules regarding security of radioactive material? 
A policy approved by the Radiation Safety Advisory Committee 
established the requirements for security of radioactive materials at 
UNLV. 
It shall be the policy of the University of Nevada Las Vegas to properly 
control radioactive materials in accordance with the requirements of the 
UNLV Radiation Safety Manual and the Nevada Administrative Code. 
The following issues are addressed in this policy: 
1. Security of Radioactive Materials in Storage Areas. 
2. Security of Radioactive Materials in Laboratories. 
 
All areas where radioactive materials are used shall be posted with a 
“Caution Radioactive Materials” sign. Radioactive materials shall be used 
only by trained personnel. All personnel working in a laboratory where 
radioactive materials are in use shall be aware of the presence of the 
material in the laboratory. All radioactive materials not in use shall be in 
a locked container. These four statements form the basis of security of 
radioactive materials at the University. 
It is most desirable to have two levels of security for all radioactive 
materials at the University. However, it is recognized that this is 
inefficient for some situations and may cause more radiation exposure 
than if the sources were not handled as much. In this regard, at least 
one level of security shall be in effect to prevent the removal of sources 
from all laboratories and storage areas. 
IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS IT ACCEPTABLE FOR UNTRAINED 
PERSONNEL TO BE LEFT ALONE IN POSTED, UNCLEARED AREAS. 
"TRAINING," FOR THESE PURPOSES, MEANS RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY 





Newsletter 22 – New Laboratories in HRC Completed 
We now have two new laboratories for use of radioactive materials in 
the Harry Reid Center, MSM-234 and MSM-236. These laboratories 
offer three new fume hoods with HEPA filtered ventilation, a new 
perchloric acid hood, and two new glove boxes as well as more than 40 
linear feet of laboratory bench space, two new water purification 
systems, and two sinks. 
Our new laboratories will be controlled similar to the way that we control 
our other laboratories where radioactive materials are used. However, 
experiments with flowing water are restricted from these laboratories 
because they are located above the Marjorie Barrick Museum. 
Many features of these new laboratories are discussed in this newsletter. 
Fume Hoods  
There are two four foot and one six foot fume hood available for work 
with radioactive materials. Flow into the hoods is greater than 100 
ft/minute with the sash at 18 inches. Each hood has a flow rate alarm to 
immediately identify when a hood is not ventilated. The vent pipes that 
provide flow from each hood are stainless steel and are welded at each 
seam. Each hood flows independently to its own HEPA filtered discharge. 
Perchloric Acid Hood 
A fourth hood in the MSM-234 laboratory is designed for work with 
perchloric acid. The ventilation lines for this hood have a wash-down 
system with restricted access. The wash-down system will spray the 
inside of the vent pipes with water that will collect in the hood and 
transfer to a five gallon tank under the hood. The volume of water used 
in the wash-down must be closely monitored to prevent overflow of the 
collection tank. In order to prevent accidental overflow of the tank, this 
operation will be restricted to specifically trained people. The valves that 
provide water to the spray lines will be locked out when the wash-down 





Air Conditioning and Heating 
Temperature control is provided by two large AC systems, a 13 ton 
system providing support for MSM-234 and a 10 ton system providing 
support for MSM-236. Thermostats are on the front walls of the 
laboratories near the exit doors. Thermostats may be adjusted to provide 
a comfortable temperature in the laboratories. 
Bench Tops 
The bench tops are standard laboratory tops with acid and heat 
resistance and similar to laboratory benches in other areas, they must be 
covered with bench paper when radioactive material will be used on 
them. 
Chemical Storage 
Cabinets have been installed for chemical storage, however, the primary 
location for chemical storage will continue to be MSM-163 in the main 
laboratory area on the first floor.  
Water Systems 
There are two Pall Cascada DI water systems in these laboratories. They 
are supplied from our new 1000 gallon per day reverse osmosis system. 
As a reminder, do not use water cooling systems in this room. A leak or 
uncontrolled flow of water could be disastrous to the museum. 
Sinks 
Two sinks are provided for personal washing, and equipment cleaning. 
These sinks must not be used for release of chemicals or radioactive 
materials. All radioactive liquids are collected for disposal by the UNLV 
Radiation Safety Office. Hazardous materials are collected by the UNLV 
Hazardous Materials Technicians. Hazardous and radioactive liquids are 
stored in MSM-163 prior to transfer to RMS personnel for disposal. 
Glove Boxes 
Two new Labconco glove boxes are in MSM-236. These boxes will be 
initially under argon atmosphere and have regeneration capability. We 
anticipate that these boxes will be available for use by mid-November. 




There is a variety of electrical supply including (2) 30 amp 208V outlets, 
(2) 20 amp 110V outlets, and several 110V service outlets on each bench. 
Emergency Equipment 
Eye-wash stations are located at each sink, the emergency shower is on 
the south wall of MSM-234. Fire extinguishers are located at the 
emergency exit door in MSM-236 and inside MSM-234 at the doorway 
between MSM-234 and MSM-236. First aid kits are located at each door 
to the hallway. 
Hand & Foot Monitor 
The Thermo HFM-11 hand and foot monitor is at the exit from MSM-234 
to provide a simple method to prevent radioactive contamination from 
leaving the room. This monitor is a set of gas flow proportional detectors, 
operated on P-10 gas with a microprocessor controlled system that 
monitors system operation and provides an alarm upon detection of 
activity above background. Upon identification of an alarm, check 
yourself for contamination using a frisker, or if alpha contamination is 
detected, use an alpha scintillation detector (Ludlum 4393 / 2360) to 
identify the contaminated location and allow cleanup. 





Newsletter 23 – Radiological Emergency Preparedness 
You are working in your laboratory with a solution containing radioactive 
materials and due to some unforeseen circumstance you drop the vial 
containing your entire inventory. As you drop the vial, you notice that 
your laboratory partner, in an attempt to prevent the spill, falls to the 
ground and is hurt. Are you prepared to respond to this situation? What 
will you do?  
Your response to an uncontrolled spill of radioactive material 
Evaluate the scene, if someone is injured, get medical assistance on the 
way before any other action – call 911 from any campus phone. Ensure 
that the injured person is in a safe location and take any medical action 
that you are qualified for, to help the individual. Get Help if you need to.  
1. Stop the Spill  
If you can stop the spill by up-righting the container or turning off flow of 
liquid to a drain or preventing the flow of the liquid to a floor drain, do 
so. If you are dripping, take off your laboratory coat in the area. If 
possible use it to absorb the spill or stop the flow of the liquid. 
2. Warn Others in the Area 
Let other people in the area know that you have a problem. Loudly 
indicate that you have spilled radioactive material and no one should 
enter the spill area. Do this to minimize the spread of material from the 
area and minimize exposure to others. 
3. Isolate the Area 
You don't want other people coming back into the spill area while there is 
still a problem. Don't leave, prevent others from going into the area, lock 
the laboratory doors, put up a sign, and rope off the area. If you don't 
control the area, someone might enter the area, cause further spread of 
the material, and receive unnecessary exposure. 
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4. Minimize Exposure 
Minimize your exposure and the exposure of others by using time, 
distance, and shielding. Move away from the spill area and use physical 
structures between you and the spill to lower the dose rate in your area. 
Ensure others in the laboratory either leave the immediate laboratory 
area or also minimize their exposure. 
5. Notify the RSO 
The people in the UNLV Radiation Safety Office can assist you in your 
efforts to minimize exposure and get the laboratory back into normal 
operation. Call X54226 for anyone in RMS, X54419 or X54941 for the 
Radiation Safety Officer or Radiation Safety Technician, or 3404419 for 
the RSO cell phone. Then call people on the HRC Emergency Call List 
posted in any of the HRC radiation laboratories. If there is an injured 
contaminated person, contact the Radiation Laboratory Director 
immediately. 
Your response to a controlled spill of radioactive material 
Well, what's the difference? You have taken the precautions to assure 
that the impact of a spill will be minimized. Consider the following: 
You are working with the same liquid as above, in a hood, on a tray with 
sides to catch a spill. Your actions should be similar but will not be as 
extensive. 
If there is an injury, medical response to injured people always takes 
priority! 
Use the same sequence S-W-I-M-N as needed. 
The spill is Stopped by the tray, the need to Warn others is minimized to 
those who may need access to the hood, 
you can Isolate the hood by closing it and telling others in the laboratory. 
you can Minimize your exposure and the exposure of others by moving 
yourself 
and others away from the hood, then Notify the RSO for help. 
Preparing for an emergency involving radioactive materials is really a 




Some things that you can do in your laboratory to prevent or 
provide easy response to spills involving radioactive material: 
Always ensure that radioactive materials are used over a secondary 
container that can contain twice the volume of liquid or solid 
materials if your container is accidentally knocked over. Always 
work over absorbent material with a plastic backing. 
When you are ready to work with radioactive materials, take one 
more look at your apparatus and work area to ensure that 
movement of materials in the area will not cause a problem and 
items that may fall or be knocked over will spill into the area that 
you setup to contain the material. 
Ensure that the work area is not cluttered and there is space to 
move around unimpeded. Ensure others in the laboratory are 
aware of what you are doing and the potential for a spill if your 
area is crowded. Use radioactive materials in a hood when 
possible. 
If you will be transferring components and material from the work 
area to another area of the laboratory or another laboratory, 
ensure that the pathway is open and available before you attempt 
the transfer. Put all materials in a secondary container to prevent a 
spill. Call ahead to the destination to ensure that you will not 
confront a locked door when you get there. 
Keep a spill kit in your laboratory to assist you with rapid and 
efficient containment and cleanup of a spill. Your kit, as a 
minimum, should contain a box of protective gloves, absorbent 
material, clean rags, rubber drain covers (if there are floor drains 
in your laboratory), and a standard first aid kit. 
You should know and trust everyone in the laboratory with you. If 
you see something that someone is doing that may cause harm to 
themselves or someone else, ask them about it, if there is a 
problem with what they are doing, don’t let them do it! We all have 
to peacefully coexist in our laboratories; you and I must be 
comfortable that the laboratories are a safe place to be. 
Finally, periodically check the location and condition of emergency 
equipment. If there is anything missing let the Laboratory Manager 
know about it. 
Your primary goal is obviously successful completion of your 
research. Your secondary goal (my primary goal) is to ensure that 
you do so safely and ensure control of your radioactive material. 
 286 
 
Newsletter 24 – Portable Instruments – Ludlum Model 3 / 44-9 
This issue will begin a series of newsletters with the primary subject 
area as portable radiation detection instruments. This first issue on 
that topic will describe the workhorse of our laboratories, the rate-
meter and pancake GM detector. 
The Model 3/44-9 is a combination rate-meter with a model 44-9 GM 
detector from Ludlum Measurements Inc. 
The Ludlum model 3 rate-meter is a very simple measurement device 
with a minimum of controls. The controls are as follows: 
1. A rotary selection switch with positions: OFF, BAT, X100, X10, X1, 
X0.1. 
2. An on/off switch for audio indication. 
3. A switch for fast (4 second)/slow (22 second) response – from 10% to 
90% of the maximum reading. 
4. A reset button that takes the meter indication to zero. 
 
The Model 3 rate meter is a tool for identification of the response rate 
from a source of ionizing radiation 
emissions. The range of measurement of the 
Model 3 is up to a maximum count rate of 
500,000 cpm. The response is linear within 
±10% of the true response over the entire 
response range. The speaker provides an 
output of more than 60 db at 2 feet from the 
instrument. 
Batteries -The battery compartment 
contains 2 “D” cells. The battery 
compartment is accessible from the top of 
the instrument. The battery configuration 
is indicated on the underside of the 
battery compartment cover. Alkaline 
batteries should provide greater than 2000 




The Case – The Model 3 has a cast aluminum body with a steel handle 
and speaker holes on the side. This provides for a light instrument that 
is also rugged. Even so, if you drop this instrument, check it for damage 
and operability – go through all of the instrument checks before you use 
it for a measurement. 
Temperature Operating Range – The normal calibration of this 









C). Instrument operation outside of this range may require different 
calibration. 
The Ludlum Model 44-9 Pancake GM Probe – This is the standard 
probe on GM instruments used in the radiochemistry laboratory and is 
a very common detector used in many industries. 
This probe houses a pancake type 
halogen quenched GM detector 
with a typical detection efficiency 
of 19% for 99Tc beta emissions at 
¼” from the source. The window 
area is approximately 15 cm2 and 
the open window area is 12 cm2.  
The GM detector in this probe 
operates on 900 volts, has a 
typical dead time of approximately 
80 microseconds.  
The Detector 
The GM detector in this instrument 
is about 2 inches in diameter and 
has a mica window with a thickness 
of 2 mg/cm2. The filling gas is neon 
with a halogen quenching agent 
(chlorine or bromine). The window 
has a diameter of 1.75 inches (44.5 
mm). 
The background response from 
external gamma radiation will be 
about 500 CPM in a field of 10 
mrem/hour (0.1 mSv/hour). 
 
In the illustration, the detector on the left is intact, while the one on 
the right has the window removed and you can see the anode inside 
the detector. A broken window cannot be repaired on these 






What it Detects 
Ionization in the detection gas caused by alpha, beta, or gamma 
radiations will cause a pulse to be transmitted to the meter. However, 
because the detector is not in a consistent geometry, alpha particles may 
or may not penetrate the window to cause ionization of the gas, so a 
consistent alpha detection efficiency cannot be accurately defined. 
Gamma radiation has a low probability of interaction in the gas so 
“measurement” of dose rate is not recommended from this type of 
detector, even when the meter has a dose rate scale. Beta radiation with 
energy greater than 100 keV is detectable and “measurable” with this 
type of detector.  
Direct Measurements 
One of the more useful purposes for the pancake GM detector and rate-
meter is basic contamination control of beta emitting radionuclides. In 
order to have consistent detection efficiency while “scanning” a surface 
for beta emitting contamination, the speed of movement of the detector 
and the surface to detector distance must be controlled. The speed of 
movement is important so that there is enough residence time over a 
contaminated area to provide adequate response. The surface to 
detector distance will cause a direct change to the detection efficiency. 
If you move the detector over a surface at a speed of 2 inches per second, 
and have a 10% efficiency for the radionuclide that you are interested in, 
you will have a certain probability of detection as follows:  
Let’s consider a stationary beta GM pancake detector, the probe area is 
15 cm2, the background count rate is assumed to be 40 cpm, the 
detection efficiency is assumed to be 20%. From table 6.4 in MARSSIM, 
the critical level is 15 counts, the detection limit is 32 counts, and the 
MDC is 1800 Bq/m2 (1080 dpm/100 cm2). This might be typical of 99Tc 
on a smooth flat surface. 
Scanning is quite different than simply holding a detector stationary, 
there are some additional considerations, you are moving a detector over 
a surface and at a specified distance from the surface to keep the 
detection efficiency constant. You actually have a certain efficiency to do 
that. The count time is related to how fast you move the detector over a 
surface – consider that a spot being surveyed would pass under the 
detector for a duration that begins as the leading edge of the detector 
goes over the spot and ends as the back edge passes over the spot. So, 
the count time for a 1.75 in diameter detector passing over a spot at 2 
inches per second would have a count time on that spot of: t = 1.75 in/2 
in/s = 0.875 seconds. 
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So, you can see that the probability of detecting activity on that spot 
would become lower as you move the probe faster. You should also 
recognize that moving the probe at a constant speed and holding it a 
constant distance from the surface are going to be difficult tasks and 
your efficiency as a surveyor will continue to decrease as you get more 
tired. 
Taking this information a few steps further following MARSSIM, the 
“scan MDC” for a pancake probe GM detector as we described is 
approximately 3770 dpm/100 cm2. This value is more than 3 times the 
activity that you could detect with the stationary instrument. Imagine if 
you moved the probe much faster. 
 
Preparing for Operation 
 
1. Always make sure that your instrument is in good condition. No major 
dents in the case, it looks like it should work (no wires hanging out), 
etc. 
2. Make sure that the instrument has been calibrated in the past year. 
Check the calibration sticker for the date that calibration is due. 
3. Turn the instrument to the BAT position and make sure that the 
meter reading is beyond the battery OK position in the meter. 
4. Turn the knob to the lowest scale and check for a normal background 
response. For a pancake GM probe, the normal response should be 
between 20 and 100 counts per minute in a low background area. 
 
Precautions 
As with any instrument, there are some precautions that you can take to 
ensure that it provides you with the information that you need and that 
it continues to work. These are: 
1. Never put the instrument in water – it will never work again. 
2. When surveying contaminated areas – try not to touch the probe to 
the surface you are measuring – this will minimize the probability that 
you will contaminate the probe. 
3. Never survey sharp objects; wire, wire brushes, brooms, things that 
can make a hole in things. This action will cause the window to be 
broken and the instrument to be nonresponsive. 
4. Never use the probe as a hammer. There is a floating anode inside the 
detector that can easily be shaken out of position – maybe even short 
out – anyway use a hammer for hammering. 
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5. Try not to drop the meter or detector – dropping the meter could 
break a circuit board inside the case – dropping the probe may break 
the window or short out the anode. 
6. If there is an accident and you contaminate the detector, please 
remove the detector from normal use and let me or Trevor know that 
the instrument is OOS. We can usually decontaminate or repair the 
instrument in less than an hour.  
 
Surveying  
Whenever you check your work area after working with radioactive 
materials, you have several actions to take and decisions to make; 
1. Check your instrument – is it calibrated? – are the batteries OK? – is 
the background response OK? – does it respond to ionizing radiation? 
2. If you are working with beta emitting radionuclides that emit beta 
particles sufficiently energetic to be detected by a pancake GM 
detector, then the Ludlum Model 3/44-9 may be the instrument that 
you could use for your survey. 
3. Turn on the audible response. This is your most sensitive indicator, 
each “click” is caused by an ionizing event in the detector, if it clicked 
- it detected something! 
4. I recommend always using the “slow” response mode for low activity 
measurements or clearance surveys. “Fast” response is OK for higher 
activity measurements. You should not use “fast” response for surveys 
where you are verifying that the area is free of contamination. 
5. As you check the work area, pay particular attention to areas 
immediately adjacent to the area where your radioactive material was 
used. 
6. Your 44-9 Pancake GM probe should be held at a distance of ¼” to ½” 
from the surface that you are surveying – with the window facing the 
area that you are surveying. 
7. Move the probe over the area slowly. You can survey a large area by 
moving the probe at 1” to 2” per second. Don’t expect to detect 
anything if you wave the probe like a magic wand. 
8. If you identify a response – continue to survey – wait until you 
characterize the entire work area before you start your cleanup. This 
will help you to decide on the best method to do cleanup and provide 
information for the decision about what PPE to wear. 
9. If you exceed the response capability of your instrument, be sure to 
control the area, identify the location where the emissions causing 
that response are coming from. This may be an area where material 
was spilled or maybe your stock material was not removed from the 
work area. If you recognize this as a potential problem, then take 




~ CAUTION ~ 
Radiation detectors allow you to detect and measure radiations 
emitted by the materials that you are working with. It is important 
that you take care of them so that they continue to provide their 





Newsletter 25 – Portable Instruments – Ludlum Model 2360 / 43-93 
This issue will continue the series of newsletters with the primary subject 
area as portable radiation detection instruments. This second issue on 
that topic will describe a very important instrument for some of our 
laboratories, the rate-meter / scaler and alpha-beta scintillation detector. 
The Model 2360/43-93 is a combination rate-meter and scaler with a 
model 43-93 Alpha-Beta scintillation detector from Ludlum 
Measurements Inc. 
The Ludlum model 2360 rate-meter/scaler is a simple measurement 
device with a few more controls than the model 3. The controls are as 
follows: 
1. A rotary switch with positions: OFF, BAT, X1000, X100, X10, and X1. 
2.  A volume switch and volume control for audio indication. 
3. A switch for selection of signals from the alpha scintillators or the 
beta scintillators or both. 
 
1. A reset switch which 
also allows reading of the 
high voltage. 
2. A rotary switch that 
allows selection of the count 
time for the scaler, and a 
start button that allows 
starting the count integration 
mode. 
 
The Model 2360 rate meter 
is a tool for identification of 
the response rate or 
integrated counts over a 
specified time from a source 
of ionizing radiation 
emissions. The range of 
measurement of the Model 2360 is up to a maximum count rate of 
500,000 cpm. The response is linear within ±10% of the true response 
over the entire response range. The speaker provides an output of more 




Batteries -The battery compartment contains 2 “D” cells. The battery 
compartment is accessible from the top of the instrument. The battery 
configuration is indicated on the underside of the battery compartment 
cover. Alkaline batteries should provide greater than 2000 hours of 
instrument operation. 
The Case – The Model 2360 has a cast aluminum body with a steel 
handle and speaker holes on the side. The start button for integrated 
counts is located in the handle. This instrument is light and also rugged. 
Even so, if you drop this instrument, check it for damage and operability 
– go through all of the instrument checks before you use it for a 
measurement, just like any other instrument. The probe contains a glass 
photomultiplier tube which could be broken from shock. 
Temperature Operating Range – The normal calibration of this 









C). Instrument operation outside of this range may require different 
calibration. 
The Ludlum Model 43-93 Alpha Beta Scintillation Probe – This is the 
probe on the Ludlum 2360 instruments used in the radiochemistry 
laboratory and is a very 
common detector used in many 
industries that handle small 
quantities of alpha and beta 
emitting radionuclides. 
This probe houses a 
photomultiplier tube that 
observes the light output of a 
dual scintillator. This detector 
has a typical detection efficiency of 15% for 99Tc beta emissions at ¼” 
from the source. The window area is approximately 100 cm2 and the 
open window area is 89 cm2. 
The detector in this probe operates on 1650 volts, has a typical response 







The detector in this instrument is about 3.5 inches by 5.75 inches and 
has a mylar window with a thickness of 0.5 mg/cm
2
. The detector is a 
plastic plate with a coating of zinc sulfide. The background response 
from external gamma radiation will be about 5000 CPM in a field of 10 
mrem/hour (0.1 mSv/hour). 
 
In the illustration, the detector is the solid white rectangle in the middle. 
At the top middle is the mylar window, on the left is the cover plate 
which holds the detector in place and on the right is a metal grid that fits 
over the window to provide some protection for the window. A broken 
window can be repaired on these detectors. A replacement window costs 
approximately $30.00. 
 
What it Detects  
Interactions of alpha radiation in the zinc sulfide, or beta, or gamma 
radiations in the plastic scintillator will cause a pulse to be transmitted 
to the meter. The voltage of the pulse will depend on whether the 
interaction was in the ZnS or the plastic. The 2360 ratemeter/scaler will 
separate the signals to allow determination of alpha or beta response. 
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Gamma radiation has a low probability of interaction in the gas so 
“measurement” of gamma dose rate is not recommended from this type of 
detector, even when the meter has a dose rate scale. Beta radiation with 
energy greater than 100 keV is detectable and “measurable” with this 
type of detector. 
Direct Measurements  
One of the more useful purposes for this scintillation detector and rate-
meter is basic contamination control of alpha or beta emitting 
radionuclides. In order to have consistent detection efficiency while 
“scanning” a surface for alpha or beta emitting radionuclides in 
contamination, the speed of movement of the detector and the surface to 
detector distance must be controlled. The speed of movement is 
important so that there is enough residence time over a contaminated 
area to provide adequate response. The surface to detector distance will 
cause a direct change to the detection efficiency. 
If you move the detector over a surface at a speed of 2 inches per second, 
and have a 15% efficiency for the alpha emitting radionuclide that you 
are interested in, you will have a certain probability of detection as 
follows: 
Let’s consider a stationary 43-93 detector, the probe width is 100 cm2, 
the background count rate is assumed to be 1 cpm, the detection 
efficiency is assumed to be 15%. From table 6.4 in MARSSIM, the critical 
level is 2 counts, the detection limit is 7 counts, and the MDC is 150 
Bq/m2 (90 dpm/100 cm2). This might be typical of 239Pu on a smooth flat 
surface. 
Scanning is quite different than simply holding a detector stationary, 
there are some additional considerations, you are moving a detector over 
a surface and at a specified distance from the surface to keep the 
detection efficiency constant. You actually have a certain efficiency to do 
that. The count time is related to how fast you move the detector over a 
surface – consider that a spot being surveyed would pass under the 
detector for a duration that begins as the leading edge of the detector 
goes over the spot and ends as the back edge passes over the spot. So, 
the count time for a detector that is 7 cm wide passing over a spot at 5 
cm per second would have a count time on that spot of: t = 7 cm/5 cm/s 
= 1.4 seconds. 
So, you can see that the probability of detecting activity on that spot 
would become lower as you move the probe faster. You should also 
recognize that moving the probe at a constant speed and holding it a 
constant distance from the surface are going to be difficult tasks and 
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your efficiency as a surveyor will continue to decrease as you get more 
tired. 
 
Taking this information a few steps further following MARSSIM, the 
“scan MDC” for a scintillation detector probe for alpha contamination as 
we described is approximately 85 dpm/100 cm2. This value is more than 
4 times the activity that alpha emitting contamination should be 
controlled to (22 dpm/100 cm2). Imagine if you moved the probe much 
faster. 
Preparing for Operation  
1. Always make sure that your instrument is in good condition. No major 
dents in the case, it looks like it should work (no wires hanging out), 
etc.  
2. Make sure that the instrument has been calibrated in the past year. 
Check the calibration sticker for the date that calibration is due.  
3. Turn the instrument to the BAT position and make sure that the 
meter reading is beyond the battery OK position in the meter.  
4. Turn the knob to the lowest scale and check for a normal background 
response. For a 43-93 scintillation probe, the normal response should 
be between 0 and 10 counts per minute for alpha and 100 to 300 
counts per minute for beta in a low background area.  
 
Precautions 
As with any instrument, there are some precautions that you can take to 
ensure that it provides you with the information that you need and that 
it continues to work. These are:  
1. Never put the instrument in water – it may never work again.  
2. When surveying contaminated areas – try not to touch the probe to 
the surface you are measuring – this will minimize the probability that 
you will contaminate the probe.  
3. Never survey sharp objects; wire, wire brushes, brooms, things that 
can make a hole in things. This action will cause the window to be 
broken and the instrument to respond to ambient light (remember a 
scintillation detector works by detection of photons from the 
scintillator).  
4. Never use the probe as a hammer. There is a glass photomultiplier 
tube in the probe that will break if subjected to shock – anyway use a 
hammer for hammering.  
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5. Try not to drop the meter or detector – dropping the meter could 
break a circuit board inside the case – dropping the probe may break 
the window or the photomultiplier tube.  
6. If there is an accident and you contaminate the detector, please 
remove the detector from normal use and let me or Trevor know that 
the instrument is OOS. We can usually decontaminate or repair the 
instrument in less than an hour.  
 
Surveying 
Whenever you check your work area after working with radioactive 
materials, you have several actions to take and decisions to make;  
1. Check your instrument – is it calibrated? – are the batteries OK? – is 
the background response OK? – does it respond to ionizing radiation? 
2. If you are working with alpha emitting radionuclides that emit alpha 
particles sufficiently energetic to be detected by the 43-93 detector, 
then the Ludlum Model 2360/43-93 may be the instrument that you 
could use for your survey.  
3. Turn on the audible response. This is your most sensitive indicator, 
each “click” is caused by an ionizing event in the detector, if it clicked 
- it detected something! Notice that there are two different click 
frequencies – one for alpha particles detected, and one for beta 
particles detected. 
4. As you check the work area, pay particular attention to areas 
immediately adjacent to the area where your radioactive material was 
used. 
 
1. Your 43-93 probe should be held at a distance of ¼” to ½” from the 
surface that you are surveying – with the window facing the area that 
you are surveying. 
2. Move the probe over the area slowly. You can survey a large area by 
moving the probe at 1” to 2” per second. Don’t expect to detect 
anything if you wave the probe like a magic wand. 
3. If you identify a response – continue to survey – wait until you 
characterize the entire work area before you start your cleanup. This 
will help you to decide on the best method to do cleanup and provide 
information for the decision about what PPE to wear. 
4. If you exceed the response capability of your instrument, be sure to 
control the area, identify the location where the emissions causing 
that response are coming from. This may be an area where material 
was spilled or maybe your stock material was not removed from the 
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work area. If you recognize this as a potential problem, then take 
action to prevent spread of the contamination. 
 
~ CAUTION ~ 
Radiation detectors allow you to detect and measure radiations 
emitted by the materials that you are working with. It is important 
that you take care of them so that they continue to provide their 
function and allow you to protect yourself and others from ionizing 
radiation. 
Newsletter 26 – Laboratory Inspection 
This issue will explain what a laboratory inspection is for and provide 
you with guidance that you can use to ensure that your area meets 
reasonable criteria for safety. 
One very important aspect of our radiation safety program is evaluation 
of laboratories to ensure that we are in compliance with our radioactive 
materials license, x-ray machine registrations, and State of Nevada 
regulations. 
We do inspections of every laboratory containing radioactive materials – 
every day; the Radiation Safety Office checks our laboratories during a 
monthly visit to ensure that we meet their criteria for a safe laboratory as 
well. The inspection is NOT an in depth evaluation of compliance, but we 
do check at least the following: 
POSTINGS AND LABELING  
• Proper labeling of the room for radioactive materials. 
• “No Eating, Drinking or Smoking” sign still posted. 
• No evidence of food or drink in the laboratory. 
• Proper labeling of the storage area and work areas. 
• Proper labeling of containers. 
• Emergency phone numbers posted near the phone. 
• Notice to Employees and NRC-1 posted. 
• Laboratory map posted on the door. RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY  
• Radioactive materials use log. 
• Source storage containers are secured at all times. 
• Samples containing radioactive materials are appropriately labeled. 
• Samples containing radioactive material are appropriately stored. 





• Contamination surveys of the room maintained. 
• Work areas do not present a safety hazard to other laboratory 
inhabitants. 
• Work areas are properly identified when contaminated. 
• Researchers check their areas for contamination before leaving. 
WASTE ITEMS  
• Solid waste is appropriately disposed of in appropriate containers. 
• Liquid waste is placed in the appropriate disposal area. 
• Aqueous and organic waste streams are separate. 
• Organic waste streams are minimized. 
• Mixed waste is not created on a large scale. 
• LSC Waste is maintained in LSC vials and a waste form is attached. 
• There are no radioactive materials or labels in the clean trash. 
 
BENCHTOPS  
• Bench tops should be free of clutter. 
• There should be adequate room for work when no experiments are 
taking place. 
• Equipment that generates a lot of heat should not be on flammable 
bench coverings. 
• Samples, equipment, and stock solutions should be toward the center 
of the bench to prevent them from being knocked off. 
• Radioactive stock solutions should be stored in the safe when they are 
not immediately in use. 
• Open containers of liquids must be in a secondary containment. 
 
GLOVE BOXES  
• Glove boxes should be maintained relatively clean inside. 
• The gloveless box should be maintained clean at all times when work 
is not in progress in that box. 
• The port covers should always be on the gloveless box when it is not in 
immediate use. 
• The gloves and box should be checked for integrity every day. 
Purpose  
The purpose of our inspection is not to pick on anyone or slow down 
research. The purpose is to ensure that we do maintain compliance with 
our Radioactive Materials License and general safety requirements. 
Notification  
We do not send out a warning that we will be inspecting laboratories 
because we must verify that compliance is the norm, not just something 
that is present when we know an inspector will visit our laboratories. 
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When the State of Nevada regulators visit our facility, they will not call to 
tell us when they are coming to inspect us. We must be ready for their 
inspection of our laboratories at all times. 
If there are experiments in progress that may be adversely affected by 
persons entering the laboratory, then please send a message to the group 
to identify these situations. 
Inspectors 
Our inspections may be done by any one of the persons on our staff. 
Typically, they are done by the laboratory manager or an Authorized User 
However; anyone can identify potential problems and should identify the 
problems to the laboratory managers as soon as possible. 
Findings 
When we find a condition that is in conflict with a regulation or 
requirement, the Laboratory Director or Laboratory Manager is notified 
and he/she will make contact with the person responsible for the 
laboratory area to provide simple means of ensuring compliance. We will 
work with the researcher to achieve compliance for any violation or item 
of concern with as little impact on the research in that laboratory as 
possible. 
Consider the inspection process as a good way to ensure that our 




Newsletter 27 – Radioactive Material Inventory 
As a Radioactive Material licensee in the State of Nevada, we have 
limitation on the total activity of radioactive materials that we may have 
at any one time. These limits are a maximum amount of activity for each 
different radionuclide. 
In order to establish compliance we determine the fraction of the allowed 
activity for each radionuclide, then we then 'sum the fractions' and the 
sum must be less than 1 for the determination of compliance. 
For example, let’s say that we have 20 mCi of 241Am and 50 mCi of 137Cs. 
If our license limit for 241Am is 30 mCi and our license limit for 137Cs is 
150 mCi, then we have reached: 
Sum of Fractions = 20/30 + 50/150 = 100% of our license limit. 
User Limits 
Each user has a radioactive materials allowance in order to maintain the 
total possession of all users less than our license limits. The activity 
assigned as a User limit is determined by the RSO. The items that are 
important in determination of the User limits are: 
The limits of our radioactive materials license and ensuring that other 
users are not deprived of experimentation because one person restricts 
our ability to maintain license compliance by having an unusual 
amount of a certain radionuclide with a low license limit. 
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Some radionuclides have much lower license limits than others and may 
be more or less restrictive. 
For example, our limit for 32P is 1 Curie and our limit for 3H is 100 
Curies. If these were the only radionuclides that we had, life would be 
simple. 
The license limit for some radionuclides is based on the mass of the 
nuclide. 
For example, the license limit for 239Pu is included in our 'special nuclear 
material limit of 200 grams. Whereas our limit for 238U is included in our 
'source material' limit of 100 pounds. 
And there are some radionuclides that have extremely low limits such as 
228Th that has a limit of 0.00005 Ci (50 microcuries).  
Periodic Inventory Checks 
YOU SHOULD ALWAYS BE AWARE OF YOUR RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIALS. IF YOU DISCOVER THAT A SOURCE IS MISSING FROM 
YOUR STORAGE OR USE AREAS, PLEASE CONDUCT A SEARCH FOR 
THE MATERIAL AND CONTACT ONE OF THE USERS IMMEDIATELY! 
The Radiation Safety Office must be aware of the location of all 
radioactive materials at UNLV. To ensure this, they conduct a complete 
inventory check every 6 months. Just because a source is 'exempt', this 
does not mean that it is not held under our license. 
ALL RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS THAT ARE NOT NATURALLY 
OCCURRING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (NORM) ARE CONTROLLED 
UNDER OUR RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS LICENSE. 
Consider the inventory process as another good way to ensure that our 





Laboratory Control of Sources 
Control of sources of radioactive material in our laboratories is of course 
not just to ensure license compliance, it’s for our protection and the 
protection of others in the laboratories and it is for the protection of our 
radiochemistry program. We must always ensure that our radioactive 
material is within the boundaries described by our license and no one 
will get hurt by our material. 
There are sign out sheets located at the primary source storage area in 
MSM-168. If you are a user, be sure to sign out any materials that are 
provided to others for work – and make sure that you retrieve the 
material from them when they are done taking the amount that they 
need. The amount removed should be recorded on the form. 
When you get a stock solution or compound from a user, make sure that 
you return the remaining material to the user so that it can be properly 
stored in one of our primary storage areas. If a source or solution is 
completely used, and the container is disposed, then annotate that on 
the sign out form. 
If you know the location of a source with an HRC-XXX label on it (where 
XXX is a number), you should make sure that this source is returned to 




Newsletter 28 – Survey Documentation 
Surveys are done to ensure compliance with Federal and State 
regulations and our Radioactive Materials License conditions. When an 
inspector from the State of Nevada comes to the campus to review our 
program, he/she reviews documentation to ensure that we have complied 
with regulations. Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) section 459.337 is 
the requirement that applies to surveys. 
NAC 459.337 Surveys and monitoring. (NRS 459.030) 
1. Each licensee and registrant shall make, or cause to be made, surveys 
that: 
(a) Are necessary for the licensee or registrant to comply with NAC 
459.010 to 459.950, inclusive; and 
(b) Are necessary under the circumstances to evaluate: 
(1) The magnitude and extent of radiation levels; 
(2) Concentrations or quantities of radioactive material; and 
(3) The potential radiological hazards. 
 
2. The licensee or registrant shall ensure that instruments and 
equipment used for quantitative radiation measurements are calibrated 
for the radiation measured at intervals not to exceed 12 months. 
One important concept to understand regarding surveys: all information 
must be written and the survey must be signed by the person doing the 
survey and the survey reviewer, and signatures must be dated. 
The following information is necessary for that documentation: 
The location surveyed (be as specific as possible). 
The date of the survey. 
The model and serial number of the portable instruments used for 
the survey. 
The model and serial number of the laboratory instruments used 
for smear or sample analysis. 
The date that the next calibration of this instrument is due. 
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The location of any smears or dose rate readings taken in the 
laboratory. 
The results of smears analyzed (an attached analysis sheet is fine). 
The dose rates in the area at the location of measurement. 
A note about actions taken when the survey identifies an abnormal 
situation (such as contamination outside the labeled work area). 
How often are surveys required? 
The required frequency of radiation and contamination surveys in 
laboratories differs depending on the amount of activity used and the 
potential for contamination spread to personnel traffic routes in the 
buildings. However, every time we are in the laboratory working with 
radioactive materials, we need to ensure (by survey) that we did not 
spread contamination and that all radioactive materials are secure before 
we leave the laboratory. 
How long should it take to do and document a survey? 
A basic contamination control survey of a complete laboratory should not 
take more than an hour. A routine survey of a small work area should 
only take minutes. This depends on the size of the laboratory and 
whether or not contamination was identified that must be cleaned up. 
Some laboratories may also need a periodic evaluation of the dose rate in 
the laboratory; this should take no more than half an hour. 
What forms should be used to document the surveys? 
Forms to document surveys of the laboratories are maintained in the 
main corridor of the first floor laboratory s. The laboratory managers can 
help you find what you need to document your surveys. When completed, 
all survey forms are kept in the binders that are maintained in the 
hallways (a very good place to identify the results of past surveys and the 
current radiological profile of the laboratories). 
Basic Survey Information 
Always wear gloves to protect your skin from radioactive or chemical 
contamination that may be on surfaces. 
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Smear surveys are done to identify the activity of removable 
contamination from a surface. 
Smears are small 2" disks of paper or cloth that are rubbed on a surface 
to evaluate the amount of radioactive material that could be removed 
from a surface by normal touching of that surface. 
The standard area of a smear is 100 cm2, 100 cm2 is about 4 inches by 4 
inches. 
Use even pressure when rubbing the smear on a surface. 
Don’t press too hard or you will destroy the smear. 
Wear gloves when doing a contamination survey, you are looking for 
removable contamination from surfaces - you might find some. 
When measuring the dose rate in an area, hold the meter at the location 
of measurement for at least 30 seconds. Record each measurement when 
it is taken. The typical height above the floor at which to take 
measurements is approximately 1 meter. 
Evaluation of Smears 
All measurements that are documented for purposes of radiation 
protection must be made with equipment that has calibration traceable 
to the National Institute of Standards and Technology. We have several 
analysis systems that meet this qualification. All Liquid Scintillation 
Counters, the Tennelec Gas Proportional Counter in MSM-145, and the 
Berthold Gas Proportional Counter in MSM-167 have traceable 
calibration. 
Special Situations 
In case of spills, cleanup should be done as soon as practical and the 
area affected should be controlled to prevent the spread of 
contamination. Most importantly, after the spill is cleaned up, the survey 
that demonstrates the area to be free of contamination must be made 
with equipment that has calibration traceable to the National Institute of 




Newsletter 29 – Fume Hoods in the HRC Radiochemistry Program 
Chemical fume hoods in the radiochemistry laboratories provide us with 
a great deal of protection during our work. There are currently 7 fume 
hoods with HEPA filtered ventilation and 6 without filtered ventilation in 
our laboratories. It is important to know the limitations of the fume 
hoods that we are working in so that we do not have a release of 
radioactive materials from the laboratories and so that we do not cause 
damage to the systems or a contamination control problem in the hoods 
or in the laboratories. 
Laboratory fume hoods are the first defense to minimize chemical 
exposure to research workers. They are considered the primary means of 
protection from inhalation of hazardous vapors. It is, therefore, 
important that all potentially harmful chemical work be conducted inside 
a properly functioning fume hood. To ensure safety, all fume hoods are 
evaluated for flow rate by the safety organization annually. This 
newsletter is intended to help identify fume hood types and outline 
exposure control practices in relation to the hood. 
All fume hoods currently at the HRC are conventional hoods. This term is 
used to describe a constant air volume (CAV) hood, an older, traditionally 
less elaborate hood design used for general protection of the worker. 
Because the amount of exhausted air is constant, the face velocity of a 
CAV hood is inversely proportional to the sash height. That is, the lower 
the sash, the higher the face velocity. However, not all hoods in the HRC 
operate the same way. Some have an exhaust discharge point that is 
high in the hood body and some exhaust air from the lower back of the 
hood. 
The HF hood in MSM-164 exhausts from the lower back. A drawback to 
this design is associated with the flow of air around anything that is 
between the exhaust point and the sash. Turbulence within the hood is 
undesirable and may cause a flow of air from the apparatus that you 
want to ventilate. For this hood, keep clutter inside the hood to a 




Using a Fume Hood 
There are several types of protection that fume hoods provide us, so 
let’s look at some of those. 
1. A fume hood provides a sash that can be pulled down to a level where 
it provides shielding from splashes of caustics, acids, or low energy 
emissions such as beta particles and very low energy photons. 
2. A fume hood has a ventilation system that pulls air into the hood and 
away from us. This prevents vapors and airborne particulates that 
may have been created by your samples from coming into your air 
space preventing airborne exposure to aromatic compounds and 
airborne chemicals or radioactive materials. 
3. A fume hood provides some degree of splash protection for uncovered 
parts of the body. This protection may also be appropriate should 
there be an energetic reaction with your material that may 
instantaneously over pressurize the hood. 
4. A fume hood provides services that may be required for your 
experiments such as electrical outlets, gas supply, water supply, etc. 
5. Flammable and corrosive cabinets typically comprise the bottom 
supporting structure of the fume hood. They are vented or non-vented 
enclosures used primarily for storage of flammable or corrosive 
materials. If vented, the flammable storage cabinet is connected to the 
hood exhaust. 
Fume Hoods in MSM-164 
There are two fume hoods in MSM-164, as you face them; the one on the 
left is a normal HEPA filtered hood that is useful for general 
radiochemistry and the one on your right is a HEPA filtered hood 
designed for use with Hydro-Fluoric acid. This is the only HF certified 
hood that we have and if you want to use HF, you must have HF training 
and you must have another HF trained person with you when you do the 
work.  
Fume Hoods in MSM-165 
There are three unfiltered fume hoods in laboratory MSM-165 all of them 
are for use of radioactive materials. Because these have unfiltered 




As you face the three hoods, the hood on the far right is designed for use 
of perchloric acid. All of these hoods are very useful for chemistry 
experiments that require only small amounts of radioactive material. The 
sample activity that you work with in these hoods should typically be 
less than 10 micro-Curies and be in solution or in a solid mass that will 
not likely become airborne. 
All unfiltered hoods represent a possible release point for radioactive 
materials or chemicals that are not contained. Because of the ease with 
which activity could be released from these hoods, it is necessary to 
ensure that radioactive materials will not be removed from your 
experiment and go up the stack. 
Fume Hood in MSM-167 
There is one unfiltered hood in MSM-167, it is approved for use of 
radioactive materials and is a smaller hood than is in MSM-165. Since 
this room houses analysis equipment and the hood is unfiltered, it is 
desirable to use only very low level radioactive materials in this room to 
minimize the impact on any instrumentation and prevent a release to the 
outside. 
Fume Hood in MSM-172A 
There is one unfiltered hood in MSM-172A, it is approved for use of 
radioactive materials and is a smaller hood than is in MSM-165. Since 
this room houses analysis equipment, it is desirable to use only very low 
level radioactive materials in this room to minimize the impact on any 
instrumentation. 
Fume Hoods in MSM-173 
The fume hoods in the technetium laboratory (MSM-173) are HEPA 
filtered and the most desirable hoods to use higher levels of activity. The 
ventilation from these hoods goes through a double HEPA filter train 




Fume Hoods in MSM-234 
There are two fume hoods in laboratory MSM-234, one is a perchloric 
acid hood and the other is a HEPA filtered general chemistry hood. As in 
any unfiltered hood, the activity in the perchloric acid hood must be 
limited to prevent an uncontrolled release of activity from the laboratory. 
The HEPA filtered general chemistry hood will of course support higher 
levels of activity. 
One more item about the perchloric acid hood in MSM-234; DO NOT 
OPERATE THE WATER FAUCET – THERE IS NO DRAIN IN THIS 
SYSTEM. This also applies to the wash-down system on this hood. 
Without the ability to collect the water, it is necessary that a collection 
system be provided when it is necessary to do a wash-down. 
Fume Hoods in MSM-236 
There are two fume hoods in laboratory MSM-236; both are HEPA filtered 
general chemistry hoods. 
TIPS FOR FUME HOOD SAFETY  
1. Conduct all operations that may generate air contaminants at or above 
the appropriate Threshold Limit Value TLV inside a filtered hood. The 
TLV for a chemical may be found in its MSDS. Radionuclides that may 
become airborne in excess of the DAC value must be used in a HEPA 
filtered fume hood. 
 
2. Keep all apparatus at least 6 inches back from the face of the hood. A 
stripe on the bench surface is a good reminder. 
 
3. Users should always keep their faces outside the plane of the hood 
sash. 
 
4. Hood sash openings should be kept to a minimum. Hoods are tested 
(and should be used) with a hood sash opening of 15 inches. 
 
5. Do not use the hood as a waste disposal mechanism except for small 
quantities (< 10 ml) of volatile materials. 
 
6. Do not store chemicals or apparatus in the hood. Store chemicals in 
an approved safety storage cabinet. 
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7. Keep the slots in the hood baffle free of obstruction by apparatus or 
containers. 
 
8. Minimize foot traffic past the face of the hood to prevent disruptions in 
air flow. 
 
9. Keep laboratory doors closed when working in the hood. 
 
10. Do not place electrical receptacles or other spark sources inside the 
hood when flammable liquids or gases are present. No permanent 
electrical receptacles are permitted in the hood. 
 
11. Use an appropriate barricade (e.g. a blast shield) if there is a chance 
of explosion or implosion. 
 
12. Do not remove hood sash or panels except when necessary for 




Newsletter 30 – Risks associated with Radiation Exposure at HRC 
More than one hundred years have passed since Roentgen discovered X-
rays in 1895. Since then, radiation has become widely used for medical 
and industrial purposes and is a byproduct of energy generation, 
communication, and electronic components. We are exposed to man-
made radiation through its medical uses, by radiation-emitting products, 
employment in industries using radiation or radioactive materials, and 
nuclear weapons. 
Sources of Radiation Exposure 
Most of the dose received by members of the general population comes 
from natural and not man-made sources. These natural sources include 
cosmic rays, terrestrial radiation, and internally deposited radionuclides. 
Radon, a decay product of uranium-238, is the largest contributor to 
population dose. Radon decays to several short lived daughters that are 
inhaled and internally irradiate the lung. Estimates of total radiation 
exposure for the United States show that radon contributes over half 
(50%) of the estimated effective dose, and man-made sources contribute 
less than 20%. 
Health Effects Research 
Research into the health effects of radiation exposure has been 
conducted since the early 1900's. Radiation burns and radiation 
sickness were recognized in the operators of early X-ray machines. 
Radiation-caused skin cancers were also observed. By the mid 1900's, 
the potential for external irradiation and internally deposited 
radionuclides to cause cancer at other sites was documented. The most 
famous episodes involved the radium dial painters in the United States, 
and the survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bomb blasts in 
Japan. 
The effects observed as a result of these high exposures indicate that 
even low radiation exposures may cause damage to our bodies. Limits for 
exposure to radiation set by the federal government are set at a small 
fraction of the dose that effects have been observed. The occupational 
limit for whole body exposure to ionizing radiation is 5000 mrem/year. 
Studies of people exposed to low levels of radiation have been in progress 
for many years involving hundreds of thousands of workers. Even though 
there is no indication that low doses of radiation cause us harm, the 
mechanisms for damage to our bodies cannot be quantitatively defined in 
the presence of other mechanisms that damage our bodies. Some of the 
many other damage mechanisms are smoking, drinking, intense sports, 
driving, and even walking across the street. 
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What happens if a human is exposed to a high dose of radiation to 
the whole body all at once? 
• For less than 25,000 millirem, there are no directly observable 
effects. There are changes in some human cells that can be observed 
with a microscope at exposures above 10,000 mrem. 
• 25,000 to 50,000 millirem, there will be no symptoms, but there 
might be some changes in the chemistry of the individual's blood. 
• 100,000 to 300,000 millirem, some physical changes (such as skin 
reddening and temporary hair loss) are seen, particularly at the high end 
of the range. 
• 300,000 to 1,000,000 millirem, vomiting is the first symptom, and 
the human loses his/her ability to produce blood. At the upper end of 
this range, bone marrow transplants are generally needed and, if medical 
care is not available, the condition can be fatal within one month of 
exposure. 
• 1,000,000 to 5,000,000 millirem, there will be vomiting, loss of 
blood production, and failure of the gastrointestinal system. In general, 
an acute dose of this magnitude is fatal within two weeks. 
• Greater than 5,000,000 millirem, central nervous system failure is 
likely, and death will occur within a period of days. 
 
How much dose is received by occupational radiation workers 
and other people working at HRC? 
Monitoring of people on campus has shown that in all areas of research 
and at locations where radiation producing machines are used, the 
average annual dose to anyone (including members of the RSO staff) is 
less than 5 millirem/yr. 
The highest dose received by any individual, monitored for occupational 
exposure at the Harry Reid Center for Environmental Studies during 
2008 was 25 mrem. 
Risks From Low Doses 
Generally speaking, no observable risks or effects are seen from either 
acute or chronic doses of less than 25,000 millirem. Statistical methods 
are used to predict the likelihood of long-term effects, such as cancer, for 
large populations exposed to low doses. Unfortunately, there are 
complications, such as natural incidence of cancer and cancer caused by 
other agents such as smoking, that make these evaluations difficult. 
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The radiation protection industry, for a number of years, has 
conservatively assumed that there is some risk associated with any 
radiation dose, no matter how small. We talk about this in training as 
ALARA, we maintain our dose As Low As Reasonably Achievable. The 
risk is assumed to increase linearly with dose, meaning the higher the 
dose, the greater the risk. Based upon these very conservative 
assumptions, the risk of dying from cancer as a result of a 1,000 
millirem radiation dose is 5 in 10,000 or 0.0005. 
Is a risk of 0.0005 a large risk? 
When compared to the types of risks people incur every day of their lives, 
that risk is actually quite small. For example, the U. S. Department of 
Labor gives the following lifetime probabilities of death: 
• Cancer - 0.35 Highway vehicles - 0.25 
• Heart attacks - 0.11 Falls - 0.11 
• Electrocutions - 0.10 Explosions - 0.04 
• Airline Crash - 0.03 Fires - 0.01 
Most of us face more significant risks associated with our normal life 
style, like driving to and from UNLV, than we do on our job working with 
radioactive materials or radiation producing machines. However, one of 
the fundamental principles of radiation protection is that no radiation 
dose is acceptable unless there is a corresponding benefit associated 
with that dose that is at least as large as the risk. 
The National Safety Council maintains a web site indicating statistics 
associated with fatal injuries (both accidental and intentional). If you 
have more interest in risk, take a look at the site: 
http://www.nsc.org/lrs/statinfo/odds.htm 
Like any job where there are hazards, work in a field where you are 
exposed to radiation involves some degree of risk, is a personal choice. If 
you feel that the risks are too high, then maybe you should not be 
working with radiation. However, ensure that you properly evaluate the 
risks associated with any other job. Many people who are exposed to 
radiation at power plants, in hospitals, in the military, or in universities 




Newsletter 31 – Labeling Radioactive Material 
Consider the following situation: (You are authorized to use 
radioactive materials.) 
You are in your laboratory cleaning up after an experiment and you see 
a container that has eluded you for a few years, a residual package 
from a previous researcher. The package has no markings on it and 
appears to be intact. You pick up the package and open it. A puff of 
dust permeates the room and you notice that the inner package has a 
small trefoil symbol on it. You use a contamination survey meter and 
identify that the area is contaminated, the room is contaminated, you 
are contaminated, and you most likely have sustained an intake of 
radioactive material. 
How do I know what I was exposed to? 
The simple answer is - you don't! The label didn't tell you that there was 
radioactive material in the container, it did not tell you how much, or 
what radionuclide you were exposed to, and sometimes more important; 
what chemical compound were you exposed to? An evaluation will have 
to be made of the material, the work area, (possibly outside the work 
area), and your body (to determine the magnitude of the intake and the 
associated dose that you received). 
What do I do now?! 
Call the RSO! This may be a serious exposure with long-term 
consequences, not the least of which may be a call to State regulators. In 




How can I prevent this type of accident from happening?  
A simple label on the outside of the package could have prevented 
exposing you to the radioactive dust or a chemical hazard. 
If you find such a container or package in your laboratory or work area, 
you really have no need to open it. If after discussion with the laboratory 
manager and the RSO, you decide to open it, then do so under controlled 
conditions. Put on gloves! Put it in a filtered hood or other protective 
enclosure! Use a frisker to check for contamination, or the presence of a 
gamma or energetic beta source within the package. An operating glove 
box or filtered hood should provide adequate control for opening a 
package containing an unknown. Ensure that you are appropriately 
protected and other persons in the area are also well protected. Note: the 
RSO must be notified immediately any time that radioactive material is 
found. Finally, label the package, container, and/or contents with all the 
information you have regarding 
it. 
What should the label read? 
A label for radioactive material 
should be similar to the 
following: 
Indicate the radionuclide or 
radionuclides, the activity in the 
package, and the dose rate on 
contact and at 1 meter, indicate 
the status of the package (If you 
don't want someone to open it, 
write "DO NOT OPEN" in bold 
letters on the package). Indicate 
who you are and the date and 
time you created the label. 
What materials should be labeled? 
Certainly, all radioactive materials should be labeled with the 
information indicated above (NAC 459.355-357, inclusive). And you must 
label all hazardous chemicals with the name of the chemical and the 




containers or racks, and all dilutions, fractions, etc. should bear a 
reference number which will allow identification if YOU are not around. 
This is especially important if you would not want someone else to open 
the package! 
Some Other Thoughts. 
Whenever you leave a material unattended, it should be labeled. If you 
will be away from the material for any length of time, ensure that the 
material is stored properly. Provide detailed instructions of what is in the 
package, how to open the package, how to handle the material, and how 
to dispose of the material. 
Experienced Authorized Users may open "unknowns," although the RSO 
must always be notified when radioactive materials that we did not know 
about are found. Assistants and students must contact the AU for the 
laboratory and should not under any circumstances open an unknown 
package. Human nature (and scientific curiosity) being what they are, 
however, surprises will happen. What we can do therefore is ensure that 




Newsletter 32 – Safety and Security in the HRC Laboratories 
The radiochemistry laboratories in the Harry Reid Center for 
Environmental Studies (HRC) allow work with radioactive 
materials by trained personnel who are trusted to protect 
themselves and others from harm. 
Safety 
Before you first started to do work with radioactive materials at the HRC 
you receive training in basic aspects of radiation safety. Let me remind 
you of some of your responsibilities for safety while you are working in 
the laboratories. 
1. Good housekeeping is required where radioactive materials are 
used. Work areas must be clearly defined and uncluttered. 
2. Work surfaces shall be covered to facilitate easy decontamination. 
Bench coverings shall be changed frequently, i.e., weekly, or 
whenever the covering is noticeably soiled, torn, or contaminated. 
3. Locate work areas away from heavy traffic or doorways. 
4. When moving radioactive solutions between approved locations, 
place the material within covered secondary containers that 
contain sufficient absorbing material to absorb twice the quantity 
of liquid. 
5. You must wear protective clothing when you or others in a 
laboratory are working with chemicals or radioactive materials. As 
a minimum, this is a laboratory coat, safety glasses, long pants, 
and close-toed shoes. 
6. Radioactive materials shall be stored so as to prevent unauthorized 
access or removal from their place of storage. The storage shall not 
create a "Radiation Area" and must be shielded or sealed to keep 
exposures ALARA. Radionuclides shall not be left unsecured in 
unoccupied laboratories. 
7. Containers with radioactive materials for storage, processing, or 
use, shall be individually and conspicuously labeled. The label 
must specify the identity of the radionuclide, the estimated activity 
(amount), the initials of the contact person for that material, and 
the date. Containers of radioactive material may be placed in 
properly labeled secondary containers for storage. 
 319 
 
8. Empty and decontaminated containers must have the label 
removed or defaced. 
9. You have a continuous monitoring device that you wear during all 
work in the laboratories. This device is very sensitive to external 
radiations and is specifically assigned to you. Do not loan your 
dosimeter to anyone else, and do not wear anyone else’s dosimeter. 
10. Your experiences in the laboratories may cause you to have a need 
for training to use Hydrofluoric Acid (HF) or other potentially 
dangerous compounds. You should always find out about the 
elements and compounds that you are working with, look in the 
MSDS for each compound – make absolutely sure that you protect 
yourself. 
11. Be sure that the gloves that you wear are appropriate for 
protection from the chemicals you are using. 
12. If you need to use HF, you must have HF training, you must have 
a buddy (who is also trained) with you, the buddy must have a 
tube of calcium gluconate ready to apply should you spill any on 
you. 
Security 
1. There are several ways that we ensure security of our laboratories and 
the radioactive materials that we use. On October 1, 2009 we will 
institute more controls to protect the laboratories – the back hallway 
will be locked at all times and the main entry (near the parking lot) 
will be guarded against unauthorized entry. Your Marlock cards will 
provide you with access. DO NOT – UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES 
LOAN ANYONE ELSE YOUR MARLOCK CARD. 
2. In addition to the Marlock permissions, you may have a proximity 
card that provides you with access to the primary radioactive material 
research laboratories. Your Marlock card is assigned to you and is 
ONLY for YOUR use. DO NOT – UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES LOAN 
ANYONE ELSE YOUR PROXIMITY CARD. 
3. If at any time, you cannot find your Marlock or Proximity card, please 
call the Radiation Laboratory Director immediately – so that your card 
can be disabled. If you don’t, you are potentially jeopardizing our 
laboratories and radioactive materials. 
4. Our primary supply of radioactive materials is maintained under the 
control of the primary Authorized Radioactive Material Users. Access 
to these materials requires a key and a combination. This area must 
never be left open and unattended. If you see this area open, call one 
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of the primary users immediately! 
Our work with radioactive materials and potentially dangerous 
substances is very important. Our trust in each other is essential to the 
proper protection of ourselves and those who work with us. Our 
protection of the laboratories and protection of the materials that we 




Newsletter 33 – X-ray Machines 
There are many types of X-ray machines used at UNLV, Dental X-ray, 
Diagnostic X-ray, X-ray Fluorescence, and Crystallography machines.  
What are X-rays? 
X-rays are electromagnetic radiation similar to light but with a higher 
energy. They are produced in the electron energy shells of atoms when 
electrons or other charged particles excite the atoms of a dense material. 
How does an X-ray machine make X-rays? 
X-ray machines have an evacuated glass (X-
ray) tube where a high voltage is put across 
two electrodes, the negative cathode, and 
the positive anode. The voltage ranges from 
several thousand volts to several hundred 
thousand volts. This diagram shows the 
typical components of an x-ray tube. 
 
What do these different machines do? 
Dental x-ray machines make pictures of the internals of our teeth. They 
are low energy and low dose rate machines where the distance from the 
source to film is small and the resulting picture is small. 
Medical diagnostic x-ray machines may be used to evaluate our internal 
bone structures or other structures in our bodies. They are typically 
higher in energy than dental machines because they have to penetrate a 
larger depth of the body (and bigger bones) than dental x-rays. 
X-ray Fluorescence machines are low energy machines that are used to 
identify the elements in a sample. The source may be electronic or a 
source of low energy x-ray emitting radioactive material. The x-rays may 
be specialized to look for one element (such as lead) or output to a 
spectrometer to identify several elements in an item. The output is 
usually higher because the response depends on radiation scattered from 
the item being analyzed. Fluorescence is a spectro-chemical method of 
analysis where the molecules of the analyte are excited by irradiation at a 
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certain wavelength and emit radiation of a different wavelength. The 
emission spectrum provides information for both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis. 
X-ray Crystallography machines are very low energy at extremely high 
intensity. These machines are designed to observe the structure of 
molecules through diffraction of the x-ray beam. In order to “see” 
molecules it is necessary to use a form of electromagnetic radiation with 
a wavelength on the order of bond lengths, such as X-rays. X-ray 
crystallography is an experimental technique that exploits the fact that 
X-rays are diffracted by crystals. It is not an imaging technique. 
There are variations of each type of machine in order to enhance certain 
analyses or reduce equipment costs for a specific purpose. The degree of 
hazard associated with each machine depends on the radiation safety 
techniques used to protect the operator. Some machines use key 
switches and interlocks to prevent inadvertent exposure, and on some 
machines the exposure time and resulting dose at the operator’s 
position are very low. Training is usually the key to ensuring a low dose 
to x-ray machine operators. 
What are the dose rates from various x-ray machines? 
The following table lists the dose rate in Sievert/minute from the 
different machine types. One Sievert is 100 rads. In this table contact 
means as close to the source as you can reasonably get. The dose rate 
at 1 meter is estimated as the ‘unshielded’ dose rate. 
Dose Rate (Sv/minute) 
 
Machine Type Dental Medical Fluorescence Crystallography 
Contact with 
tube 
0.01 0.1 10 1000 
At 1 meter 0.00001 0.0001 0.1 10 
 
Also, different medical procedures deliver different doses to patients as 




Radiation Dose Comparison 
What dose do machine operators receive? 
If operators of X-ray machines are cautious and use time, distance, and 
shielding appropriately, they will receive no measurable radiation dose 
from most X-ray procedures. 
The highest dose received by UNLV employees and students is from 
fluoroscopic diagnostic X-ray machines and is incurred when they are 
assigned off campus to clinical work in hospitals. Fluoroscopy machines 
are essentially an X-ray movie where the beam is on continuously to 
allow a physician to observe movement of body components or materials 
in the body. Since the patient may have to be moved around on the X-ray 
table during the ‘filming’, the technicians moving the patient are closer to 
the X-ray beam and receive higher doses. There are ways to reduce the 
exposure even with fluoroscopy, such as reducing the beam ‘on time’. For 
example, if a machine puts out half the number of X-rays in the same ‘on 
time’, the dose to everyone (including the patient) is cut in half. 
For low energy machines such as dental X-ray, fluorescence, or 
diffraction machines the dose is primarily to the skin (shallow dose). If 
directly exposed to the beam from a florescence or crystallography 
machine for even a small time period may cause burns. 
  





Number of Chest X 
rays (PA film) for 
Equivalent Effective 
Dose2  
Time Period for 
Equivalent Effective 
Dose from Natural 
Background Radiation3  
Chest x ray (PA film)  0.02  1  2.4 days  
Skull x ray  0.07  4  8.5 days  
Lumbar spine  1.3  65  158 days  
I.V. urogram  2.5  125  304 days  
Upper G.I. exam  3.0  150  1.0 year  
Barium enema  7.0  350  2.3 years  
CT head  2.0  100  243 days  




The information gained by the use of X-rays is extremely valuable but 
care must be taken to get that information. The highest dose is received 
when you must repeat a procedure many times to get the information 
that you need. Try to do it right the first time, take your time, think it out 




Newsletter 34 – Some Good Work Practices 
I was walking through the laboratories on my standard waste pickup on 
Wednesday and took some photos of conditions in the laboratories that 
should not happen. This led me to the topic for this month, some good 
work practices. 
In a discussion of good radiological work practices, highlighted 
undesirable situations should help to understand what might be better. 
Some pictures 
This was the first area that caught my eye. This picture shows items 
piled into a yellow tray with a “Radioactive Material” pad. This pad 
represents a contaminated area. The items piled into that area may not 





This picture represents a similar situation, clean items in a potentially 
contaminated area, but also shows some potentially contaminated pads 
flowing off of the area. This could lead to dripping of radioactive liquids 
from the pads and an uncontrolled spill.  
 
When you set up a contaminated area, keep things that are not 
contaminated from getting contaminated, and keep the number of things 
that could get contaminated to a minimum. Vial covers in the “disposable 







Tube trays and holders should be outside the contaminated area unless 
they are holding tubes with contaminated liquid in them, or they are 
contaminated from previous experiments. In this case, they are just 




In this picture, radioactive solutions are in a tube holder, but there is no 
absorbent in the tray and nothing to indicate that the tray is a potentially 






Any materials brought into one of the higher activity laboratories should 
be taken out of packaging in a clean area, and the packaging disposed of 
as clean waste. In this case, in MSM-173, packing materials on some 





Your reference materials and notebooks should be maintained free of 
contamination at all times, if possible. There is never a reason to put a 
document in a contaminated area. The pen, sharpie, and tape should 














We have always said that blue pads represent a contaminated area and 
that green represents a clean area. In this picture a green pad is used for 
radioactive liquids and the tray to the right with radioactive solutions, 
has no liner.  
There seems to be a lot of confusion about what to use as a tray 
liner, so here is the desired plan.  
1. Use blue pads with the words “Radioactive Materials” to provide an 
absorbent surface for radioactive liquids – should they spill.  
2. Use green pads for non-radioactive liquids  
3. Don’t use absorbent pads if you do not have liquids in the tray. A spill 





As always, be considerate to others in the laboratory, be a part of the 
friendly environment that lets us complete our research with minimal 
interference as a result of poor forethought on the part of someone else.  
Keep your work areas clean and non-contaminated, use time distance, 
and shielding to reduce your external dose, minimize your intake of 
radioactive materials via inhalation and ingestion by preventing 
radioactive materials from entering your breathing zone.  
1. You must survey your work area each time that you do work there.  
2. Always prepare your samples in a radiologically clean area.  
3. You are part of your work area; always check yourself for 
contamination before leaving the work area.  
4. Prevent contamination from leaving the laboratory area by verifying 
that you are not contaminated using the PCM.  
5. Prevent contamination from leaving the laboratories by surveying all 




Newsletter 35 – Wearing Dosimetry 
One requirement that is most important to a radiation safety program 
is monitoring the radiation dose that any radiation worker receives. 
From a regulatory standpoint we monitor dose to ensure that people 
don’t receive dose in excess of limits and that they maintain their dose 
As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). In addition, the radiation 
safety office will periodically take bioassay samples to ensure that we 
minimize intake of radioactive materials.  
Who wears dosimetry at the HRC? 
Any person working with radioactive materials or radiation producing 
machines at the HRC or in the radio-chemistry laboratories at the SEB 
who may receive a dose in excess of 500 millirem in a year is required to 
wear dosimetry. However, we typically provide dosimetry to many more 
than is required to demonstrate that doses are low in our laboratories.  
How do I get dosimetry for a new radiation worker? 
You can contact the Radiation Safety Office at 5-4226 or visit their web 
site to download a form Form # 09 - Radiation Dosimetry Request . Just 
fill out the form and return it to the RSO. They will request your new 
dosimeter and if necessary provide you with a badge immediately.  
How often are dosimeters exchanged? 
 
Every two months the radiation safety office collects our old dosimetry 
badge and exchanges it for a new one. The badges are sent to Landauer 
(the dosimetry company that UNLV uses) for processing. The results are 
typically received in 15 days or so after Landauer receives the badges. 
Remember that these results are for the previous 2 month monitoring 
period. It is possible to request an "emergency" reading of a dosimetry 
badge, for which Landauer charges an additional $50.00. This is done 
only if a very high dose is expected and has never been done at UNLV. 
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What if my badge is lost? 
When you lose your dosimeter, the RSO will need to provide you another 
dosimeter – but in order to ensure that they have a reasonable record of 
your dose (from the time that the lost badge was worn); they will need to 
have a Lost Badge Report filed and evaluated by the RSO.  
What if I am exposed to radiation at more than one job? 
Some people are exposed to radiation at UNLV and at another place 
where they work. Those people wear the UNLV dosimeter for UNLV (or 
student) functions and their other dosimeter at the other work function. 
Only one dosimeter is worn for each job.  
How is my dose controlled if I am exposed at two locations? 
The only way that dose can be controlled when you work at two locations 
is an effort by YOU to ensure that the RSO at both locations knows that 
you wear dosimetry at another location. Then the RSO's can 
communicate information to ensure that you do not exceed dose limits. If 
the locations are both on campus, then the same badge issued by the 
UNLV RSO should be worn in both places unless different instruction is 
received from the UNLV RSO.  
What if I have declared my pregnancy? 
This is one of the few times that the RSO may provide someone with two 
dosimetry badges. The badge monitoring the mother is worn on the part 
of the body expected to receive the highest dose to the mother and the 
other is worn on the front surface of the baby's location under any 
protective equipment (example: a lead apron). Any specific concerns 




Newsletter 36 – Surveying Your Workspace 
A responsibility that we all have when working with radioactive materials 
is to ensure that our radioactive materials do not affect others. We do 
this by preventing the spread of radioactive contamination from our work 
areas. The only way that we can accomplish this is by using some 
method to identify the presence of the activity in and around our work 
areas each time we use radioactive materials. 
What is a survey for? 
A contamination survey simply identifies the location of radioactive 
material in the area surveyed. 
What are the main methods of finding out where contamination is? 
This depends on the radionuclide emissions that we desire to evaluate, 
what form the radionuclide(s) are in, and what methods we have to 
measure the emissions. 
Radionuclides in our laboratories could be in solutions, in powders, or in 
solids. The emissions from these materials could be electrons, photons, 
or alpha particles. Also, we have a few different detectors that may or 
may not be appropriate for the measurement that we may need. 
What are direct measurements? 
Direct measurements of contamination are made using portable 
instruments that can be moved over a work surface and the rate of 
detection for particles can be evaluated by a meter, or by sound. The 
‘click’ that is made by the speaker on portable detectors is a direct 
indication of an interaction in the detector. 
Direct measurements are useful for immediate indication of high 
concentrations of activity on item, bench tops, floors, or work areas. 
There are two portable detectors that are currently used by our program 
to locate emissions from radionuclides: 
To do a direct measurement survey, check the instrument for operability 
(see the next section), measure emissions from the work area, adjacent 
areas, the bench in front of you, the floor under where you were 
standing, and your clothing. 
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To measure the emissions, hold the probe at 1 cm from the  area you 
want to check, move the probe slowly, 3 to 6 cm per second is a 
reasonable speed. While the probe is in motion, pay attention to the 
sound of the meter. If you hear an increase in the frequency of the 
‘clicks’, move the probe back over that area and hold the probe there for 
about 30 seconds to assess the magnitude of the increase. 
If the increase is three times the background count rate, then consider 
that area to be contaminated, wipe the area and throw the wipe in the 
solid radioactive waste. 
Ludlum Model 3 
The Ludlum Model 3 rate-meter with a 44-9 Geiger probe is currently 
used in our program for evaluation of emissions from alpha and/or beta 
emissions from most of the radionuclides that we use. It is useful for 
detection and measurement of beta radiation and detection of gamma 
radiation or alpha radiation. This detector has a small sensitive area; the 
window has a diameter of 4.75 cm, an overall area of 17.7 cm2. 
The detection efficiency for 99Tc beta emissions for the model 3 is 
approximately 10% (0.1 counts/transformation), so a measurement of a 
surface activity concentration of 1000 dpm/probe area would be 
approximately 100 counts per minute. With a background count rate of 
100 counts per minute, this is the lowest activity that could be measured 
by the Model 3 with some small degree of confidence. 
This instrument is not appropriate for measurement of alpha emissions 
because they are not consistently detected due to variations in the 
window thickness of the detector. It is also not appropriate for 
measurement of high energy photon emissions because of the small 
sensitive volume of the detector. 
Some more specific information about the Ludlum Model 3 Geiger 
counter is provided in Newsletter HRC-24. 
Ludlum Model 2360 
The Ludlum Model 2360 rate-meter/scalar with a 43-93 alpha/beta 
scintillation probe is useful for measurement of both alpha and beta 
emissions from most of the radionuclides that we use. It is not useful for 
measurement of gamma emissions although it will detect them. The 43-
93 detector has a 100 cm2 probe with a very thin mylar window. 
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The detection efficiency for 99Tc beta emissions for the model 2360 is 
approximately 15% (0.15 counts/transformation), so a measurement of a 
surface activity concentration of 1000 dpm/100 cm2 would be 
approximately 150 counts per minute. With a background count rate of 
150 counts per minute, this is the lowest activity that could be measured 
by the Model 2360 with some small degree of confidence. 
This instrument is not appropriate for measurement of high energy 
photon emissions because of the small sensitive volume of the detector. 
Some more specific information about the Ludlum Model 2360 rate-
meter with the 43-93 probe is provided in Newsletter HRC-25. 
Preparing to Operate an Instrument 
1.  Always make sure that your instrument is in good condition. No 
major dents in the case, it looks like it should work (no wires hanging 
out), etc. 
2. Make sure that the instrument has been calibrated in the past year. 
Check the calibration sticker for the date that calibration is due. 
3. Turn the instrument to the BAT position and make sure that the 
meter reading is beyond the battery OK position in the meter. 
4. Turn the knob to the lowest scale and check for a normal background 
response. For a pancake GM probe, the normal response should be 
between 20 and 100 counts per minute in a low background area. For an 
alpha/beta scintillation probe, the normal background response is 
between 100 to 200 counts per minute. 
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Portable Instrument Precautions 
Radiation detectors are delicate; they are the only way that you can tell if 
there is ionizing radiation in your area, try to prevent them from damage. 
As with any instrument, there are some precautions that you can take to 
ensure that it provides you with the information that you need and that 
it continues to work. These are: 
1.  Never put the instrument in water – it will never work again. 
2.  When surveying contaminated areas – try not to touch the probe to 
the surface you are measuring – this will minimize the probability that 
you will contaminate the probe. 
3.  Never survey sharp objects; wire, wire brushes, brooms, things that 
can make a hole in things. This action will cause the window to be 
broken and the instrument to be non-responsive. 
4.  Never use the probe as a hammer.  There is a floating anode inside 
the 44-9 Geiger detector that can easily be shaken out of position – 
maybe even short out. There is a photomultiplier tube in a 43-93 that 
can shatter – anyway use a hammer for hammering. 
5.  Try not to drop the meter or detector – dropping the meter could 
break a circuit board inside the case – dropping the probe may break the 
window or short out the anode on the 44-9 or break the photomultiplier 
tube in the 43-93. 
6.  If there is an accident and you contaminate the detector, remove the 
detector from normal use and notify the laboratory manager that the 
instrument is Out Of Service. Usually the instrument can be 
decontaminated or repaired in less than one hour. 
Are there other than direct measurement surveys? 
Yes, direct measurement surveys are appropriate to measure the total 
activity on a surface. However, as you can surmise from the previous 
discussion, direct measurements with our portable instruments are not 
adequate to ensure that we are in compliance with the 100 dpm/100 
cm2, level of concern for removable beta emitting radionuclides and the 
20 dpm/100 cm2 limit for removable alpha emitting radionuclides. 
Also, direct measurements are not useful for contamination control if the 
background response rate is high. A smear survey is capable of providing 
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a more sensitive evaluation of removable activity on a surface – even in a 
high background area. 
What is a smear? 
The smears that we use are small disks of paper with an adhesive back. 
Each smear comes on a small rectangle of paper with an area to record a 
smear identification number and some information about the location, 
date, time, surveyor, and to indicate the analysis method. 
The smear is made of paper so if you rub it on rough surfaces like rough 
concrete or metal, it will tear or shred. It should be used on smooth dry 
surfaces. Making the smear wet will decrease your detection efficiency for 
alpha and beta emissions. If you smear a wet area, let the smear dry 




What are smear surveys? 
In smear surveys, a smear is rubbed over an area of 100 cm2 to collect a 
sample of the removable radioactive material on the surface. One 
hundred square centimeters is used in order to provide a standard area. 
The smear location is indicated on a survey map, usually by writing the 
smear number on the map at the location where the smear was rubbed. 
When you have your smears ready for analysis, take the time to evaluate 
them with a portable instrument to make sure that they do not have too 
much activity on them. If they do, they could cause contamination of the 
low background detector (then it won’t be low background). 
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The smear is then analyzed for activity on a detector appropriate for the 
emissions from the radionuclides expected to be present. In our case, the 
smear can be analyzed on a low background alpha/beta counter or a low 




Newsletter 37 – Weekly Plans for Radiochemistry 
In the past several weeks we have implemented a program for planning 
all work with radioactive materials in the radiochemistry laboratories at 
the HRC and in other areas where work is done for the radiochemistry 
program. This program was implemented because an authorized 
Radioactive Material User (User) must be responsible for all work 
conducted under the authority of the UNLV Radioactive materials 
license. In previous years we worked under a few different systems that 
caused confusion among the Users and prevented a strong User 
knowledge of the work. This newsletter is to more adequately define the 
planning process and answer some questions that have come up. 
What is a radioactive material User? 
A User is a person who has been authorized by the UNLV Radiation 
Safety Officer (RSO) to work independently with radioactive materials. A 
Radioactive Materials User is a permanent faculty or staff member who 
has submitted an application to the RSO and has been approved, based 
on education, experience, and trust to work with licensed radioactive 
materials at the UNLV main campus, the UNLV Shadow Lane campus, or 
at a specific (approved) site remote from the main campus. A User must 
be aware of work that is conducted under their authority and they must 
be present on campus when that work is in progress. 
Who are the Radioactive Material Users that work with the 
Radiochemistry Program? 
There are several radioactive material Users in the Radiochemistry 
program as follows: 
 
1. Dr. Ken Czerwinski, 
2. Dr. Gary Cerefice, 
3. Dr. Ralf Sudowe, 
4. Dr. Thomas Hartmann, and 
5. Dr. Vern Hodge. 
 
What is in a plan for work with radioactive materials? 
 
The basic form for submitting a plan is simple, the questions to answer 
are: 
 
What are the dates of your work and who are you? 
 
What radionuclide(s) will you be working with and what do you want to 




How much activity of those radionuclides will be used and where will you 
use it? 
 
Then check all of the things that you would like to do with the activity 
and turn the form in to a User. 
How is a plan evaluated? 
The work plan is reviewed by an authorized User, and if the work looks 
reasonable without additional controls, then the User checks the “box” at 
the bottom of the form that indicates, the submission has been 
“Compared to RMS guidelines and is accepted without additional 
controls” and signs the form, and puts the information on the board 
indicating that work may proceed. 
A User signature is REQUIRED and your project must be on the board 
before work may proceed. If you have submitted a plan and your project 
is not listed on the board, then assume it has not been approved. 
What is the planning board? And what is its purpose? 
Work within the radiochemistry laboratories requires the knowledge and 
presence of a radioactive materials User. The white board at the 
laboratory bay entry is a simple way of identifying who could be working 
in the laboratories and what they are working on. 
Why do I have to submit a new plan each week? 
A new plan is required each week so that each User knows that the plan 
is current and the work described in the plan is accurate. We previously 
had a board that rarely changed and was not a very good indicator of the 
work going on in the laboratories. Documentation ensures information is 
available for the UNLV Radiation Safety Office to evaluate our work. 
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What if I don’t submit a plan and must do work with radioactive 
materials? 
A User MUST be aware of any use of radioactive materials and must 
approve that use for any time that they are responsible. A User may 
approve use of radioactive materials as needed. 
However, if a User has not approved your plan and you are working with 
radioactive materials, you are in violation of the UNLV radioactive 
materials license and will be excused from the laboratories and your 
reentry will be restricted until the UNLV Radiation Safety Officer, the 
HRC Laboratory Director, and your supervisor approve your 
authorization to continue your work. 
What if my plan is not approved? 
If you have submitted a plan that involves evolutions that may be 
hazardous to you, others in the laboratory, or may result in release of 
materials from the laboratory areas, the User evaluation may cause the 
work to be held up until the work is discussed with you and reasonable 
controls are put in place to ensure the safety of all. If the work involves 
significant amounts of activity, a work plan may be required and 
approval by the RSO may be required. 
Remember, the Radiation Safety Officer at UNLV has TOTAL 
authority to stop work by anyone using radioactive materials on 
campus at any time. Our license is a broad scope type B license with 
the State of Nevada and the RSO is the supervisor of all radioactive 
material use at UNLV. 
What about surveys? 
If you work with radioactive materials in the radiochemistry laboratories, 
you have a responsibility to yourself and others in the laboratory bay to 
prevent the spread of radioactive contamination from your work area. As 
such, you must do and document surveys to provide compliance with the 
UNLV Radiation Safety Manual and thus the UNLV Radioactive Materials 
License(s). If you did not document a survey of your work area(s), then 




How can I learn more about controls for my project? 
There are many ways to become familiar with controls that may be 
applicable to your work as follows:  
1. Review the UNLV Radiation Safety Manual for requirements. The 
UNLV Radiation safety Manual is now specifically indicated as a part of 
our radioactive materials license. 
 
2. Discuss your project with your supervisor and ensure that you have 
considered all hazards associated with the materials that you will use. 
 
3. Review the Material Safety Data Sheets for the chemicals that you use 
in your research; be sure to control the chemical hazards as well as the 
radiological hazards. 
 
4. Discuss your project with the UNLV Radiation Safety Officer and/or 
the HRC Radiation Laboratory Director. 
 
A general rule that I have about work with any hazardous materials is: 
“Make sure that you are comfortable with the controls before you start 
your project.  
 




Appendix C – Fraction of Surface Activity Removed by the Gel 
Table 3-2. Fraction of Total Activity on the Surface Removed by the Gel 
Location 
Number 













1 55 0.028 126 0.992 
2 259 0.053 63 0.984 
3 7078 0.337 71 0.986 
4 582 0.234 94394 1.000 
5 4565 0.148 107622 1.000 
6 1019 0.241 95 0.989 
7 207 0.102 45 0.978 
8 148 0.075 14 0.927 
9 23 0.025 37 0.973 
10 92 0.012 25 0.960 
11 139 0.085 19 0.948 
12 175 0.050 15 0.935 
13 80 0.015 31 0.968 
14 126 0.022 31 0.968 
15 78 0.057 35 0.971 
16 57 0.021 5 0.801 
17 151 0.015 11 0.909 
18 259 0.054 33 0.970 
19 291 0.061 13 0.923 
20 316 0.121 97 0.990 
21 123 0.172 18 0.943 
22 4308 0.240 19 0.946 
23 1220 0.128 19 0.947 
24 538 0.134 12 0.917 
25 3996 0.060 32 0.969 
26 368 0.035 31 0.968 
27 156 0.035 13 0.923 
28 352 0.018 18 0.945 
29 4250 0.085 13 0.924 
30 14 0.161 36756 1.000 
31 12 0.055 46 0.978 
32 13 0.074 6803 1.000 
33 23 0.209 6331 1.000 
34 43 0.175 6898 1.000 
35 52 0.122 5 0.788 
36 179 0.139 2 0.596 



















38 20 0.079 11433 1.000 
39 38 0.253 8598 1.000 
40 41 0.144 78 0.987 
41 105 0.130 5 0.802 
42 84 0.125 4 0.759 
43 18 0.098 4 0.760 
44 51 0.187 2 0.516 
45 83 0.168 4 0.728 
46 320 0.147 3 0.707 
47 88 0.263 17 0.941 
48 65 0.416 14 0.927 
49 85 0.296 16913 1.000 
50 27 0.128 11433 1.000 
51 79 0.137 12094 1.000 
52 84 0.241 13323 1.000 
53 154 0.297 9 0.892 
54 60 0.392 6 0.831 
55 113 0.212 5 0.793 
56 64 0.285 3 0.675 
57 367 0.245 5 0.811 
58 139 0.238 3 0.652 
59 140 0.282 2 0.593 
60 98 0.627 6 0.841 
61 70 0.213 7 0.856 
62 96 0.221 7 0.864 
63 65 0.228 10 0.902 
64 149 0.442 15 0.935 
65 689 0.424 16252 1.000 
66 18 0.271 27780 1.000 
68 36 0.136 9638 1.000 
69 31 0.139 30 0.967 
70 59 0.128 32220 1.000 
71 153 0.190 90 0.989 
72 425 0.061 37 0.973 
73 54 0.208 17575 1.000 
74 10 0.010 22583 1.000 
75 81 0.275 22772 1.000 
76 89 0.013 97 0.990 
77 7 0.118 259 0.996 
78 106 0.143 45 0.978 
79 29 0.394 13 0.920 
80 27 0.358 28 0.964 
81 193 0.423 74 0.987 
82 279 0.558 24 0.958 


















84 327 0.208 13 0.924 
85 248 0.149 14 0.930 
86 321 0.074 18 0.943 
87 1727 0.195 13 0.921 
89 96 0.033 4 0.762 
90 57 0.012 5 0.801 
91 49 0.008 11 0.909 
92 20 0.002 18 0.943 
93 675 0.110 25 0.960 
94 2266 0.098 21 0.953 
95 236 0.033 19 0.946 
97 47 0.042 18 0.944 
98 81 0.053 14 0.928 
100 283 0.071 15 0.934 
101 1145 0.160 9 0.887 
102 126 0.101 20 0.951 
104 140 0.039 12 0.918 
105 476 0.174 7 0.857 
106 330 0.127 9 0.884 
108 107 0.079 17 0.942 
109 401 0.150 5 0.814 
110 180 0.166 7 0.851 
111 375 0.219 11 0.912 
112 241 0.170 48094 1.000 
113 694 0.077 17 0.942 
114 710 0.446 12756 1.000 
115 488 0.310 26740 1.000 
116 56 0.031 48 0.979 
117 132 0.033 63 0.984 
118 1008 0.314 9 0.882 
119 1090 0.258 179 0.994 
120 1155 0.021 107622 1.000 
121 100 0.013 94394 1.000 
122 351 0.032 65102 1.000 
123 446 0.002 71 0.986 




Appendix D - A Model Standard Procedure for Radionuclide 
Recovery 
INTRODUCTION 
This procedure is a model to identify the specific aspects of a chemical 
procedure for reuse of radioactive materials that are important to the 
safety of personnel involved in the operation and those that may be in 
the area of this work. Each of the measures that should be taken for 
control of hazardous or radioactive chemicals are common and based on 
documents cited throughout this model procedure. This is not intended 
to be an extensive guide to chemical safety; all research facilities have 
Health and Safety or Risk Management groups with experienced 
personnel to provide guidance in experimentation with radiochemicals. 
Personnel who work in radiochemistry laboratories should experience 
radiation safety training, chemical hygiene training, and specific 
laboratory training for the research that they will do.  
PURPOSE 
The purpose of this procedure is to provide guidance for safety 
considerations appropriate for removal of radionuclides from chemical 
compounds or mixtures. This guidance is to minimize the hazards 
experienced or protect personnel from those hazards. The goal is to 
recover radionuclides from so that they are in more easily stored and 
used again without presenting a hazard to the laboratory. 
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 
Radioactive materials emit radiation; the degree of hazard associated 
with their emissions depends on the type of radiation emitted and the 
energy of that radiation. Those radionuclides that emit gamma radiation 
or high energy beta radiation may provide more of an external radiation 
hazard, one in which the emissions have sufficient energy and 
penetrability to cause an important degree of risk to researchers even 
though the material is outside of the body. This external radiation risk is 
controlled by minimizing the time of exposure to high dose rates, 
maximizing the distance from the source to minimize the dose rate, and 
using shielding to minimize the dose rate. 
Some other materials may have emissions that are not important as an 
external radiation hazard, but are important if inside of the body. For 
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example, radionuclides that emit alpha or low energy beta radiation 
might be important if inhaled, absorbed through the skin or a wound, or 
ingested. There may also be radionuclides that emit both penetrating and 
non-penetrating radiation, for example gamma and alpha or alpha 
emitters in a compound with a light element that may emit neutrons 
when hit with an alpha particle. 
The emissions and their energy are well documented for radionuclides 
[148]. The appropriate measures to be taken will vary by radionuclide 
and when working with materials that contain activity in excess of 1 
Annual Limit on Intake [149] for the most restrictive intake pathway, 
inhalation or Ingestion, the Radiation Safety Officer or Health Physicist 
should be consulted to ensure appropriate controls are used. A control 
guideline was established for use in the radiochemistry laboratories at 
UNLV [150]. 
Once established, methods of proper use will ensure: 
Control of radioactive contamination to minimize inhalation or 
ingestion. 
 Proper security to prevent theft of radioactive materials. 
 Exposure reduction by external exposure control methods. 
CHEMICALS 
Chemistry safety involves active measures to prevent contact with the 
skin, inhalation, and ingestion. The specific hazards of chemicals are 
identified in Material Safety Data Sheets published by the manufacturer 
of the chemicals [151]. The MSDS is required by OSHA guidelines [152]. 
A second source of information regarding the hazards associated with 
chemicals is the NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards [153]. With 
these sources of information a researcher should be able to identify the 
potential effects of exposure to specific chemicals, the levels which have 
shown to be safe to work with, and the mechanisms that are reasonable 
for protection. 
The most common hazards associated with chemicals are those hazards 
that are considered ‘characteristic’ such as ignitable, corrosive, reactive, 
or toxic. These classifications are generally applied to hazardous waste 
[154], but are important for laboratory safety. The measures to protect 
personnel from these hazards are well known. Training to assist people 
in protection methods and accident response is common for personnel 
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working in the hazardous waste industry and is required by OSHA as 
HAZWOPER training [155]. 
BASIC SAFETY 
Know the hazard 
Any time chemicals and/or radioactive materials are used, the hazard 
associated with their use must be known. Review the known safety 
information about the materials known to be in the residue. For example; 
the Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) or other manufacturer’s 
information [156]. If there is no applicable MSDS, then consider the 
compounds that will be created by the processes used to return the 
radioactive residue to a reusable material, the compounds used in the 
research to make the material, and base controls on all of those. 
Throughout the work to recover the radioactive elements or return the 
material to a more desirable form for reuse, a number of important safety 
considerations must be made. These may involve controls associated 
with: 




 Freeze drying 
 Bubbling 
 Evaporating 
Each of these methods has its own requirements for safety that may add 
a degree of complexity to the determination of the total hazard associated 
with the recovery. If there is a degree of concern for strong energetic 
release from a mixture, then consult a senior member of the research 
group or do a test with a small mass of material before using a larger 
mass. 
PLANNING 
An evaluation of the material to be recovered should be completed to 
ensure that adequate control measures have been implemented to 
provide for the safety of personnel and the facility. Radiation, chemical, 
and basic safety must all be considered as part of your plan to recover 
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the material. The following safety levels are as defined in the UNLV Risk 
Assessment and Control Guideline for Radioactive Materials.  
The degree of authorization should be commensurate with the 
importance of the resulting damage should something deviate from the 
desired outcome. Conditions for including the authorization to proceed 










LEVEL I – User Authorization 
The dose equivalent rate at working distance from the material is less than 
0.01 mSv/hour, and the limiting activity fraction for level 1 is less than 1. 
This level is appropriate for general laboratory conditions where the risk to 
all personnel is low and typical of most work in the laboratories where the 
safety of personnel is trusted to the researcher. 
LEVEL II – User Authorization 
The dose equivalent rate at working distance from the material is less than 
0.1 mSv/hour, and the limiting activity fraction for level 2 is less than 1. 
This level would be appropriate for laboratory conditions where the risk to 
all personnel is low and typical of most hazardous work in the laboratories 
where the safety of personnel is trusted to the Authorized User. 
LEVEL III – Radiation Safety Officer Authorization 
The dose equivalent rate at working distance from the material is less than 
1 mSv/hour, and the limiting activity fraction for level 3 is less than 1. 
This level would be appropriate for laboratory conditions where the risk to 
all personnel is elevated and not typical of work in the laboratories. In 
these situations, which are rare, participation of the radiation safety staff 
is important in planning the experiment and the attendance by a member 
of the Radiation Safety Office may be considered necessary. In this 
situation it is considered appropriate to minimize the number of personnel 
working in the lab who may be affected by the operation. 
LEVEL IV - Radiation Safety Committee Authorization 
The dose equivalent rate at working distance from the material is less than 
1 mSv/hour, and the limiting activity fraction for level 4 is less than 1. 
This level would be appropriate for laboratory conditions where the risk to 
all personnel is elevated and not typical of work in the laboratories. In 
these situations, which not anticipated, participation of the radiation 
safety committee is important in planning the experiment and attendance 
by a member of the Radiation Safety Office is necessary. In this type of 
situation, the laboratory is restricted to only personnel who are involved in 
the experiment, and that number should be limited. 
 
Table  B-27 - Controls for Recovery of Radionuclides from Residues 
 353 
 
DOSE RATE CONTROLS 
For beta and gamma emitting radionuclides, there may be a 
consideration for the shallow or deep dose equivalent rates. If the 
consideration is primarily for beta radiation, then a plexiglass shield 
between the researcher and the material will probably be adequate. This 
type of shield is also appropriate for protection from splattering, 
splashing, or flying debris and may protect a researcher from caustic or 
thermal burns. 
For gamma emitters, an important consideration is the energy of the 
gamma emissions, a simple method to determine the thickness of 
shielding required to lower the dose rate is the use of a chart similar to 
Table B-1. If the dose rate can be minimized by the use of shielding, that 
action should be taken without reducing the controls which would 
minimize inhalation or ingestion intake of the material. 
CONTROL LEVEL DETERMINATION 
Using the guidance of the UNLV Radiation Safety Office, the limiting 
activity fraction for each level would be as follows. If the Limiting ALI 
Fraction is not less than 1, then elevate to the next level: 
LFi(M) = Limiting ALI Fraction for radionuclide mixture M for Rad Level i*:  
 
          ∑(
  
   
)
 
   
 
EQUATION A-1 
* The limiting ALI for radionuclides of interest for each Rad Level at 
UNLV is shown on Tables B-3, B-4, and B-5: Risk Assessment and 
Control Guides for Radiochemistry Radionuclides. 
n = the index number for each radionuclide considered. 
An = the activity of radionuclide(n) that is in the residue. 
ALi = the limiting activity of radionuclide(n) for Rad Level i. 
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SF = A safety factor that may be based on minimizing the activity 
that will undergo heating, or bubbling. This factor would be a 
fraction of 1. 
SAFETY FACTOR 
The safety factor indicated in equation A-1 is added to the ALI fraction as 
a means of establishing a more limiting set of controls. At this time, while 
this concept is in its early stages, the values for safety factor (SF) 
presented in Table B-2. 
The establishment of a safety factor for any process that may cause the 
development of a hazard as a result of the radioactive material or another 
constituent of a solution or solid is simply a means to allow a stronger 
control to be applied. The assignment of such a factor may be made by a 
researcher, an Authorized User, or by Radiation Safety or Hazardous 
Material Safety Personnel based on their knowledge and experience in 
dealing with a specific material. 
As can be identified from the information in Table B-2, it is recognized 
that a temperature, degree of mixing or any process at which adverse 
reactions in unknown solutions will occur is of course unknown.  Thus 
inappropriately establishing a “safety” factor based on limited knowledge 
is undesirable. The researcher and their supervision should strive to 
apply a safety factor to prevent situations that will be hazardous to any 
person in a laboratory. They should use the information that they have 
about what went into a solution and what may have been created from 
environmental influences on the solution. 
Table B-2 establishes a minimum safety factor based on the simple fact 
that some tasks have an inherent hazard that cannot be avoided. When 
items are heated, or stirred, or bubbled, the possibility of contamination 
spread is higher than processes that will not cause a physical change to 
the solution. One process that could be considered benign to the solution 
might be storage unless other influences of heat or cold could affect the 
material or its container. 
Other considerations appropriate to the development of safety practices 
should also consider the extreme case where explosion or a significant 
release of radioactive material to the public could occur. In these cases, 
every effort should be taken to more accurately characterize the degree of 
hazard before processing the material. Processing a small quantity may 











Heating In heating, the concern is associated with 
causing the radioactive material to become 
airborne, splashing out of its container or 
causing emission of hazardous gas from the 
solution. Consider multiple factors for 
heating depending on the fraction of an 
important temperature (melting point, 
boiling point) for the material heated. If the 
possible outcome is simply a warming of the 
solution then the factor is lower. If the 
outcome could be volatilization or splashing, 
then the factor is higher. 





In mixing, the aggressiveness of mixing can 
be associated with improving the probability 
of a spill of liquids. The safety factor 
associated with slow mixing with a stir bar 
could be 0 and the safety factor associated 
with aggressive mixing in a blender or 
centrifuge could cause a serious spill of 
radioactive material if there is equipment 
failure. 
0.1 to 1.0 
Freeze 
Drying 
Freeze drying removes water and volatile 
liquids from a solution. Improper setup and 
use can cause sprays and spills of process 
materials or internal contamination of the 
freeze drier. If a positive outcome of freeze 
drying is known for a substance, then the 
safety factor of 0 is appropriate.  If there is 
the possibility that it may not go well 
consider a higher safety factor. 










Bubbling In bubbling a gas through a solution to get a 
reaction to occur, the bubbling will cause 
droplets of the solution to splash out of the 
container unless precautions are taken to 
avoid this. Bubbling without protection 
against splashing should not be done, 
however, if it cannot be avoided consider a 
higher safety factor. 
0.1 to 1.0 
Other 
processes 
This list considers only some of the 
processes that are used in the laboratory for 
separation of liquids and solids from liquids. 
Consider the hazard, if there is a likelihood 
of creating airborne activity or causing a 
spread of radioactive contamination, apply a 
safety factor appropriate to abate the 
hazard. 
0 to 1.0 
 
SAMPLE RECOVERY 
Consider use of 10 MBq of Am-241 and 15 MBq of Pu-239 for a recovery,  
Consider a safety factor of 0.1 because the material will be heated. 
A review of the Control Guidelines indicates that this material must be 
done in a glove box. 
Am-241 has a limiting activity at Level 4 of 29.6 MBq (Considering no 
airborne activity). Am-243 has the same limiting activity. 
Applying equation A-1, LFi(M) = 0.1 + 10/29.6 + 15/29.6 = 0.945 
Since LFi(M) is less than 1, the material can be recovered at RAD LEVEL 
IV, the dose equivalent rate at one meter from the material is: 




At RAD LEVEL IV, the recovery should be reviewed by the Authorized 
User with the RSO to ensure that adequate controls are established 
during the recovery. 
Other items that must be considered are training of personnel involved, 
documentation of the recovery, disposition of the waste produced, 
cleanup and contamination control surveys. 
 
METHODS 
This section provides some specific safety considerations that would 
depend on the specific methods that might be considered for a recovery. 
While these items are appropriate for safety associated with the selected 
process, they may not be the only safety measure that should be taken. 
Protective clothing for example, will only provide appropriate protection 
when it is intact. The researcher must make continuous observation of 
the process so that unexpected situations are readily identified and 
actions can be taken to provide protection. 
Analysis 
In analysis of materials, it is possibly more important to provide 
protection to the instrument so as to avoid damage. It is also important 
to recognize that many of these instruments operate on high voltage and 
may have very hot or cold surfaces. These three hazards are some of the 
most important to be aware of. Knowing the presence of the hazard is 
important, knowing how to protect yourself from it is more important. 
Review some of the methods that are used in the laboratory and the 





Table B-9 – Risk Assessment Guide for Radiochemistry – Level 1 & 2 




















Am-241 8.479E-05 4.921 4.173E-04 0.00037 3.137E-08 
Am-242m 4.950E-05 4.921 2.436E-04 0.00037 1.832E-08 
Am-243 8.456E-05 4.921 4.161E-04 0.00037 3.129E-08 
Ba-133 1.231E-04 0.10582 1.303E-05 25.9 3.188E-03 
Cd-109 4.983E-05 0.2775 1.383E-05 1.48 7.375E-05 
Cm-244 1.741E-05 3.7 6.442E-05 0.00037 6.442E-09 
Cm-248 1.227E-05 3.7 4.540E-05 0.000074 9.080E-10 
Co-57 4.087E-05 0.21127 8.635E-06 25.9 1.059E-03 
Co-60 3.703E-04 0.24679 9.139E-05 1.11 4.110E-04 
Cs-137 1.032E-04 0.0185 1.909E-06 3.7 3.818E-04 
Eu-152 2.012E-04 1.48 2.978E-04 0.74 1.489E-04 
Eu-154 2.042E-04 0.925 1.889E-04 0.74 1.511E-04 
Eu-155 1.804E-05 1.628 2.937E-05 3.33 6.007E-05 
Hf-175 6.443E-05 0.12321 7.938E-06 33.3 2.146E-03 
I-125 7.432E-05 0.02479 1.842E-06 1.48 1.100E-04 
Mn-54 1.382E-04 0.0925 1.278E-05 29.6 4.091E-03 
Na-22 3.620E-04 0.02479 8.974E-06 14.8 5.358E-03 
Np-237 1.251E-04 4.625 5.786E-04 0.000148 1.851E-08 
Pb-210 6.801E-05 0.00185 1.258E-07 0.037 2.516E-06 
Po-210 1.424E-09 0.185 2.634E-10 0.0222 3.161E-11 
Pu-236 2.405E-05 3.7 8.899E-05 0.00074 1.780E-08 
Pu-238 2.135E-05 4.773 1.019E-04 0.00037 7.900E-09 
Pu-239 8.145E-06 4.921 4.008E-05 0.00037 3.014E-09 
Pu-240 2.030E-05 4.921 9.990E-05 0.00037 7.511E-09 
Pu-241 NA 4.921   0.0111   
Pu-242 1.684E-05 4.218 7.103E-05 0.00037 6.231E-09 
Ra-226 3.274E-06 0.12321 4.034E-07 0.0222 7.268E-08 
Sb-125 1.028E-04 0.148 1.521E-05 18.5 1.902E-03 
Sr-85 2.052E-04 0.0555 1.139E-05 74 1.518E-02 
Sr-90 NA 0.2775   0.148 
 Tc-99 1.242E-10 0.21127 2.624E-11 25.9 3.217E-09 
Tc-99m 3.317E-05 0.0148 4.909E-07 2960 9.818E-02 
Th-229 1.989E-04 24.679 4.909E-03 0.000037 7.359E-09 
Th-230 1.861E-05 24.679 4.593E-04 0.00037 6.886E-09 
Th-232 1.848E-05 25.9 4.786E-04 0.000037 6.838E-10 
U-232 2.403E-05 9.25 2.223E-04 0.00037 8.891E-09 
U-233 7.866E-06 9.25 7.276E-05 0.00148 1.164E-08 
U-235 9.159E-05 9.25 8.472E-04 0.00148 1.356E-07 
U-238 1.763E-05 9.25 1.631E-04 0.00148 2.609E-08 
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Table B-10 - Risk Assessment Guide for Radiochemistry – Level 3 





















Am-241 8.479E-05 0.00000222 1.882E-10 0.0296 2.510E-06 
Am-242m 4.950E-05 0.00000222 1.099E-10 0.0296 1.465E-06 
Am-243 8.456E-05 0.00000222 1.877E-10 0.0296 2.503E-06 
Ba-133 1.231E-04 0.259 3.188E-05 74 9.109E-03 
Cd-109 4.983E-05 0.0148 7.375E-07 11.1 5.531E-04 
Cm-244 1.741E-05 0.0000037 6.442E-11 0.037 6.442E-07 
Cm-248 1.227E-05 0.00000074 9.080E-12 0.0074 9.080E-08 
Co-57 4.087E-05 0.259 1.059E-05 148 6.049E-03 
Co-60 3.703E-04 0.0111 4.110E-06 7.4 2.740E-03 
Cs-137 1.032E-04 0.037 3.818E-06 3.7 3.818E-04 
Eu-152 2.012E-04 0.0074 1.489E-06 29.6 5.956E-03 
Eu-154 2.042E-04 0.0074 1.511E-06 18.5 3.778E-03 
Eu-155 1.804E-05 0.0333 6.007E-07 148 2.670E-03 
Hf-175 6.443E-05 0.333 2.146E-05 111 7.152E-03 
I-125 7.432E-05 0.0148 1.100E-06 1.48 1.100E-04 
Mn-54 1.382E-04 0.296 4.091E-05 74 1.023E-02 
Na-22 3.620E-04 0.148 5.358E-05 14.8 5.358E-03 
Np-237 1.251E-04 0.00000148 1.851E-10 0.0185 2.314E-06 
Pb-210 6.801E-05 0.00037 2.516E-08 0.037 2.516E-06 
Po-210 1.424E-09 0.000222 3.161E-13 0.111 1.581E-10 
Pu-236 2.405E-05 0.0000074 1.780E-10 0.074 1.780E-06 
Pu-238 2.135E-05 0.00000259 5.530E-11 0.0333 7.110E-07 
Pu-239 8.145E-06 0.00000222 1.808E-11 0.0296 2.411E-07 
Pu-240 2.030E-05 0.00000222 4.507E-11 0.0296 6.009E-07 
Pu-241 NA 0.000111 
 
1.48 
 Pu-242 1.684E-05 0.00000259 4.362E-11 0.0296 4.985E-07 
Ra-226 3.274E-06 0.000222 7.268E-10 0.074 2.423E-07 
Sb-125 1.028E-04 0.185 1.902E-05 74 7.607E-03 
Sr-85 2.052E-04 0.74 1.518E-04 111 2.278E-02 
Sr-90 NA 0.00148 
 
1.11 
 Tc-99 1.242E-10 0.259 3.217E-11 148 1.838E-08 
Tc-99m 3.317E-05 1.85 6.136E-05 185 6.136E-03 
Th-229 1.989E-04 0.000000333 6.623E-11 0.0222 4.416E-06 
Th-230 1.861E-05 0.00000222 4.131E-11 0.148 2.754E-06 
Th-232 1.848E-05 0.00000037 6.838E-12 0.0259 4.786E-07 
U-232 2.403E-05 0.00000296 7.113E-11 0.074 1.778E-06 
U-233 7.866E-06 0.0000148 1.164E-10 0.37 2.910E-06 
U-235 9.159E-05 0.0000148 1.356E-09 0.37 3.389E-05 




Table B-11 - Risk Assessment Guide for Radiochemistry – Level 4 





















Am-241 8.479E-05 1.48 1.255E-04 0.0111 9.412E-07 
Am-242m 4.950E-05 1.48 7.326E-05 0.0111 5.495E-07 
Am-243 8.456E-05 1.48 1.251E-04 0.0111 9.386E-07 
Ba-133 1.231E-04 1850 2.277E-01 1295 1.594E-01 
Cd-109 4.983E-05 1850 9.219E-02 74 3.687E-03 
Cm-244 1.741E-05 1.85 3.221E-05 0.0185 3.221E-07 
Cm-248 1.227E-05 0.37 4.540E-06 0.0037 4.540E-08 
Co-57 4.087E-05 1850 7.561E-02 1295 5.293E-02 
Co-60 3.703E-04 1850 6.851E-01 55.5 2.055E-02 
Cs-137 1.032E-04 1850 1.909E-01 185 1.909E-02 
Eu-152 2.012E-04 1850 3.722E-01 37 7.444E-03 
Eu-154 2.042E-04 1850 3.778E-01 37 7.555E-03 
Eu-155 1.804E-05 1850 3.337E-02 166.5 3.004E-03 
Hf-175 6.443E-05 1850 1.192E-01 1665 1.073E-01 
I-125 7.432E-05 74 5.500E-03 74 5.500E-03 
Mn-54 1.382E-04 1850 2.557E-01 1480 2.045E-01 
Na-22 3.620E-04 1850 6.697E-01 740 2.679E-01 
Np-237 1.251E-04 0.925 1.157E-04 0.0074 9.257E-07 
Pb-210 6.801E-05 1.85 1.258E-04 1.85 1.258E-04 
Po-210 1.424E-09 5.55 7.903E-09 1.11 1.581E-09 
Pu-236 2.405E-05 3.7 8.899E-05 0.037 8.899E-07 
Pu-238 2.135E-05 1.665 3.555E-05 0.01295 2.765E-07 
Pu-239 8.145E-06 1.48 1.205E-05 0.0111 9.041E-08 
Pu-240 2.030E-05 1.48 3.004E-05 0.0111 2.253E-07 
Pu-241 NA 74 
 
0.555 
 Pu-242 1.684E-05 1.48 2.492E-05 0.01295 2.181E-07 
Ra-226 3.274E-06 3.7 1.211E-05 1.11 3.634E-06 
Sb-125 1.028E-04 1850 1.902E-01 925 9.509E-02 
Sr-85 2.052E-04 1850 3.796E-01 1850 3.796E-01 
Sr-90 NA 55.5 
 
7.4 
 Tc-99 1.242E-10 1850 2.298E-07 1295 1.608E-07 
Tc-99m 3.317E-05 1850 6.136E-02 1850 6.136E-02 
Th-229 1.989E-04 1.11 2.208E-04 0.00185 3.680E-07 
Th-230 1.861E-05 7.4 1.377E-04 0.0111 2.066E-07 
Th-232 1.848E-05 1.295 2.393E-05 0.00185 3.419E-08 
U-232 2.403E-05 3.7 8.891E-05 0.0148 3.556E-07 
U-233 7.866E-06 18.5 1.455E-04 0.074 5.821E-07 
U-235 9.159E-05 18.5 1.694E-03 0.074 6.778E-06 




Table B-12 – A Sample of Possible Equipment Hazards in Laboratories 
Method Equipment Hazard 
Analysis Atomic Emission Spectroscopy High voltage 
  Hot surfaces 
  Gasses – Asphyxiates - Ar 
  Gasses - Toxic 
  Laser reflections 
  Sample handling - liquids 
 Mass Spectroscopy High voltage 
  Hot surfaces 
  Gasses – Asphyxiates - Ar 
  Gasses - Toxic 
  Laser 
  Sample handling - liquids 
  High Vacuum 
 Gamma Spectroscopy High voltage 
  Cold surfaces - LN 
  Sample handling - liquids 
  Gasses – Asphyxiates 
 Alpha Spectroscopy Vacuum 
  Airborne materials* 
 Laser Spectroscopy Airborne materials* 
  Laser reflections* 
 UV Vis Photospectroscopy UV Exposure* 
  Sample handling - liquids 
  Gasses – Asphyxiates 
 FT/iR Photospectroscopy IR Exposure* 
  Sample handling - liquids 
  Gasses – Asphyxiates 
 Liquid Scintillation Counting Hazardous cocktails* 
  Sample handling - liquids 
  Contamination control 
 Alpha/Beta Counting High Voltage 
  Flammable gasses – CH4 
  Gasses – Asphyxiates - Ar 
  Contamination control 
 Transmission Electron Microscope High Voltage 
  X-ray emissions 
  High Vacuum 
  Contamination control 
 Scanning Electron Microscope High Voltage 
  X-ray emissions 
  Contamination control 
 X-Ray Diffraction Spectroscopy High Voltage 
  High dose rates 
 X-Ray Fluorescence High Voltage 




Method Equipment Hazard 
Sample Preparation 
Heating Furnace High voltage 
  Hot surfaces 
  Gasses – Asphyxiates, Toxic 
 Hot Plate High voltage 
  Hot surfaces 
 Oven High voltage 
  Hot surfaces 
 Arc Furnace High voltage 
  Hot surfaces 
  IR Exposure* 
  Airborne materials* 
 Reactor High voltage 
  Hot surfaces 
  High Pressures 
Cooling Chilling in Dry Ice Cold Surfaces 
  Gasses – Asphyxiates – CO2 
 Refrigeration and Chiller Operations Cold Surfaces 
  Liquid under pressure 
 Gas Flow Gasses – Asphyxiates 
  Gas under pressure 
 Flowing Liquid Coolant Cold Surfaces 
  Liquid under pressure 
  Electrical hazard 
Other Freeze Drying Cold Surfaces 
  Contamination Control 
  Vacuum 
 Dissolution Caustic liquids 
  Contamination Control 
 Dilution Contamination Control 
 Filtration Dose Rate Increase 
  Liquids under pressure 
 Stirring Contamination Control 
  Spill Potential 
 Ball Mill Contamination Control 
  Heavy moving parts 
 Caustic Bath Contamination Control 
  Serious Spill Danger 
 Pellet Pressing Contamination Control 
  Airborne Activity Hazard 
 Polishing Contamination Control 
  Airborne Activity Hazard 
 Grinding Contamination Control 




Appendix E - Data from Experiments for Radionuclide Recovery 
 
 This appendix provides the data for experiments done to recover 
99Tc from residue in solutions that were no longer useful to the research 
for which they were created. The data for each experiment was collected 
as it was determined whether the activity in each solution was 
substantial enough to provide a useful recovery and as the process 
continued once the decision was made that it would be valuable. The 
data is primarily in a form that was devised to provide for consistent data 
collection. Important information about each residue was collected in as 
simple a way as possible to minimize costs. The result of this evaluation 
is a mechanism that is applicable to residues from laboratory 
experiments and provides a low cost method to determine desirability of 




Residue Numbers 12-27-10-1 and 12-27-10-2 
 Residues #12-27-10-1 and #12-27-10-2 have a relatively low 
technetium concentration and limit the mass of 99Tc available for 
recovery. With less than 1 mg of 99Tc each, these samples are low volume 
and can be solidified for waste. Recovery of 99Tc from these samples is 
noted as not recommended.  Samples were absorbed into contamination 












UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form 
 
Residue Number: #12-27-10-1 & #12-27-10-2 
Date of Storage: Unknown 
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended?  (Yes☐, No☒) 
Volume of solution: 100 + 200 mL Solution pH: unknown 
Radionuclide (1): 99Tc; Mass (1) = 7.28E-1 mg; Act. (1) = 0.5 MBq 
Radionuclide (2): 99Tc; Mass (2) = 1.72E-1 mg; Act. (2) = 0.1 MBq  
Chemical compound(s): 1 – TBP-TcO4 
Chemical compound(s): 2 – Dark liquid/No label 
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐ 
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒ 
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is 
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as 
radioactive waste?  (Yes☒, No☐, N/A☐) 












Residue Number 12-27-10-3 
 Residue #12-27-10-3 was labeled “Organic liquids containing Pu & 
U”, and the matrix was indicated as n-dodecane. The activity appeared 
low from the LSC analyses, but this may be a “desirable recovery effort” 
since there were no other solutions containing these radionuclides. The 
residue was a light brown liquid and had no film on the inside of the 125 












UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form 
 
Residue Number: #12-27-10-3 
Date of Storage: Unknown 
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☐, No☒) 
Volume of solution: 30 mL Solution pH: 5 
Radionuclide (1): 239Pu; Mass (1) = 1.49E-2 mg; Act. (1) <0.1 MBq 
Chemical compound(s): Contained both Pu & U in n-dodecane 
Chemical compound(s): CAS 112-40-3 
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐ 
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒ 
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is 
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as 
radioactive waste?  (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒) 




 The sample had no color on the filter. The dispersion continued to 
the extent of the filter and there was no ring around the dispersion. This 
indicated that the material was not very volatile, not very viscous, and 
did not have many visible particles in the mixture. The portable 
instrument response from this residue was similar to background and a 





Residue Number 12-27-10-4 
 Residue #12-27-10-4 initially contained 800 mL of an unidentified 











 If the material was homogeneous in this solution, then it would 
have a concentration of approximately 2.7 mg/mL. This sample had 
great recovery potential and could be the source used for collection of 
data for several recovery techniques for 99Tc. There was no film on the 
inside of the container and a strong odor of ammonia emanated from the 
container. The sample was colorless on the filter. The dispersion 
continued to an ellipse of 4.5 cm by 4 cm, without a ring around the 
ellipse perimeter, and it evaporated relatively quickly. This information 
UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form 
Residue Number: # 12-27-10-4 
Date of Storage: Unknown 
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Volume of solution: 800 mL Solution pH: 3 
Radionuclide (1): 99Tc; Mass (1) = 2.15E+03 mg; Act. (1) =1350 MBq 
Chemical compound(s): Organic Acid, light brown in color  
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐ 
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒ 
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is 
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as 
radioactive waste?  (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒) 




indicated that the material was more volatile, not very viscous, and did 




Residue Number 12-27-10-5 
 Residue #12-27-10-5 was 300 mL of organic solvent containing an 
estimated 1.75 grams of 99Tc in solution. The solution appears to be 
homogeneous, and has a concentration of approximately 5.8 mg of 
99Tc/mL. This sample had great recovery potential and could also be a 
source used for collection of data for several recovery techniques. There 












UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form 
 
Residue Number: #12-27-10-5 
Date of Storage: Unknown 
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Volume of solution: 300 mL Solution pH: 3 
Radionuclide (1): 99Tc; Mass (1) = 1.75E+3 mg; Act. (1) = 1100 MBq 
Chemical compound(s): Organic, dark brown colored liquid 
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐ 
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒ 
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is 
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as 
radioactive waste?  (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒) 




The sample color on the filter paper was light brown. The dispersion 
continued to an ellipse of 4.8 cm by 6 cm with no visible ring. This 
information indicated that the material was volatile, not very viscous, 
and did not have many visible particles in the mixture.  
 
Residue Number 12-27-10-6 
 373 
 
Residue #12-27-10-6 was labeled as an unspecified organic acid. 
Because of its small volume, 30 mL, and small black particles in the 
liquid, it was decided to filter the residue to see if this separation could 
be simple. The residue was filtered through a paper filter into a 250 mL 
beaker, which was then washed with 100 mL of a 0.1 M potassium 
chloride solution and allowed to settle for 24 hours. This was a simple 
attempt to observe the effect of a salt on the solution. No other salts were 
tested in this fashion. 
After this treatment, several black specks were observed to be on 
the bottom of the beaker with several white crystals, when counted 
separately from each other, the highest response on a Geiger counter was 
from the black specs, possibly a compound containing 99Tc. A 50 mL 
sample of 3% H2O2 was added to the beaker to assist oxidation of any 
other 99Tc in solution. The KCl salt dissolved and the black particles 
containing the majority of the 99Tc stayed at the bottom of the beaker, 
they did not dissolve. The mixture was transferred into two centrifuge 
tubes and a small volume of the mixture containing the 99Tc residue was 
removed by transfer pipette into a conical bottom 5 mL glass tube. This 
recovery caused collection of approximately 10 mg of the 99Tc compound. 
With an estimated 47 mg available from LSC analysis, the recovery was 
21.3% and considered successful. While this is not a drastic quantity of 
99Tc, the technique was simple, the cost was only the time required to 
filter the solution and wash the filter, and the cost of chemicals was less 
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than $1.00. The dispersion information indicated that the material was 










UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form 
Residue Number: #12-27-10-6 
Date of Storage: Unknown 
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Volume of solution: 25 mL Solution pH: unknown 
Radionuclide (1): 99Tc; Mass (1) = 4.70E+1 mg; Act. (1) = 29.5 MBq 
Chemical compound(s): Organic acid, black suspended particles, 
light brown liquid 
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐ 
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒ 
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is 
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as 
radioactive waste?  (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒) 
Notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office?  (Yes☐, No☒) 
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Residue Number 12-27-10-7 
 Residue #12-27-10-7 was labeled organic waste. The activity 
identified by LSC analysis indicated an approximate 99Tc mass of 1.58 











 The dispersion continued to a 5 cm by 5.4 cm ellipse with a 
slightly darker ring around the dispersion. This experiment indicated 
that the material was volatile and did not have many visible particles in 
the mixture. The emissions measured from the filter by portable 
instrument indicated an approximate activity of 5x107 Bq/mL or a total 
activity in the container of 8x108 Bq in the container. This indicates an 
UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form 
 
Residue Number: #12-27-10-7 
Date of Storage: Unknown 
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Volume of solution: 125 mL Solution pH: unknown  
Radionuclide (1): 99Tc; Mass (1) = 1.58E+3 mg; Act. (1) = 992 MBq 
Chemical compound(s): Organic waste, light brown liquid 
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐ 
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒ 
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is 
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as 
radioactive waste?  (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒) 




approximate mass of 99Tc of 1.27 grams and is reasonably consistent 





Residue Number 12-27-10-8 
 Residue # 12-27-10-8, by discussion with the researcher [116], 
was found to be a 99Tc2S7 compound. While the results from samples in 
this study may not be similar in ease or cost, each can be concluded with 














UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form 
 
Residue Number: #12-27-10-8 
Date of Storage: Unknown 
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☐, No☒) 
Volume of solution: 100 mL Solution pH: unknown 
Radionuclide(1): 99Tc; Mass (1) = 1.11E+1 mg; Act. (1) = 6.9 MBq 
Chemical compound(s): Black viscous solid by design 
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐ 
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒ 
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is 
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as 
radioactive waste?  (Yes☐, No☒, N/A☐) 




 With regard to this particular sample, the residue was found to be 
a compound mixture, which created a black viscous mass having the 
property of easily drying to a solid and being available for disposal as a 
solid waste. In the previously referenced discussion with the researcher, 
he indicated this to be a product that is not easy to break down. 
Although this product (99Tc2S7) is easily made, it presents very low 
recovery potential and therefore is an undesirable step in a recovery 
process. It may be a useful waste form for technetium isotopes [19]. The 
recovery potential for this material was considered to be low because of 
the particulate matter that was present in the waste. The compound 
became a tar-like solid mass in the container. This material was disposed 







Residue Number 12-27-10-9 
Residue #12-27-10-9 had a mass concentration of 99Tc similar to 











This sample also did not represent an opportunity to regain a 
significant quantity of material and was therefore excluded from the 
recovery experiments. The material was absorbed into a contamination 
control pad, allowed to dry, and disposed of as solid radioactive waste. 
  
UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form 
 
Residue Number: #12-27-10-9 
Date of Storage: Unknown 
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☐, No☒) 
Volume of solution: 400 mL Solution pH: unknown  
Radionuclide(1): 99Tc; Mass (1) = 5.12E+1 mg; Act. (1) = 32.1MBq 
Chemical compound(s): H2O matrix 
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐ 
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒ 
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is 
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as 
radioactive waste? (Yes☐, No☒, N/A☐) 








Residue Number 12-27-10-10 
Residue #12-27-10-10 was labeled, “FP waste 5/5/06”. With a 
















 There was no film on the inside of the container. The sample color 
on the filter paper was pale green. The dispersion continued to an ellipse 
of 6.2 cm by 7 cm and with no ring. Figure 3-3 provides a photograph of 
the dispersion experiment for this sample. Based on the filter dispersion, 
the mixture was likely to contain a volatile fluid. As shown in Figure 3-3, 
UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form 
 
Residue Number: #12-27-10-10 
Date of Storage: Unknown 
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Volume of solution: 200 mL Solution pH: 0 
Radionuclide(1): 99Tc; Mass (1) = 7.92E+2 mg;  Act. (1) = 497 MBq 
Chemical compound(s): Dark brown colored liquid 
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐ 
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒ 
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is 
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as 
radioactive waste? (Yes☐, No☒, N/A☐) 




the response rate from the activity on the filter indicates a rough activity 
of 1.2x106 dpm (2x104 Bq). This relates to an activity concentration of 
2x105 Bq/mL or for the 800 mL volume, a total activity of 16.4 MBq, 
approximately 3% of the activity determined from LSC analysis. In the 
determination of the activity on the filter, a detection efficiency of 30% 
was assumed. This appears to be much higher than appropriate for 






Residue Number 12-27-10-11 
Residue #12-27-10-11 did not represent an opportunity to regain a 
significant quantity of material, so recovery of 99Tc from this sample is 
not feasible. The residue was neutralized using NaOH to a pH of 9 and 
solidified using Aquaset II a commercial solidification agent Invalid 
source specified.Invalid source specified. to make an immobile 











UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form 
 
Residue Number: # 12-27-10-11 
Date of Storage: Unknown 
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☐, No☒) 
Volume of solution: 300 mL Solution pH: unknown  
Radionuclide (1): 99Tc; Mass (1) = 5.85E+0 mg; Act. (1) = 3.7 MBq 
Chemical compound(s): None 
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐ 
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒ 
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is 
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as 
radioactive waste?  (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒) 







Residue Number 12-27-10-12 
Residue #12-27-10-12, an unlabeled sample, with a mass 
concentration of approximately 1.4 mg/mL was potentially a good 
reclamation. There was a thick orange film on the inside of the container. 
On the filter paper the sample color was light green. The dispersion 
continued to an ellipse of 6.2 cm by 7 cm and with no discernible 














   
  
UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form 
 
Residue Number: #12-27-10-12 
Date of Storage: Unknown 
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Volume of solution: 800 mL Solution pH: 0 
Radionuclide (1): 99Tc; Mass (1) = 1.12E+3 mg; Act. (1) = 704 MBq 
Chemical compound(s): Orange colored liquid 
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐ 
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒ 
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is 
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as 
radioactive waste?  (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒) 








Residue Number 12-27-10-13 
Residue #12-27-10-13, a labeled sample (“Tc waste organic 
liquids”) with a mass concentration of approximately 1.2 mg/mL, had an 
estimated recovery quantity at almost 600 mg and presented an excellent 
opportunity for reclamation. There was no dispersion data for this 
sample and all subsequent samples because it was felt that the data 
already collected was sufficient to allow a decision for recovery. There 












UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form 
 
Residue Number: # 12-27-10-13 
Date of Storage: Unknown 
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Volume of solution: 500 mL Solution pH: unknown 
Radionuclide (1): 99Tc; Mass (1) = 5.91E+2 mg; Act. (1) = 370 MBq 
Chemical compound(s): Tc waste organic liquids, dark brown 
colored liquid 
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐ 
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒ 
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is 
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as 
radioactive waste?  (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒) 




Residue Number 12-27-10-14 
Residue #12-27-10-14 was also a labeled (“Tc waste in H2O, NOx 
11/15/2010 NF”) sample with a mass concentration of approximately 1.3 
mg/mL, this sample was determined to be a good candidate for 















UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form 
 
Residue Number: # 12-27-10-14 
Date of Storage: Unknown 
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Volume of solution: 200 mL Solution pH: unknown 
Radionuclide (1): 99Tc; Mass (1) = 2.62E-2 mg; Act. (1) = 164 MBq 
Chemical compound(s): Tc waste in H2O, NOx 11/15/2010 NF, 
dark brown liquid 
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐ 
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒ 
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is 
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as 
radioactive waste?  (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒) 





Residue Number 12-27-10-15 
Residue #12-27-10-15 was also a labeled (“0.5 g of 99Tc in organic 
acid”) sample with a mass concentration of approximately 4.4 mg/mL; 
this sample was determined to be a good candidate for reclamation. 
















UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form 
 
Residue Number: # 12-27-10-15 
Date of Storage: Unknown 
Has a value analysis been completed?  (Yes☒, No☐) 
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended?  (Yes☒, No☐) 
Volume of solution: 500 mL Solution pH: unknown 
Radionuclide (1): 99Tc; Mass (1) = 2.18E+3 mg; Act. (1) =1370 MBq 
Chemical compound(s): 0.5g of Tc in organic acid, dark brown 
liquid 
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐ 
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒ 
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is 
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as 
radioactive waste?  (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒) 




Residue Numbers 12-27-10-16 and 12-27-10-17 
Residues #12-27-10-16 and #12-27-10-17 were considered 
reasonable for recovery based on their concentrations, 0.48 mg/ml and 
0.473 mg/ml respectively. Both samples were listed on the same form as 




















UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form 
 
Residue Number: #12-27-10-16 & #12-27-10-17 
Date of Storage: Unknown 
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐) 
Volume of solution: 50 + 450 mL Solution pH: unknown 
Radionuclide (1): 99Tc; Mass (1) = 2.38E+1 mg; Act. (1) = 14 MBq 
Radionuclide (2): 99Tc; Mass (2) = 2.13E+2 mg; Act. (2) = 133 MBq  
Chemical compound(s): 1 – No notation 
Chemical compound(s): 2 – No notation 
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐ 
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒ 
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is 
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as 
radioactive waste?  (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒) 
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